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Social protection aims to protect individuals against negative income shocks 
and to reduce poverty and inequality. In developed economies, no less 
than 20-30% of GDP is spent on social protection, such as pensions, public 
expenditure on health and benefits targeted at the elderly, unemployed, 
disabled, sick, families and the poor. In order to ensure that these 
expenditures are well-targeted and cost-efficient, we need to know the 
economic effects of social protection.
This thesis studies a number of the intended effects and potential adverse 
effects that social protection may have. It contains four empirical studies 
that answer the following questions. Are mandatory activation programs 
for young welfare recipients reducing the number of individuals Not in 
Employment, Education or Training (NEETs) during a severe economic 
recession? To what extent are income losses caused by unemployment 
shocks compensated by increases in earnings from the spouse? Does a right 
to social security in the constitution have an impact on social expenditure? 
How are different social expenditure types related to poverty, inequality 
and GDP growth? Altogether, this book considers the welfare state from 
different perspectives, with a focus on both the redistributive effects and the 
employment effects of social protection.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This study is part of 
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In developed economies, between 20% and 30% of GDP is spent on
pensions, health care and benefits targeted at the elderly, unemployed,
disabled, sick, families and the poor. In order to spend these amounts
well-targeted and cost efficient, we need to know the economic effects
of social protection. On the one hand, we have to find out whether the
intended goals of social protection are achieved, such as the extent to
which social insurance protects individuals against income shocks. On
the other hand, social protection may also come with adverse behavioral
effects, such as reduced job search effort caused by welfare benefits.
This thesis contributes to the literature by both studying some of
the intended effects and some of the potential adverse effects. We start
this introduction with a brief overview of the aims of social insurance
and social protection more broadly, after which we describe some of the
adverse behavioral effects that social protection may have. We next relate
these positive and negative effects of social protection to the outcome
variables that are studied in this PhD thesis.
Social insurance aims at protecting individuals against negative income
shocks caused by unemployment, disability, sickness and old age (Barr
2012). In principle, this is welfare enhancing because individuals are risk
averse and there is uncertainty about individuals’ future income. Risk
aversion implies that an increase in income risk lowers expected utility,
because of diminishing marginal utility of consumption.1 Social insurance
helps to smooth income over the life cycle and over ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states
and thereby reduces risks and increases lifetime utility. This is especially
1Diminishing marginal utility of consumption means that the utility that individuals
derive from products and services decreases when they consume more and more of it.
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2 Introduction Chapter 1
true for liquidity constrained individuals, who have less possibilities
to smooth consumption (Chetty 2008), and for individuals with time-
inconsistent present-biased preferences, who save too little (Thaler and
Shefrin 1981). Furthermore, social insurance may increase welfare because
people are loss averse (e.g. Kahneman et al. (1991)) and social insurance
reduces income losses.2
When taking a broader perspective, social protection also aims at reduc-
ing poverty and inequality and in some cases at increasing employment
(Barr 2012). Reducing poverty and inequality may increase welfare and
productivity among poor people (Baldacci et al. 2008; Cingano 2014; OECD
2014). Moreover, reducing inequality is expected to decrease rent-seeking
behavior (Stiglitz 2012).3 Further, social protection spending increases
macroeconomic stability and by reducing inequality it may also increase
political and social stability (Rodrik 1999; Kumhof et al. 2015). Finally,
social protection may induce positive behavioral effects. Income security
may increase risk taking, investments and thereby productivity (Acemoglu
and Shimer 2000; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001).
Social protection can also provoke adverse behavioral effects. Social
protection systems shift part of the costs associated with certain behavior
(e.g. risk taking) to others. This generates a discrepancy between the
individual costs and benefits and the social costs and benefits. Individuals
tend to choose too much leisure (or consumption) from a social perspective
when part of the costs of leisure (or consumption) are borne by others
(Chetty 2008; Chetty and Finkelstein 2013). This inefficient behavior is
called moral hazard. Examples of moral hazard caused by social protection
are: decreases in job search efforts because of unemployment benefits (e.g.
Krueger and Meyer (2002)) and opting out of employment because of
early retirement benefits (e.g. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013)). Another
distortionary effect arises from taxes that are needed to finance the welfare
2Loss aversion refers to people’s tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring
equivalent gains.
3Rent-seeking refers to resources spent (by the rich) on increasing one’s share of
existing wealth without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic
efficiency through poor allocation of resources, reduced actual wealth-creation, lost
government revenue and increased income inequality (Stiglitz 2012).
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state. These taxes can reduce labour supply and private investments,
which might lead to lower output.
In this thesis, we study both the achievement of some of the intended
goals of social protection as well as some potential negative behavioral
effects provoked by social protection.4 We consider the following variables
for studying the effectiveness of social protection: the number of NEETs
(not in employment, education or training), social assistance coverage, dif-
ferent sources of compensation for wage losses caused by unemployment
shocks (including within-household insurance), and poverty and inequal-
ity at an aggregated level. For studying potential adverse effects induced
by social protection, we consider the effects on employment outcomes and
on economic growth. In addition, we study how a constitutional right to
social security is related to different kinds of social expenditure.
All together, we consider the welfare state from different perspectives,
with a focus on both the redistributing effect of social protection and the
employment effects of social protection. In the second and third chapter,
we employ quasi-experimental methods using micro panel data from the
Netherlands. In the fourth and fifth chapter, we use aggregated OECD
panel data to perform international comparative research. The chapters
can be read independently and all contain an extensive introduction.
This introductory chapter aims to summarize the motivations, research
questions, and outcomes of the four chapters.
Chapter 2: Preventing NEETs 1.1
Young individuals not in employment, education or training (NEETs) are
a major policy concern, in particular during periods of recession. In line
with this, NEETs are a prime concern for the European Commission (Car-
cillo et al. 2015). This increased policy attention for reducing the number
of NEETs is accompanied with a trend towards stricter conditions for re-
4The effectiveness and efficiency should of course not be the only criteria by which
a social protection system should be judged. Justice and fairness, public support,
consistency within the legal framework and the social contract are other considerations
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ceiving welfare benefits, via e.g. the imposition of job search requirements
and/or by making welfare benefits receipt conditional on participation in
so-called work-learn programs.
In chapter 2, we study the effects of a mandatory activation program for
young individuals on the NEETs rate during a severe economic recession.
Specifically, we study the WIJ (Wet Investeren in Jongeren, Work Investment
Act for Young Individuals) reform, introduced in the Netherlands at the
end of 2009, just after the start of the Great Recession. The reform targeted
individuals up to and including 26 years of age. The goal of the WIJ
reform was to reduce the number of young NEETS. To this end, welfare
benefits were made conditional on participation in ‘work-learn programs’.
This chapter aims to answer the question: “What is the effect of a manda-
tory activation program for young individuals on the NEETs rate during a severe
economic recession?" We consider the effects of the WIJ reform on key out-
come variables: NEETs claiming welfare benefits, NEETs not claiming
welfare benefits, the overall NEETs rate, the employment rate and the
enrollment rate in education.
We use differences-in-differences and regression discontinuity and the
large administrative dataset Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel)
of Statistics Netherlands (2015) to estimate the causal effects of the WIJ
reform. The Labour Market Panel tracks 1.2 million individuals over the
period 1999-2012 and contains a large set of labour market outcomes and a
large number of individual and household characteristics. We consider the
treatment effect for three different age groups, 20-22, 23-24 and 25-26 years
of age, while our base control group consists of individuals 27-28 years of
age. A key challenge in the empirical analysis is to control for potentially
different time effects between the treatment and control groups, due to
e.g. differential trends or different business cycle responses (Bell and
Blanchflower 2011). In our preferred specification we therefore include
demographic controls, a full set of unemployment-age dummies, age-
specific trends and control-specific trends. We also present an extensive
placebo analysis, including placebo treatment dummies for the years just




Section 1.2 Chapter 3: The Added Worker effect 5
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the reform had a
statistically significant large negative effect on the number of young NEETs
claiming welfare benefits of –24% in the age group 25-26 years of age, the
only treatment group that passes all the placebo tests. Second, the reform
had only a small and statistically insignificant effect on the total number of
NEETs. The reform pushed young individuals out of welfare, but did not
increase the number of young individuals in employment or education.
We argue that this is likely to be due to the state of the business cycle, as
the reform clashed head on with the start of the Great Recession. During
these years it was hard for people, in particular young individuals, to find
a job. Third, our analysis shows that controlling for differential trends in
a differences-in-differences analysis may be important for some outcome
variables, like the enrollment rate in education, when studying a reform
that targets young individuals and using somewhat older individuals
as a control group. Finally, we show that standard pre-reform placebo
treatment dummies may fail to reject the common time effects assumption.
Chapter 3: The Added Worker effect 1.2
Since the start of the Great Recession, policymakers and academics have
shown increased interest in the effect of unemployment shocks on the
labour supply of partners of the unemployed workers– also known as
added worker effects (henceforth AWE). The empirical literature generally
finds the AWE to be small, see e.g. Hardoy and Schøne (2014), Halla et al.
(2018) and Bredtmann et al. (2018) for recent contributions. Two pertaining
questions are whether the AWE has become more important in the years
following the onset of the Great Recession and whether the AWE declined
over time as the female participation rate increased (leaving less space for
increases in labour supply).
Chapter 3 answers the question: “How did the Added Worker Effect
change over time and over the business cycle in the Netherlands during the period
2003-2015?" To shed more light on the relation between the AWE and
the business cycle, we study the AWE for women whose male partner
became unemployed in the years before and during the Great Recession.
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This chapter assesses the importance of the AWE for the updated ‘Labour
Market Panel’ of Statistics Netherlands (2017). The updated Labour Market
Panel tracks the labour market outcomes of 1.8 million individuals for the
period 1999-2015, as well as their social security records.
Our research strategy compares households with male partners who
became unemployed to households with male partners that remained
employed in a given year. Using a differences-in-differences setup with
individual fixed effects, we estimate the impact of male partner’s unem-
ployment shock in a particular year on the earnings of both partners,
the employment of the female partner, income from Unemployment In-
surance (UI) and other social benefits, and profits from self-employment
– all measured over a time window from 2 years before entering UI to
three years after entering UI. By taking different reference years for the
unemployment shocks occurring to cohorts in our sample, we assess how
the effects vary over the business cycle and over time more generally.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the unemployment
shock of a male partner, causing a loss in gross income of 20 to 30 thousand
euro, has a positive and statistically significant but small positive AWE
of 2-5% (500-1,000 euros). Second, the AWE for women that we estimate
is small and insignificant during the first years of the Great Recession
(2008-2009). Third, our findings point to the existence of both intensive
and extensive margin effects for the AWE. The decrease in the AWE at the
start of the Great Recession is mostly driven by decreases at the intensive
margin. And the extensive margin effect decreased over time. Finally, we
find an AWE of about 2% (500 euro) of profits from self-employment of
the female partner and the treatment effect on male partner’s profits more
than doubled from about 2000 euro 3 years after entering UI in 2004 to
about 4500 euro 3 years after entering UI in 2012.
1.3 Chapter 4: Constitutional commitment to social se-
curity
In recent decades, politicians and academics have emphasized the role
of social rights for social and economic development (Townsend 2007;
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ILO 2014). The main argument for a rights-based approach to social de-
velopment is that it gives an entitlement that can be enforced in court.
Without such a right, people are dependent on the ‘good-will’ of the in-
cumbent government for proper education, health care and social security.
In theory, the constitution can play an important role for social rights, as
constitutions provide universal rights and protect minorities against the
majority. However, the number of empirical studies on the effect of social
rights in the constitution is still limited.
Chapter 3 of this thesis answers the question: “What is the effect of consti-
tutional commitment to social security on different social expenditure schemes?"
First, we are interested in the effect of constitutional commitment to social
security (CCSS) on total social expenditure, which shows whether CCSS
has an effect at all. Second, we study whether the effect of CCSS is most
sizable on social expenditure schemes for beneficiaries who are seen as
less deserving by the public opinion. We expect a larger effect of CCSS
on these social expenditure schemes if the median voter cares less about
these social expenditure schemes, leaving a larger role for the constitution.
We use a panel data set for 17 EU-countries from 1990 until 2012. The
data on social expenditures as a percentage of GDP are taken from the
Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the OECD. For CCSS, we use the
indicator created by Ben Bassat and Dahan (2018), which we define as one
or zero, depending on the presence of a legal provision on assistance to
old age, survivors, disability, unemployment, sickness, work injury or the
poor in the constitution. We run OLS models, 2SLS regression models
and the Heckman two step model with the rigidity of the constitution
as an instrument, to correct for possible endogeneity and to derive the
effect of CCSS on different social expenditure schemes. In line with our
expectations, the rigidity of the constitution has a positive effect on CCSS,
indicating that our instrument is relevant.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find a positive significant
effect of CCSS on total social expenditure of 3.8 percentage points. This
includes a positive effect on spending on old age and survivor, incapacity,
unemployment and active labour market policies. Second, the most sizable
effects, expressed as a percentage of average spending, are found for
spending on unemployment and active labour market policies. These
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are the expenditure schemes targeted at people who are perceived as
less deserving by the public opinion (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003;
Van Oorschot 2006). Third, no positive effect is found on expenditure on
health and family, which are expenditure types that are not covered in
CCSS. This suggests that the positive effect on social expenditure is due to
CCSS and not caused by a positive attitude towards redistribution.
1.4 Chapter 5: Social expenditure and poverty, inequal-
ity and GDP growth
Since Piketty (2014) has published his work on income inequality, there
is a resurgence of the public and academic debate on income and wealth
inequality. This debate is strengthened by the rise of populist movements.
For a long time, policymakers and academics assumed a trade-off between
reducing income inequality and increasing GDP growth (Kaldor 1957;
Okun 1975; Lazear and Rosen 1981; Benabou 2000; Arjona et al. 2003).
More recent studies challenge this view and find a negative association
between income inequality and economic growth (Persson and Tabellini
1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Perotti 1996; Easterly 2007; OECD 2014;
Dabla-Norris et al. 2015). Moreover, the latest empirical evidence does
not support that redistribution is negatively related to economic growth
(Thewissen 2013; Ostry et al. 2014). Nevertheless, redistribution is a broad
concept and different kinds of redistribution, translated into different
social expenditure types, have different effects on poverty, inequality and
economic growth.
Therefore, we focus in this chapter on the question: “How are different
social expenditure types related to poverty, inequality and GDP growth" First,
we investigate how social expenditure at the aggregated level is related to
poverty, inequality and GDP growth. This analysis provides insights in
the potential trade-off between poverty and inequality on the one hand
and GDP growth on the other hand. Second, we study the relationships
for social expenditure on 1) old age and survivor, 2) incapacity, 3) health,
4) family, 5) unemployment and active labour market policies (ALMPs)
and 6) housing and others. This analysis shows the importance of the
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
Section 1.4 Chapter 5: Social expenditure and poverty, inequality and GDP
growth 9
different expenditure types for reducing poverty and inequality and for
the potential detrimental effects on GDP growth.
We use a panel data set of 22 EU-countries for the years 1990-2015
for our base results and a panel data set of 32 OECD countries in our
robustness analysis. The data are taken from several OECD databases.
We employ OLS and 2SLS regression models in which the lagged values
of the different expenditure variables are used as explanatory variables.
We use social expenditure in period (t-1) because social expenditure itself
also depends on growth and potentially also on poverty and inequality.
In our 2SLS model, we use the social expenditure variables in period (t-2)
as instrumental variable. Our preferred model is an OLS model with
panel corrected standard errors in which we correct for first order serial
correlation and control for country and year fixed effects.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find total public social
expenditure to be negatively related to poverty and inequality and not
significantly related to GDP growth. Hence, there seems to be no trade-off
between reducing poverty and inequality on the one hand and higher
economic growth on the other hand. Second, the different social expendi-
ture schemes are differently related to poverty, inequality and economic
growth, which makes more accurate targeting possible. For poverty, we
find negative relations with expenditure on family, unemployment and
ALMPs and housing and other.5 For inequality, we find a strong negative
association with social expenditure on old age and survivor and family. Fi-
nally, a strong positive relation with GDP growth is found for expenditure
on housing and others.






2 Preventing NEETs During the
Great Recession –
The Effects of a Mandatory
Activation Program for Young
Welfare Recipients
Abstract
We study the impact of a mandatory activation program for young wel-
fare recipients in the Netherlands. What makes this reform unique is
that it clashed head on with the Great Recession. We use differences-in-
differences and regression discontinuity and data for the period 1999–2012
to estimate the effects of this reform. We find that the reform reduced the
number of welfare recipients but had no effect on the number of NEETs
(individuals not in employment, education or training). This last finding
contrasts with previous studies, which we argue is due to the reform
taking place during a severe economic recession.
A working paper version of this chapter is published as Cammeraat et al. (2017)
and is currently under review. The chapter is co-authored by Egbert Jongen en Pierre
Koning. We are grateful to Ineke Bottelberghs, Marina Pool and Mirthe Bronsveld-de
Groot of Statistics Netherlands for the data on participation in mandatory activation
programs by young welfare recipients. Furthermore, we are grateful for comments and
suggestions by Leon Bettendorf, Richard Blundell, Matz Dahlberg, Sander Gerritsen, Bas
Jacobs, Max van Lent, Daniël van Vuuren and seminar and conference participants at
Leiden University, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the IIPF 2016
Doctoral School in Mannheim, the IIPF 2016 Conference in South Lake Tahoe, EALE 2016
in Ghent, NED 2016 in Amsterdam, LAGV 2017 in Aix-en-Provence and the RWI-GIZ
Conference ‘What Works? The Effectiveness of Youth Employment Programs’ 2017 in
Berlin. Remaining errors are my own.
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2.1 Introduction
Young individuals not in employment, education or training (NEETs) are
a major policy concern, in particular during periods of recession. NEETs
are a prime concern for the European Commission (Carcillo et al. 2015).
In his 2016 State of the Union speech, President Juncker of the European
Commission stated he wants to “continue to roll out the Youth Guarantee
across Europe, improving the skillset of Europeans and reaching out
to regions and young people most in need.” (European Commission
2016) This increased policy attention for reducing the number of NEETs
is accompanied with a trend towards stricter conditions for receiving
welfare benefits, via e.g. the imposition of job search requirements and/or
by making welfare benefits receipt conditional on participation in so-
called work-learn programs. Prominent examples of such policies that
are targeted at young unemployed individuals include the New Deal
for Young People in the UK and the Job Corps in the US (Kluve 2014).
Previous studies have found that stricter conditionality of welfare benefits
decreases welfare claims and increases employment rates (Blundell et al.
2004; Dahlberg et al. 2009; Persson and Vikman 2014; Hernæs et al. 2016;
Kluve et al. 2016; Bolhaar et al. 2018).
In this paper, we study the effects of a mandatory activation program
for young individuals during a severe economic recession. Specifically, we
study the WIJ (Wet Investeren in Jongeren, Work Investment Act for Young
Individuals) reform, introduced in the Netherlands at the end of 2009, just
after the start of the Great Recession. The reform targeted individuals
up to and including 26 years of age. The goal of the WIJ reform was to
reduce the number of young NEETs. To this end, welfare benefits were
made conditional on participation in ‘work-learn programs’. We consider
the effects of the WIJ reform on key outcome variables: NEETs claiming
welfare benefits, NEETs not claiming welfare benefits, the overall NEETs
rate, the employment rate and the enrollment rate in education.
We use differences-in-differences and regression discontinuity and
the large administrative dataset Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel)
of Statistics Netherlands (2015) to estimate the causal effects of the WIJ
reform. The Labour Market Panel tracks 1.2 million individuals over the
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period 1999–2012 and contains a large set of labour market outcomes and
a large number of individual and household characteristics. We consider
the treatment effect for three different age groups, 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26
years of age, while our base control group consists of individuals 27–28
years of age. A key challenge in the empirical analysis is to control for
potentially different time effects between the treatment and control groups,
due to e.g. differential trends or different business cycle responses (Bell
and Blanchflower 2011). In our preferred specification we therefore include
demographic controls, a full set of unemployment-age dummies, age-
specific trends and control-specific trends. We also present an extensive
placebo analysis, including placebo treatment dummies for the years just
before the reform and placebo treatment dummies for the earlier economic
downturn in 2002–2004.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the reform had
a statistically significant large negative effect on the number of young
NEETs claiming welfare benefits of –24% in the age group 25–26 years of
age, the only treatment group that passes all the placebo tests. Second, the
reform had only a small and statistically insignificant effect on the total
number of NEETs. The reform pushed young individuals out of welfare,
but did not increase the number of young individuals in employment or
education. Third, our analysis shows that controlling for differential trends
in a differences-in-differences analysis may be important for some outcome
variables, like the enrollment rate in education, when studying a reform
that targets young individuals and using somewhat older individuals as a
control group. Furthermore, we show that standard pre-reform placebo
reform dummies may be insufficient to test for common time effects, as
business cycle responses may differ still.
Our paper relates to a number of studies that consider the effects of
mandatory activation programs for young individuals.1 Blundell et al.
(2004) use area-based piloting and age-related eligibility rules to identify
1Our analysis also contributes to a broader literature on the effect of training programs
targeted at the youth. The overall success rate of programs on employment and wage
earnings is found to be small, see e.g. a recent meta-analysis by Kluve et al. (2016).
According to Kluve et al. (2016), one of the key determinants of success is that programs
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the employment impact of a mandatory job search programme in the UK,
the New Deal for Young People. They find that the program increased the
probability to find employment by about five percentage points. Dahlberg
et al. (2009) and Persson and Vikman (2014) analyze respectively the
effect on the number of welfare recipients and entry and exit effects of a
welfare reform in Sweden where city districts in Stockholm implemented
mandatory activation programs at different rates. They find that the
reform reduced welfare participation and increased employment rates of
younger individuals, with the main effect operating through the entry rate
into welfare. Hernæs et al. (2016) exploit a geographically differentiated
implementation of conditionality of welfare benefits for Norwegian youth
and find that stricter conditionality reduces welfare claims and increases
high school completion rates. These analyses suggest that the combination
of welfare conditionality and welfare-to-work programs can reduce the
number of NEETs and promote employment and enrollment in education
among young individuals.
We make the following contributions to this literature. First, we show
that stricter conditionality combined with welfare-to-work programs does
not always increase employment or enrollment in education. Indeed, we
find that for the WIJ reform there was no effect on the number of NEETs.
The main effect of the reform was simply to push young individuals out of
welfare. We argue that this is likely to be due to the state of the business
cycle, as the reform clashed head on with the start of the Great Recession,
during which it was hard for people, in particular young individuals, to
find a job. Second, we consider all potential outcome states, not only
NEETs on welfare but also NEETs not on welfare, and the enrollment in
education next to employment (and we also consider the effect on entry
and exit rates). Indeed, our analysis for young individuals in the treated
group shows that when looking at the effects on the employment rate,
it is important to study changes in the enrollment rate in education as
well. Third, we use an exceptionally large and long data set, that allows
us to study and account for differential trends and test for differences
in business cycle responses across age groups in an earlier economic
downturn. The latter turns out to be crucial, as standard pre-reform
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placebo treatment dummies may fail to reject the common time effects
assumption.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the institu-
tional setting and the main features of the reform. Section 2.3 discusses
the empirical methodology. Section 2.4 discusses the dataset and gives
descriptive statistics. In Section 2.5 we then present graphical evidence, the
estimation results and a large number of robustness checks. Section 2.6 dis-
cusses our findings and concludes. An appendix contains supplementary
material.
Institutional setting and the reform 2.2
Young NEETs are a policy concern in all OECD countries. However, there
is considerable variation in the share of NEETs among the young across
OECD countries, and the extent to which the share of NEETs has changed
during the Great Recession, see Table 2.1. Panel A gives indicators for
individuals 20–24 years of age, and panel B gives indicators for individuals
25–29 years of age. The Netherlands has one of the lowest NEETs shares
among OECD countries, in 2015 only 8.9% of 20–24 year olds in the
Netherlands were NEETs.2 Over the period 2005–2015, there has been a
moderate rise in the share of NEETs in the Netherlands. The low share of
NEETs in the Netherlands is mirrored by the high share of 20–24 year olds
that are in education, as well as by the high share of 20–24 year olds that are
employed, whereas the share of unemployed 20–24 year olds is relatively
low, see again Table 2.1.3 Turning to individuals 25–29 years of age, the
Netherlands also scores relatively favorable in terms of a low NEETs rate,
a high enrollment rate in education, a high employment-to-population
rate and a relatively low unemployment rate.
2In 2015, the only country in the OECD with a lower share of NEETs was Iceland
(6.6%). Below we will compare our results to studies for e.g. Norway, Sweden and the
UK. In this respect it is relevant to note that Norway had a NEETs rate that was only
slightly higher than in the Netherlands, the NEETs rate in Sweden was somewhat higher
still, whereas the NEETs rate in the UK was considerably higher (almost double the
NEETs rate in the Netherlands for individuals 20–24 years of age).
3The shares of individuals in education and individuals in employment add up to
more than 100% because individuals in education can be employed, and employed
individuals can also be in education.
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Table 2.1: An international perspective on NEETs
NEETs-to- Education-to- Employment-to- Unemployment-to-
population rate population rate population rate population rate
Year 2005 2015 2015 2015 2015
Panel A: Individuals 20–24 years of age
Continental Europe
Netherlands 8.1 8.8 57.7 69.4 6.7
Belgium 18.3 15.8 45.3 42.0 9.8
France 17.8 20.9 44.4 46.2 14.2
Germany 18.7 9.3 54.4 64.3 5.1
Scandinavia
Denmark 8.3 12.4 59.1 63.4 7.6
Finland 13.0 18.3 47.8 52.5 14.7
Norway 9.6 10.2 42.1 66.6 5.8
Sweden 13.4 11.8 46.0 56.4 13.0
Anglo-Saxon countries
Australia 11.6 13.1 44.5 71.5 7.3
Canada 14.4 14.4 41.6 64.7 8.3
United Kingdom 16.8 15.6 33.8 65.3 8.2
Unites States 15.5 15.8 38.5 64.1 6.5
OECD average 17.3 16.9 44.8 53.4 9.9
Panel B: Individuals 25–29 years of age
Continental Europe
Netherlands 10.7 12.1 20.8 82.2 5.7
Belgium 17.7 20.2 8.5 74.4 11.0
France 19.8 23.4 8.5 72.1 12.5
Germany 21.2 12.8 20.8 77.9 5.0
Scandinavia
Denmark 11.6 15.2 30.4 73.8 7.9
Finland 14.0 18.2 26.9 70.2 10.1
Norway 12.3 14.0 14.6 77.1 5.2
Sweden 10.0 10.8 25.1 75.6 8.7
Anglo-Saxon countries
Australia 15.4 15.5 19.1 78.5 4.4
Canada 15.7 17.6 12.8 76.7 7.0
United Kingdom 16.6 16.2 12.7 79.4 5.0
Unites States 18.1 20.0 13.2 75.4 4.7
OECD average 19.0 19.3 16.3 73.5 9.4
Notes: Using data from OECD (2016a), OECD (2016b) and OECD (2016c). The education-to-population rate is the enrollment
in education divided by the relevant age population. The unemployment-to-population rate is calculated as the unemploy-
ment rate multiplied by the labour force participation rate.
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The reform we consider targets young individuals on welfare benefits.
In the Netherlands, welfare benefits form a safety net that is provided
by municipalities to support unemployed individuals who are not, or
are no longer, entitled to other types of social insurance benefits like
unemployment insurance. The vast majority of new welfare recipients
consists of individuals with insufficient work history for entitlement to
unemployment insurance.4 Welfare benefits are means-tested and assets-
tested.5 The level of welfare benefits differs across household types and
age groups. In 2008, before the start of the WIJ reform, welfare benefits
ranged from 220 euro per month for singles of 18–20 years of age to 1,320
euros per month for couples with children (Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment 2008).
The Work Investment Act for Young Individuals (Wet Investeren in Jon-
geren, WIJ) came into force in October 2009 as a consequence of increased
policy attention for NEETs and welfare dependency. The reform was
designed before the start of the Great Recession, but the implementation
was after the start of the Great Recession (Recession started in September
2008). Similar to e.g. the New Deal for Young People in the UK, the aim
of the WIJ was both to activate young welfare recipients and to foster their
human capital formation. The WIJ stipulated that for individuals below
the age of 27, entitlement to welfare benefits became conditional on partic-
ipation in a mandatory activation program. These mandatory programs
were defined as ‘work-learn offers’ and consisted of public employment
programs, apprenticeships and internships. Any wage earnings in these
programs were supplemented up to the level of welfare benefits. As Figure
2.1 shows, the WIJ increased the coverage rate of activation programs for
young welfare recipients in our respective treatment groups (individuals
20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age, discussed below) from around 85%
in January 2010 to around 95% in 2011 (on average). Hence, the reform
restricted the discretionary room of caseworkers in administering welfare
benefits and work-learn offers.
4In 2014, only 22% of all new welfare recipients consisted of unemployed workers
who exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits (UWV 2014).
5For single individuals, net worth should not exceed 5,765 euro. For households with
more persons, net worth should not exceed 11,895 euro.
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Notes: Statistics Netherlands (personal communication). This figure gives the share of individuals on welfare
participating in an activation program in the respective treatment groups 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age
and the control group 27–28 years of age.
The WIJ applied to all new entrants into welfare from October 2009
onward. However, as the enactment of the WIJ implied a substantial
increase in the workload for municipalities, municipalities were given 9
additional months – until July 2010 – to increase coverage of the WIJ to
100% of the pre-existing stock of welfare recipients. Figure 2.1 suggests
that in the end it took until January 2011 for the WIJ to achieve its largest
coverage.
To get a better understanding of the implementation of the WIJ reform
at the municipality level, we interviewed policymakers and caseworkers
in the city of Amsterdam that were involved in the design and imple-
mentation of the WIJ. In Amsterdam, the majority of work-learn offers
were provided by retail companies, local industries and welfare-to-work
organizations. The respondents in our interviews stressed that some as-
pects of the WIJ were already common practice in Amsterdam. That is,
apprenticeships, internships and public employment programs were al-
ready provided for individuals up to 23 years of age (Board of Amsterdam
2009). In effect, in Amsterdam the WIJ reform thus implied the extension
of these programs to individuals with 24–26 years of age, together with the
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imposition of welfare conditionality for all young individuals below the
age of 27. In our empirical analysis, we focus on the group of individuals
25–26 years of age, because they are the most comparable to the control
group of 27–28 years of age (as indicated by e.g. placebo pre-reform
dummies), but we also consider the effects for younger age groups.
A previous social security reform implemented in the early 2000s
already went in the direction of improving opportunities for youth who
enter the labour market while tightening up their obligations to find work
or improve their employability (OECD 2008; OECD 2010).6 However,
this reform was much smaller than the WIJ-reform and the obligations
were enforced much less strictly, which also follows from Figure 2.1. The
huge effect of the WIJ-reform on exit rates from welfare, which we will
present in the results section, provides evidence that the WIJ-reform had
a substantial additional effect on welfare conditionality on top of this
previous reform.
Finally, next to the WIJ reform, there were two other reforms relevant
for our analysis that took place in January 2012. First, the government
replaced the mandatory acceptance of work-learn offers with ‘work-first’
arrangements. Specifically, the government introduced an initial one-
month ‘job-search period’ during which individuals younger than 27 years
of age did not receive welfare benefits. This may explain the small drop
in the participation rate in activation programs in January 2012, and
the larger drop in January 2013, see Figure 2.1. Second, adult children
living at home were no longer eligible to welfare benefits when they
lived in a household in which first-degree relatives had sufficient income
or assets (the ‘household-income test’). To study to what extent these
additional reforms may affect our results, we also present treatment effects
by individual treatment years, the treatment effect on the probability of
being an adult child living at home and the treatment effects for the
subgroup of adult children living at home.
6This reform was called “Chain for Work and Income” which was established in 2002
with the SUWI Law (Law on implementation structure for work and income)
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2.3 Empirical methodology
We use differences-in-differences (DD) and regression discontinuity (RD)
to estimate the effects of the WIJ reform on a number of outcome variables.
Our preferred method is DD because this gives us an average treatment
effect for a larger group than the local average treatment effect of regression
discontinuity. Indeed, we are also interested in the treatment effect for
individuals further away from the cutoff (20–24 years of age). Furthermore,
we may be concerned that welfare recipients or their caseworkers might
anticipate the 27th birthday of the welfare recipient, when participation
in work-learn arrangements is no longer obligatory, or that participation
in work-learn arrangements may continue after the 27th birthday of the
welfare recipient.7
2.3.1 Differences-in-differences
The reform was targeted at individuals up to 27 years of age and started
in October 2009. A key assumption of the DD approach is common time
effects for the treatment and control group (in the absence of the reform).
In this context, our preferred treatment group consists of individuals 25–26
years of age and a control group consisting of individuals 27–28 years
of age. Our baseline model also considers the treatment effects for the
treatment groups consisting of individuals 20–22 and 23–24 years of age,
but we will show that changes in the enrollment in education complicate
the analysis for these groups (young individuals in the treated group
have a choice of staying in education, while this is hardly a choice for
individuals in the older control group). The age variable is measured on
the 1st of October of each year, and the outcome variables are averages for
October each year.
As outcome variables we consider (i) the ‘participation rate’ in NEETs,
defined as not being in employment or education8, (ii) the participation
7A robustness analysis where we leave out observations close to the threshold using a
so-called donut-RD design yields similar results as the base RD specification with these
observations included though.
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rate in NEETs on welfare, (iii) the participation rate in NEETs not on
welfare, (iv) the employment rate, and (v) the enrollment rate in education.
The participation rate in NEETs, the employment rate and the enrollment
rate in education sum to one, but we analyse them independently.
For all these outcome variables we estimate a linear probability model
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). Let yiat be a dummy variable that is 1 if
individual i in age group a is ‘participating’, ’employed’ or ‘enrolled’
in period t. In our preferred DD specification, we regress the outcome
variable on a set of year fixed effects (αt), age fixed effects (βa), age-
specific trends (with coefficients γa), an interaction term between age
and the unemployment rate (ut) with age-specific coefficients φa, a set of
demographic controls Xi (gender and ethnicity) with coefficients μx, a set
of demographic-control-specific trends with coefficients ψx, a treatment
effect (DDgt) for individuals in the treatment group g in a given year t in
the post-reform period with coefficient δg,t, and an error term �iat:
yiat = αt + βa + γat + φaut + X′iμx + X
′
itψxt + δg,tDDgt + �iat. (2.1)
We are primarily interested in the treatment coefficients δg,t. We include
an interaction term between age and the unemployment rate to allow for
different business cycle responses across age groups (Bell and Blanchflower
2011). Furthermore, we include age-specific and demographic-control-
specific trends to allow for trend differences.9
In an extension to this model, we add placebo treatment dummies for
the pre-reform years 2008 and 2009. The coefficients on these placebo
treatment dummies are informative about potential remaining differential
time effects between the treatment and control groups, for example be-
cause of changes in group specific trends or differences in business cycle
responses not captured by the age-specific unemployment terms, and also
about potential anticipation effects of the reform.
Finally, to allow for correlation in the error terms at a higher level
than the individual and over time, we use cluster-robust standard errors
9We have 10 years of pre-reform data to estimate the coefficients on these trends.
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(Bertrand et al. 2004; Donald and Lang 2007). We cluster the standard
errors by month of birth. This results in 264 clusters in our base DD
specification, which is deemed sufficiently large by Angrist and Pischke
(2009) to use the large-sample properties of the estimator.
2.3.2 Regression discontinuity
In the RD approach we estimate the impact of the policy by comparing
differences in the outcome variables for individuals that are just younger
than the cutoff of 27 years that determines treatment by the WIJ reform
with individuals that are just older than this cutoff. The advantage of
using an RD approach is that the treatment and control group are likely
to share the same time-effects, however we only obtain a local average
treatment effect and we need to assume that in the absence of the reform
the outcome variables are a smooth function in age. Related to the last
point, we assume that individuals and caseworkers did not anticipate the
end of the WIJ obligations by already lowering their effort preceding the
age cutoff of 27 years.10
Similar to our DD setup, we use linear probability models in our
RD setup. In our preferred RD specification, we regress participation
status yiat on a year fixed effect (βt), age in months ait (recentered11, with
coefficient βa), an interaction term that captures the additional effect of
age when the person is younger than the cutoff a′ (with coefficient βa<a′)
to allow for a different slope to the left of the discontinuity, a treatment
effect if the age of the person is below 27 (with coefficient βRD) capturing
the discontinuity, individual characteristics Xi and an error term �it:12
yit = βt + βaait + βa<a′1(ait < a′)ait + βRDRDit + X′iμx + �it. (2.2)
10We will address this issue by also presenting ‘donut’ RD regressions (Barreca et al.
2011) that exclude months around the age cut-off of 27 years.
11Age is recentered so that individuals that have turned 27 in September have a value
of 1, they are the first age group to the ‘right’ of the discontinuity.
12We also estimated models with a quadratic term in age, and with a different quadratic
term in age to the left of the threshold. The estimated discontinuities are similar to the
results of our preferred specification (available on request).
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Our primary interest is in coefficient βRD, which measures the size of the
discontinuity in the relationship between the outcome variable and age
due to the policy. For an accurate measurement of the discontinuity it is
important to get a precise estimate of the relation between age and the out-
come variables around the discontinuity. In the RD analysis we therefore
use month of birth relative to the discontinuity as the running variable.13
Since the identification in the RD approach comes from differences in
month of birth, we cluster standard errors by month of birth, where we
put persons born in the same month but in different years in different
clusters. This generates 72 clusters in the base specification, again deemed
sufficiently large to use the large-sample properties of the estimator.
In an extension of the RD analysis we consider a ‘difference-in-discontinuity’
setup, using both the pre- and post-reform data – see e.g. the analysis in
Bettendorf et al. (2014). This specification may be relevant if the age cutoff
of 27 years of age cannot be uniquely linked to the WIJ reform but that
other pre-existing policies use a similar cutoff. To test for this possibility,
we use observations both before and after the policy reform to control
for a potential discontinuity before the reform. In this specification we
include a treatment effect γPRD that captures the pre-reform discontinuity,
and an additional treatment effect for the post-reform discontinuity rela-
tive to the pre-reform discontinuity γDRD. In the specification below, the
discontinuity before the reform equals γPRD and the discontinuity after
the reform equals γPRD + γDRD:
yit = γt + γaait + γa2 (ait)
2 + γa<a′1(ait < a′)ait
+γPRDPRDit + γDRDDRDit + X′iν + υit, (2.3)
where for the same reasons as in the RD analysis we use age measured
in months relative to the discontinuity as the running variable, and we
cluster the standard errors by month of birth.
13The exact date of birth during the month is not available in our data set.
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2.4 Data
We use data from the Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel) of Statistics
Netherlands (2015). The Labour Market Panel is a large and rich household
panel data set, tracking 1.2 million individuals over the period 1999–2012.14
We use the years 1999–2009 as the pre-reform years, and 2010–2012 as the
treatment years.
We consider three treatment groups: i) individuals 25–26 years of age,
ii) individuals 23–24 years of age and iii) individuals 20-22 years age. Our
main control group consists of individuals 27–28 years of age. As we will
see below, the treatment group of individuals 25–26 years of age is the most
similar to our main control group in terms of demographic characteristics,
levels of the outcome variables and business cycle responses. The other
two treatment groups with younger individuals are more likely to differ
from the main control group, and hence we have to be extra careful when
interpreting the estimated treatment effects for these younger treatment
groups.
The outcome variables are based on the social-economic classification
(SEC) variable in the Labour Market Panel. The SEC variable classifies
individuals according to their main source of income, where individuals
in education are always classified as being in the state of education (even
if their wage income is larger than their study grant) and individuals
with profit income are always classified as being self-employed (even if
their wage income exceeds their profit income). According to the SEC
individuals can be in the following states: (1) employee, (2) owner of
closely-held company, (3) self-employed, (4) another type of employment,
(5) on unemployment insurance, (6) on welfare benefits, (7) on disability or
sickness benefits, (8) on retirement benefits, (9) on other social insurance,
(10) in education with income, (11) in education without income, (12)
without income. We count individuals in states (1)-(4) as employed, in
states (10)-(11) as in education, and in states (5)-(9) and (12) as NEETs.
Within the state of NEETs we count individuals in state (6) as NEETs
on welfare and individuals in states (5), (7)-(9) and (12) as NEETs not
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics treatment groups and control group
Treatment Group Differences Normalized differences
(1999–2009) (treatment–control) (treatment–control)
Mean SD 1999–2009 2010–2012 1999–2009 2010–2012
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
Explanatory variables
Female 0.506 0.500 −0.006 0.000 −0.009 0,000
Non-Western immigrant 0.102 0.302 0.001 −0.004 0.003 −0.008
Western immigrant 0.072 0.258 −0.003 −0.002 −0.007 −0.005
Dependent variables
NEETS rate on welfare 0.025 0.155 −0.001 −0.004
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.088 0.283 −0.011 0.005
Total NEETs rate 0.112 0.316 −0.012 0.001
Employment rate 0.818 0.386 −0.036 −0.065
Enrollment rate education 0.069 0.254 0.048 0.063
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
Explanatory variables
Female 0.499 0.500 −0.013 −0.002 −0.018 −0.002
Non-Western immigrant 0.101 0.302 0.001 −0.004 0.002 −0.009
Western immigrant 0.069 0.253 −0.005 −0.004 −0.015 −0.010
Dependent variables
NEETS rate on welfare 0.022 0.146 −0.004 −0.007
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.078 0.268 −0.021 0.004
Total NEETs rate 0.099 0.299 −0.025 −0.003
Employment rate 0.714 0.452 −0.140 −0.212
Enrollment rate education 0.187 0.390 0.165 0.215
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
Explanatory variables
Female 0.492 0.500 −0.020 −0.004 −0.029 −0.005
Non-Western immigrant 0.101 0.301 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.016
Western immigrant 0.067 0.249 −0.008 −0.006 −0.021 −0.017
Dependent variables
NEETS rate on welfare 0.014 0.118 −0.012 −0.013
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.063 0.243 −0.035 −0.012
Total NEETs rate 0.077 0.267 −0.047 −0.025
Employment rate 0.491 0.500 −0.363 −0.459
Enrollment rate education 0.432 0.495 0.410 0.484
Notes: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands). Treatment groups: individuals 20–22,
23–24 and 25–26 years of age. Control group: individuals 27–28 years of age. Observations 1999-2012: treatment group
20–22: 582,364, treatment group 23–24: 375,182, treatment group 25–26: 376,083, control group 27-28: 391,627. Normalized
differences are mean differences divided by the square root of the sum of the variances (see Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
on welfare. As demographic control variables we include gender and
ethnicity (native/Western immigrant/non-Western immigrant).
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Table 2.2 gives descriptive statistics for the respective treatment groups,
along with the differences and normalized differences (for the demo-
graphic control variables) with the control group in the pre- and the
post-reform period. The differences in the demographic control variables
gender and ethnicity are small for all treatment groups, in particular for
the oldest treatment group with individuals 25–26 years of age. The same
is true for the so-called normalized differences (mean differences divided
by the square root of the sum of variances). Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009) argue that these normalized differences are an informative way to
check if the treatment and control group have sufficient overlap in the
covariates, and as a rule of thumb they suggest that when the normalized
difference exceeds a value of .25, linear regression becomes sensitive to
the specification. The normalized differences for gender and ethnicity stay
well below .25. Furthermore, the differences in the demographic control
variables hardly change from the pre- to the post-reform period. Hence,
there is no indication of differential changes in the composition of the
treatment and control group.15
Table 2.2 also gives descriptive statistics for the outcome variables. The
NEETs rate on welfare in the oldest treatment group is very similar to the
control group in the pre-reform period, but drops relative to the control
group in the post-reform period, suggesting a negative treatment effect on
this outcome variable for this treatment group. The pre-reform differences
in the NEETs rate on welfare are larger for the younger treatment groups,
in particular for the youngest treatment group. Also for these groups the
difference becomes larger in the post-reform period, suggesting a negative
treatment effect for the NEETs rate on welfare benefits for these groups.
The NEETs rate not on welfare is also quite similar for the older treatment
group and the control group before the reform, though somewhat lower
for the treatment group than the control group, and lower still for the
younger treatment groups. After the reform, the NEETs rate not on welfare
move closer to the control group, suggesting a positive treatment effect
on this outcome variable. The total NEETs rate again is quite similar
for the oldest treatment group and the control group before the reform,
15Figure A.2.1 in the Supplementary material plots the shares of the demographic
control variables for the treatment and control group over time.
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though again somewhat lower for this treatment group, and lower still for
the younger treatment groups. After the reform, the total NEETs rate of
the treatment groups move closer to the control group, which suggests a
positive treatment effect for the total NEETs rate. The employment rate is
lower for the treatment groups than the control group in the pre-reform
period, and the difference becomes more negative in the post-reform
period, suggesting a counterintuitive negative treatment effect on the
employment rate. Finally, the enrollment rate in education shows the
mirror image of the employment rate. The enrollment is higher in the
treatment groups than in the control group in the pre-reform period, and
this difference also becomes bigger in the post-reform period, suggesting
a positive treatment effect on the enrollment in education. However, these
simple treatment effects do not account for differential trends between the
treatment and control groups. These differential trends will turn out to
be important for some outcome variables, in particular for the younger
treatment groups, in the empirical analysis below.
Results 2.5
Differences-in-differences 2.5.1
We first present graphical evidence on the treatment effects of the reform
on the outcome variables, see Figure 2.2. The solid black line denotes
the control group of individuals 27–28 years of age, whereas the red,
blue and green lines denote the treatment groups of 25–26, 23–24 and
20-22 years of age, respectively. The dotted lines denote the difference
between the respective treatment groups and the control group. Figure
2.2(a) shows that the NEETs rate on welfare moves very much in tandem
for the treatment groups 23–24 and 25–26 years of age and the control
group in the pre-reform period, and there is a clear negative treatment
effect in 2010, which subsequently becomes smaller in 2011 and then
remains roughly constant in 2012. For the youngest treatment group 20–22
years of age, the NEETs rate on welfare also shows a quite similar pattern
to the control group prior to the reform, but there is no apparent treatment
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dip in 2010 (although the control group moves ‘up’, presumably due to
the Great Recession, and the treatment group 20–22 does not) nor is there
an apparent recovery in the NEETs rate in 2011 or 2012 for this treatment
group relative to the control group. Figure 2.2(b)-(e) make clear that there
are apparent trend differences between the treatment and control group
for the other outcome variables, also for the treatment group 25–26 years
of age. The main culprit here is the difference in trends in the enrollment
in education by age groups, see Figure 2.2(e). Hence, accounting for
differential trends will be important to isolate the treatment effect of the
reform for these outcome variables.
Table 2.3 gives the base differences-in-differences regression results. In
all specifications we use a single treatment dummy per treatment group
for the post-reform years 2010–2012.16 First consider the results for the
treatment group 25–26 years of age in Panel A, the group that is the most
similar to the control group in observable characteristics and means of
the outcome variables. Column (1) shows the results of the basic DD
setup, where we only include year dummies, a group dummy for each
individual age group and a treatment dummy for the age group 25–26.
This setup suggests a negative and statistically significant treatment effect
of –0.30 percentage points on the NEETs rate on welfare. In column (2)
we add demographic controls. Consistent with the observation that there
were negligible compositional changes in these characteristics, this hardly
affects the estimated treatment effect. In column (3) we add interaction
terms for age and the national unemployment rate, to allow for a potential
different business-cycle response by age. Again, this does not substantially
affect the estimated treatment effect for the NEETs rate on welfare. In
column (4) we then also allow for age-specific trends, and this leads to
a somewhat larger treatment effect in absolute terms (more negative) of
–0.44 percentage points. Finally, column (5), our richest and preferred
specification, shows that the inclusion of demographic-control specific
trends gives a treatment effect that is very similar to the treatment effect in
column (4). The treatment effect in column (5) of –0.46 percentage points
also suggests a sizable negative treatment effect on the NEETs rate on
16Full regression results can be found in Table A.2.1 in the Supplementary material.
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Figure 2.2: Means outcome variables treatment and control
groups: 1999–2012
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Notes: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands). The solid black line denotes
the control group of individuals 27–28 years of age, the red lines denote the treatment group 25–26 years of
age, the blue lines denote the treatment group 23–24 years of age and the green lines denote the treatment
group 20–22 years of age. The dotted lines denote the difference between the treatment group and the control
group. NEETs rates are individuals not in employment or education relative to the relevant age population,
employment rates are individuals in employment relative to the relevant age population and enrollment rates
in education are individuals in education relative to the relevant age population.
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welfare of –24% relative to a baseline of 1.9 percentage points in the last
pre-reform year (2009).
As noted earlier, accounting for trend differences between the treatment
and control group is important for the other outcome variables in Table 2.3.
In particular, we find rather similar treatment effects for the specification in
columns (1)-(3)17, but allowing for differential trends in age in column (4)
has an important impact on the treatment effects on the employment rate
and the enrollment rate in education.18 Our preferred specification is in
column (5), with results suggesting a positive and statistically significant
treatment effect on the NEETs rate not on welfare, but no effect on the total
NEETs rate. Also, there appears to be no effect on the employment rate
and the enrollment rate in education. Hence, the reform seems to have
pushed or kept the treated individuals in this age group out of welfare
without higher employment and/or enrollment in education. This is at
odds with previous studies on related reforms, as we will discuss more
extensively in the final section.
Panels B and C give the results for the younger age groups. We
focus on our preferred specification controlling for differential trends in
column (5). Similar to the age group of 25–26 years of age, negative and
statistically significant treatments effects on the NEETs rate on welfare of
about –0.4 percentage points are found for the age groups of 23–24 and
20–22 years of age. We find no effect on the overall NEETs rate for those
aged 23–24, but a large statistically significant decrease for those aged
20–22. For the individuals aged 23–24, the suggested treatment effect on
the enrollment rate in education is positive and the treatment effect on the
employment rate is negative. An optimistic interpretation of this result
is that this treatment group was stimulated to remain in (or return to)
education following the WIJ reform. As we will show in our robustness
tests, however, this finding should be interpreted with the appropriate
care.
Turning to the placebo analyses, first consider the results in Table
2.4. In this table we take specification (5) of Table 2.3 and add placebo
17Although the ‘treatment effect’ for the employment rate and enrollment rate in
education do vary in absolute size over the different specifications in columns (1)-(3).
18The inclusion of demographic-control specific trends in column (5) again hardly
affects the results when compared to column (4).
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Table 2.3: Differences-in-differences: base regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0030∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0023)
NEETs rate 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0017 0.0014
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0028)
Employment rate −0.0298∗∗∗ −0.0303∗∗∗ −0.0213∗∗∗ −0.0027 −0.0027
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0013
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0015)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0022 0.0022
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0026)
NEETs rate 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ −0.0016 −0.0017
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Employment rate −0.0728∗∗∗ −0.0730∗∗∗ −0.0598∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0508∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0048)
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0017∗ −0.0024∗∗ −0.0025∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021)
NEETs rate 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Employment rate −0.0968∗∗∗ −0.0946∗∗∗ −0.0720∗∗∗ 0.0030 0.0027
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.0751∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0075 0.0070
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES
Unemployment-age dummies NO NO YES YES YES
Age-specific trends NO NO NO YES YES
Control-specific trends NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256
Clusters 264 264 264 264 264
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment groups:
individuals 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age. Control group: individuals 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters), All specifications include age and year fixed effects. See Table A.2.1 in
the Supplementary material for the full regression results.
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Table 2.4: Differences-in-differences: pre-reform placebo’s and annual treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
Placebo 2008 −0.0023 0.0046 0.0022 −0.0037 0.0014
(0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0053) (0.0044)
Placebo 2009 −0.0022 0.0027 0.0005 −0.0032 0.0027
(0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0048)
Treatment 2010 −0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0028 −0.0019 −0.0009
(0.0021) (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0047)
Treatment 2011 −0.0045∗ 0.0097∗∗ 0.0051 −0.0102 0.0050
(0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0051)
Treatment 2012 −0.0052∗∗ 0.0039 −0.0013 −0.0038 0.0052
(0.0022) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0054)
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
Placebo 2008 −0.0034∗∗ 0.0006 −0.0029 −0.0030 0.0058
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Placebo 2009 −0.0026 0.0044 0.0018 −0.0109 0.0090
(0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0070) (0.0073)
Treatment 2010 −0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0056 −0.0026 −0.0171∗∗ 0.0197∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0078)
Treatment 2011 −0.0041 0.0030 −0.0011 −0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0068) (0.0077)
Treatment 2012 −0.0059∗∗ 0.0038 −0.0021 −0.0154∗∗ 0.0175∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
Placebo 2008 −0.0003 0.0015 0.0012 −0.0035 0.0023
(0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0050) (0.0051)
Placebo 2009 −0.0004 −0.0019 −0.0023 −0.0077 0.0099
(0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0065) (0.0063)
Treatment 2010 −0.0035∗ −0.0032 −0.0067∗ −0.0065 0.0132∗
(0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0077) (0.0076)
Treatment 2011 −0.0034 −0.0087∗∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0080 0.0201∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0083) (0.0082)
Treatment 2012 −0.0062∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0128 0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0091) (0.0090)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Unemployment-age dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Age-specific trends YES YES YES YES YES
Control-specific trends YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256
Clusters 264 264 264 264 264
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment groups:
individuals 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age. Control group: individuals 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters). All specifications include demographic controls, unemployment-age interaction
terms, age-specific trends and control-specific trends.
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
Section 2.5 Results 33
treatment dummies for the years 2008 and 2009. For each treatment group,
we also split the single treatment dummy (for 2010–2012) into single-year
treatment dummies for 2010, 2011 and 2012. With this specification, we
can both test for common time effects as well as for anticipation effects and
the evolution of the treatment effect of the WIJ reform over time. From the
table, the general picture that emerges is that the placebo dummies are
small and statistically insignificant. It is only for the NEETs rate on welfare
in the treatment group of 23–24 years of age that we find a significant
placebo dummy for 2008, but this effect would become insignificant if
we would correct for multiple testing. Another finding is that treatment
effects on NEETs rate on welfare for 2011 and 2012 are often smaller than
for 2010, which is consistent with the pattern in Figure 2.2. Hence, most of
the treatment effect seems to be confined to the first period of the reform.
Also for the NEETs rate not on welfare, most of the effect appears to be in
2010, after which the effect becomes smaller again. Finally, it should be
noted that there is still no statistically significant treatment effect for the
total NEETs rate, the employment rate nor the enrollment rate in education
when we consider single-year treatment dummies.
We also exploit the richness of our data by conducting additional
placebo analyses that capture the economic downturn in 2002–2004 in the
Netherlands – see Table 2.5 for the estimation results. The general idea here
is to detect possible differences in responses to the business cycle between
younger treatment groups and the control group of individuals aged 27–28
not accounted for by the interactions between the unemployment rate and
individual ages. If such responses are different, this casts doubt on the
common-time effects assumption underlying our DD approach. As the
table shows, we do find placebo effects in the two youngest treatment
groups. This particularly casts doubt on the large treatment effects on
employment and education enrollment rates we find for these groups. As
business cycle effects have been substantially different for the outcome
measures between the group of 27–28 years of age and those below the
age of 25, we cannot interpret the effect estimates as causal.
The Supplementary material presents some additional robustness
checks. First, one may worry that the reform created spillovers for the
control group via e.g. the job-finding rate (Blundell et al. 2004; Gautier
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Table 2.5: Differences-in-differences: placebo treatment dummy economic downturn 2002-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
Treatment 2010–2012 −0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0015 −0.0023 0.0008
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0032)
Placebo 2002–2004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0018 −0.0023
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0020)
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
Treatment 2010–2012 −0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0025 −0.0015 −0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0049)
Placebo 2002–2004 0.0004 0.0027 0.0032 0.0047 −0.0078∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0032)
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
Treatment 2010–2012 −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0046 0.0050
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Placebo 2002–2004 0.0021∗∗ −0.0006 0.0015 0.0239∗∗∗ −0.0255∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0035)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Unemployment-age dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Age-specific trends YES YES YES YES YES
Control-specific trends YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256
Clusters 264 264 264 264 264
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment groups:
20–22, 23–24, and 25–26 years of age. Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
month of birth (264 clusters). All specifications include demographic controls, unemployment rate-age interactions, age-specific trends
and control-specific trends.
et al. 2018). In Table A.2.2 we address this concern by using individuals
with 29–30 years of age as an alternative control group, and introduce
‘treatment dummies’ for our main control group of individuals 27–28
years of age. We then find rather similar treatment effects as in the base
specification for the treatment groups 20-22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age,
and no statistically significant placebo treatment effects for our control
group (27–28 years of age).19 Second, Table A.2.3 addresses the concern
that treatment effects may persist as individuals age into the control group,
another type of spillover effect that may bias our estimates. Here we
use individuals 30–31 years of age as the control group, as these were
never in the treatment group during the WIJ reform period, and introduce
‘treatment dummies’ for individuals 27–29 years of age. Again, the results
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for the treatment groups 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age are (quite20)
similar to the base specification, and the treatment effects for individuals
27–29 years of age are statistically insignificant. Third, Table A.2.4 shows
that we obtain similar results when we narrow the treatment group down
to individuals 26 years age and the control group to individuals 27 years
of age. Finally, Table A.2.5 shows that the different levels of clustering (at
the individual level, by month of birth or by year of birth, respectively)
(virtually) does not affect the statistical significance of the results.
Table A.2.6 considers to what extent the changes in the stocks are
driven by changes in the respective entry and exit rates.21 When focussing
on the older treatment group of individuals 25–26 years of age for which
the baseline results turned out to be robust, we find that the effect on the
NEETs rate on welfare runs entirely via an increased exit rate, with no
effect on the entry rate (suggesting the ‘threat effect’ for new potential
welfare recipients is limited). And vice versa, we find that the effect on the
NEETs rate not on welfare is mainly due to an increase in the entry rate
(although this coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10% level),
with no effect on the exit rate. The exit and entry rates for the total NEETs
rate, employment rate and the enrollment rate are statistically insignificant
and typically small.
The Supplementary material section also presents the outcomes for
selected other outcome variables and by subgroups. In light of our earlier
results, we now focus on the treatment group of 25–26 years of age. Table
A.2.7 shows that the effects of the WIJ on the enrollment rate in unem-
ployment insurance (UI) and disability insurance (DI) are insignificant
for this group. Next, Table A.2.8 gives the treatment effect on being in a
particular household type. Distinguishing between adult children living
at home, childless singles, single parents and couples, we do not find any
20Of course the control group becomes increasingly dissimilar to the main treatment
groups, which results in some treatment effects (total NEETs rate and employment rate)
for the age group 25–26 to become borderline significant at the 10% level, though with a
counter-intuitive sign, also suggesting this is not a causal effect.
21Specifically, for entry the dependent variable equals 1 when, for each state, the current
state is 1 and the previous state was a different state, and zero otherwise. For exit the
dependent variable equals 1 when, for each state, the current state is a different state than
the previous state, and the previous state is 1, and zero otherwise. We present results for
our most elaborate specification, including demographic controls, unemployment-age
interaction terms, age-specific trends and demographic-control-specific trends.
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statistically significant treatment effects. Given that being in a particular
household type seems largely exogenous to the treatment, Table A.2.9
then studies the treatment effects by household type. Focusing again on
the treatment group of 25–26 year olds, the largest drop in the NEETs
rate on welfare in absolute terms is for adult children living at home and
single parents, –1.0 and –7.0 percentage points respectively. In percentages
however, the drop for single parents is –22% (relative to the 2009 level),
which is comparable to the average treatment effect over all household
types. But for adult children living at home it is –45% (relative to the
2009 level), which can be explained by the additional reform in 2012,
when adult children living at home were no longer eligible to welfare
benefits when they lived in a household in which first-degree relatives
had sufficient income or assets (see Section 2). The effect for childless
singles is comparable to the average over all household types, whereas the
effect for couples is close to zero. In line with the base results where we
pool all household types, the NEETs rate not on welfare increases for all
household types. The treatment effects for the other outcome variables are
typically not statistically significant.
In addition to stratifying with respect to household types, Table A.2.10
gives the results by gender and ethnicity. The treatment effects for males
and females are similar. The treatment effects for natives are somewhat
smaller than the base results, whereas the results for immigrants are larger
in absolute terms. But in percentage terms, the effects are much more
comparable to the average, –29% for natives and –22% for immigrants
for the NEETs rate on welfare (and a statistically significant effect on the
total NEETs rate). Finally, Table A.2.11 considers the treatment effects
for provinces that had a relatively low or a relatively high pre-reform
unemployment rate. The treatment effect appears to be smaller (about
half) in the provinces which had a lower pre-reform unemployment rate.
However, the percentage drop is almost the same in regions with low and
high pre-reform unemployment rates, 25% (relative to baseline 2009) for
low unemployment regions and 24% for high unemployment regions.
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
Section 2.5 Results 37
Regression discontinuity 2.5.2
We next consider the more local treatment effect of the WIJ reform by
considering outcomes around the cutoff age of 27, using regression discon-
tinuity. To gauge the presence of such cutoff effects, Figure 2.3 shows the
NEETs rate on welfare, the NEETs rate not on welfare and the total NEETs
rate by month of birth of 25–28 year olds, relative to the discontinuity –
both for the pre-reform period (2007–2009, left panels) and post-reform
period (2010–2012, right panels).22 In the figures, value averages are cen-
tered around the cutoff age of 27. The solid lines give the predictions from
a RD regression without control variables, estimated separately on the
left- and right-hand side of the discontinuity. The dashed lines give the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. These graphs suggest a small
positive pre-reform discontinuity in the NEETs rate on welfare and a small
negative post-reform discontinuity in the NEETs rate on welfare, and no
pre-reform discontinuity for the NEETs rate not on welfare but a small
positive post-reform discontinuity for the NEETs rate not on welfare. Fi-
nally, we observe a small and positive but similar pre- and post-reform
discontinuity in the total NEETs rate.
Table 2.6 gives the RD regression results. The RD dummy captures
a different intercept on the left-hand side of the discontinuity, but we
also allow for a different slope on the left-hand side of the discontinuity
and include year fixed effects and demographic control variables. We
present results for the pre- and post-reform period, in Panel A and B
respectively.23 We find a small positive but statistically insignificant pre-
reform treatment effect for the NEETs rate on welfare, the NEETs rate not
on welfare and the total NEETs rate. In addition, both the treatment effect
on the employment rate and the education enrollment rate are negative
and statistically insignificant. For the post-reform period we find a small
22Similar plots for the employment rate and the enrollment rate in education are given
in Figure A.2.2 in the Supplementary material.
23Full regression results for the preferred RD specifications, for the pre- and post-reform
period respectively, can be found in Table A.2.12 and Table A.2.13 in the Supplementary
material. Furthermore, results for different RD specifications, for the pre- and post-reform
period respectively, can be found in Table A.2.14 and Table A.2.15 in the Supplementary
material. Figure A.2.3 shows that there is no manipulation in the running variable
(age of the child in months), and Figure A.2.4 and A.2.5 show that there are also no
discontinuities in the demographic control variables, either pre- or post-reform.
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Figure 2.3: Pre-reform (2007–2009) and post-reform (2010–2012)
outcome variables relative to the age threshold
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Notes: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands). Age is recentered around the
discontinuity (outcomes are measured in October, 1 is a person who has turned 27 in September). The solid
lines give the predictions from a RD regression without control variables, estimated separately on the left- and
right-hand side of the discontinuity. The dashed lines give the corresponding 95% confidence interval. NEETs
rates are individuals not in employment or education relative to the relevant age population.
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Table 2.6: Regression discontinuity: base regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Panel A: RD for the period 2007–2009
RD dummy 0.0020 0.0011 0.0031 −0.0044 0.0013
(placebo) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0022)
Observations 157,543 157,543 157,543 157,543 157,543
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Panel B: RD for the period 2010–2012
RD dummy −0.0014 0.0044∗∗ 0.0030 −0.0022 −0.0008
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0024)
Observations 158,195 158,195 158,195 158,195 158,195
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Panel C: DRD for the period 2007–2012
DRD dummy −0.0033∗ 0.0032 −0.0001 0.0022 −0.0021
(0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0030)
Observations 315,738 315,738 315,738 315,738 315,738
Clusters 108 108 108 108 108
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Cluster-robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (72 cluster for the RD estimates, 108 clusters for the DRD estimates).
The RD parameter estimates are for the RD dummy capturing a different intercept on the left-hand side of the
discontinuity, and also allow for a different slope on the left-hand side of the discontinuity, include year fixed effects
and include demographic control variables. Full regression results for the RD specifications for the period 2007–
2009 and 2010–2012 can be found in Table A.2.12 and A.2.13 in the Supplementary material, respectively. The DRD
parameter estimates are for the DRD dummy capturing the difference in the different intercept on the left-hand side
of the discontinuity from the period 2007–2009 to the period 2010–2012, and also allow for a different slope on the
left-hand side of the discontinuity, a change in the different slope on the left-hand side of the discontinuity, include
year fixed effects and include demographic control variables. Full regression results for the DRD specification can
be found in Table A.2.16 in the Supplementary material.
but now negative treatment effect for the NEETs rate on welfare, though
not statistically significant, a bigger positive and statistically significant
treatment effect for the NEETs rate not on welfare (at the 5% level), and a
small positive treatment effect for the total NEETs rate that is similar to the
effect in the pre-reform period. Furthermore, the post-reform treatment
effect is somewhat larger for the employment rate and somewhat smaller
for the enrollment rate in education.
Panel C of Table 2.6 then gives the coefficient on the ‘difference-in-
discontinuity’ dummy, which is very close to the difference in the discon-
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tinuity between the pre- and post-reform period.24 The results are similar
to the DD analysis. That is, there is a negative treatment effect on the
NEETs rate on welfare, statistically significant at the 10% level, a positive
treatment effect on the NEETs rate not on welfare and essentially no effect
on the total NEETs rate (and the treatment effects for the employment rate
and enrollment rate in education are insignificant).
The Supplementary material gives some additional analyses for the
RD analysis as well. RD plots by year are given in Figure A.2.6, A.2.7
and A.2.8. Consistent with the DD analysis, these graphs show that most
of the effect on the NEETs rate on welfare and the NEETs rate not on
welfare was confined to the year 2010, whereas there is no apparent effect
on the total NEETs rate in any year. Table A.2.17, A.2.18 and A.2.19 show
that we obtain qualitatively similar results when we use quarter of birth
instead of month of birth, or use a smaller or a larger bandwidth in age,
respectively. To control for potential anticipation and adaptation effects
close to and after reaching the age of 27, Table A.2.20 gives results of a
so-called donut RD (and DRD) analysis where we drop observations of
individuals three months on either side of the cutoff.25 These results are
very similar to the base RD and DRD specifications (and even closer to the
DD results than the base RD and DRD analysis). Finally, Table A.2.21 gives
the difference-in-discontinuity results for entry and exit probabilities. The
difference-in-discontinuity analysis also suggests a positive effect on the
exit probability from welfare, in line with the DD analysis, significant at
the 10 percent level. At the same time, however, it also suggests a negative
effect on the entry probability into welfare, significant at the 10 percent
level. Hence, the DRD analysis suggests there may have been some ‘threat
effect’ of the WIJ reform.
24Full regression results for the difference-in-discontinuity specification can be found
in Table A.2.16 in the Supplementary material.
25For an analysis of the implementation of donut RD designs, see e.g. Barreca et al.
(2011) or Barreca et al. (2016).
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Discussion and conclusion 2.6
In this paper we have studied the labour market effects of a Dutch manda-
tory activation program for individuals up to 26 years of age in The
Netherlands. We used differences-in-differences and regression discon-
tinuity, and a long and rich administrative dataset to uncover the effect
of the WIJ reform on the NEETs rate on welfare, the NEETs rate not on
welfare, the total NEETs rate, the employment rate and the enrollment rate
in education. We considered the separate treatment effects on individuals
20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age, using individuals 27–28 years of age
as the main control group. An extensive number of placebo tests suggests
that we can interpret the effects on the group 25–26 years of age as causal,
whereas the assumption of common-time effects seems questionable for
the the younger treatment groups. Focusing on the results for the group
25–26 years of age, we find that the reform reduced the number of NEETS
on welfare with a substantial 24%, with most of the effect in the first year
of the reform. However, the reform did not reduce the overall NEETs
rate, neither did it increase the employment rate nor did in increase the
enrollment rate in education. The reform mainly pushed individuals out
of welfare, where most of the effect appears to have come from an increase
in the exit rate from welfare rather than a decrease in the entry rate into
welfare.
Part of our findings are in line with previous studies on mandatory
activation programs targeted at young individuals. Consistent with Blun-
dell et al. (2004), Dahlberg et al. (2009), Persson and Vikman (2014) and
Hernæs et al. (2016), we find a substantial negative effect on the number of
young individuals on welfare. In line with Blundell et al. (2004), we find a
substantial positive effect of the reform on the exit rate out of welfare.26
Consistent with Blundell et al. (2004) and Dahlberg et al. (2009) we also
find that most of the effect was in the beginning of the reform period, and
then the effect diminishes in subsequent periods. As a potential expla-
nation Blundell et al. (2004) consider ‘cleaning up the registers’, which
26For a reform in Sweden, Persson and Vikman (2014) find no significant effect on the
exit rate from welfare, but a negative and statistically significant effect on the entry rate
into welfare. We find that the effect on entry is insignificant in our DD setup, but is also
negative and statistically significant in our DRD setup.
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have been noted of previous UK labour market reforms (Blundell et al.
2004, p. 594). A similar mechanism could be at work in the Dutch case.
Also consistent with Blundell et al. (2004), we find no evidence of spillover
effects to other groups. In particular, we find no effects on the group of
individuals that is one or two years older than the treatment group.
That being said, part of our findings are also at odds with previous
studies. In particular, while mandatory programs for young individuals
are usually associated with increased employment (Blundell et al. 2004;
Dahlberg et al. 2009; Persson and Vikman 2014) or education enrollment
(Hernæs et al. 2016), we find no evidence in this direction. One potential
explanation for this difference in findings is that we consider a country
where the NEETs rate is relatively low, see Table 2.1. The findings of
Hernæs et al. (2016) for Norway, a country with comparable level of
NEETs rates, however point at substantial program effects on employment
and education enrollment. Furthermore, also note that we find rather
similar treatment effects for regions with relatively low and relatively
high pre-reform unemployment rates. We argue that a more plausible
explanation for the absence of program effects on employment is that the
reform clashed head on with the Great Recession that started just prior
to the start of the WIJ reform. The Great Recession made it inherently
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more difficult for individuals, especially young individuals, to find work.
Indeed, Figure 2.4 shows the steep drop in the vacancy-to-unemployment
ratio during the reform period. This was quite different for the reforms
considered in previous studies. For the UK, (Blundell et al. 2004) note that
the New Deal was introduced at a favorable point of the business cycle
by historical standards, while stressing that “[C]learly, the program in
this favorable climate may not apply to less favorable periods.”Likewise,
the reforms in Sweden and Norway studied by Dahlberg et al. (2009),
Persson and Vikman (2014) and Hernæs et al. (2016) were implemented
in relatively favorable periods (the end of the 1990s). Our results thus
suggest that mandatory activation programs and work-learn arrangements
are a much less effective policy tool during a recession.
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Notes: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands). The solid black line denotes
the control group (27–28 years of age), the green lines denote treatment group 20–22, the blue lines denote
treatment group 23–24 and the red lines denote the treatment group 25–26 years of age. The dotted lines
denote the difference between the treatment group and the control group.
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Table A.2.1: Differences-in-differences: full results base regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treatment group 25–26 −0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0014 −0.0027 0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0032)
Treatment group 23–24 −0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0022 −0.0017 −0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0048)
Treatment group 20–22 −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0027 0.0070
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0054) (0.0056)
Group age 20 −0.0113∗∗∗ −0.0523∗∗∗ −0.0636∗∗∗ −0.3659∗∗∗ 0.4296∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0108) (0.0109)
Group age 21 −0.0088∗∗∗ −0.0532∗∗∗ −0.0620∗∗∗ −0.2886∗∗∗ 0.3506∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0093) (0.0092)
Group age 22 −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0436∗∗∗ −0.0550∗∗∗ −0.2069∗∗∗ 0.2619∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0087) (0.0085)
Group age 23 −0.0088∗∗∗ −0.0369∗∗∗ −0.0457∗∗∗ −0.1333∗∗∗ 0.1790∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0086) (0.0083)
Group age 24 −0.0065∗∗ −0.0325∗∗∗ −0.0390∗∗∗ −0.0674∗∗∗ 0.1065∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0083) (0.0075)
Group age 25 −0.0037 −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0269∗∗∗ −0.0151∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0071) (0.0054)
Group age 26 −0.0015 −0.0193∗∗∗ −0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0036 0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0042)
Group age 27 −0.0001 −0.0095∗∗∗ −0.0096∗∗ 0.0033 0.0063∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0030)
Female 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ 0.0878∗∗∗ −0.0728∗∗∗ −0.0151∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0026)
Non-Western immigrant 0.1046∗∗∗ 0.1271∗∗∗ 0.2317∗∗∗ −0.2087∗∗∗ −0.0229∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0062) (0.0041)
Western immigrant 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ −0.0828∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0033)
Unemployment rate 11.241∗∗∗ −1.5904∗∗ −0.4663 −2.2783∗∗ 27.446∗∗∗
(0.3483) (0.7155) (0.7731) (1.1161) (0.9373)
Unemployment rate* −0.1330∗∗∗ −0.2315∗∗ −0.3645∗∗∗ −0.3974∗ 0.7619∗∗∗
1(age=20) (0.0440) (0.0928) (0.0972) (0.2334) (0.2389)
Unemployment rate* −0.0526 −0.1317 −0.1844∗ −0.0603 0.2447
1(age=21) (0.0489) (0.0916) (0.0978) (0.2062) (0.2042)
Unemployment rate* 0.0572 −0.2257∗∗ −0.1685 0.0558 0.1126
1(age=22) (0.0484) (0.0966) (0.1032) (0.1937) (0.1920)
Unemployment rate* 0.0697 −0.1697∗ −0.1000 0.1004 −0.0004
1(age=23) (0.0529) (0.1028) (0.1070) (0.1810) (0.1802)
Unemployment rate* 0.0614 −0.0737 −0.0124 −0.0911 0.1034
1(age=24) (0.0635) (0.1071) (0.1174) (0.1833) (0.1685)
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Table A.1: Continued
Unemployment rate* 0.0170 −0.0496 −0.0326 −0.2982∗∗ 0.3308∗∗∗
1(age=25) (0.0645) (0.1093) (0.1166) (0.1501) (0.1194)
Unemployment rate* −0.0177 0.0302 0.0125 −0.2024 0.1899∗∗
1(age=26) (0.0558) (0.1110) (0.1189) (0.1397) (0.0888)
Unemployment rate* −0.0143 −0.0180 −0.0323 −0.0081 0.0405
1(age=27) (0.0408) (0.0756) (0.0845) (0.0998) (0.0634)
Trend age 20 0.0035∗∗ −0.0034 0.0001 −0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0038)
Trend age 21 0.0032∗∗ −0.0034 −0.0002 −0.0108∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0038)
Trend age 22 0.0032∗∗ −0.0030 0.0002 −0.0093∗∗ 0.0091∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0037)
Trend age 23 0.0030∗∗ −0.0038 −0.0008 −0.0069 0.0076∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0037)
Trend age 24 0.0030∗∗ −0.0046 −0.0015 −0.0039 0.0054
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0038)
Trend age 25 0.0032∗∗ −0.0057∗∗ −0.0026 −0.0017 0.0042
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0038)
Trend age 26 0.0032∗∗ −0.0065∗∗ −0.0032 0.0004 0.0028
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0038)
Trend age 27 0.0030∗∗ −0.0069∗∗ −0.0039 0.0018 0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0037)
Trend age 28 0.0030∗∗ −0.0080∗∗∗ −0.0050 0.0035 0.0015
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0037)
Trend female −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trend non-Western −0.0059∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗
immigrant (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Trend Western −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0012∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
immigrant (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Observations 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256
Clusters 264 264 264 264 264
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012.
Treatment groups: 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age.Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters). All specifications include demographic controls,
unemployment rate-age interactions, age-specific trends and control-specific trends.
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Table A.2.2: Differences-in-differences: 27–28 as placebo treatment group and 29–30 as
control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treatment group 27–28 −0.0003 0.0038 0.0035 −0.0052∗ 0.0017
(placebo) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0017)
Treatment group 25–26 −0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0048 −0.0076∗ 0.0028
(0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0032)
Treatment group 23–24 −0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗ 0.0017 −0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Treatment group 20–22 −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0021 −0.0064∗∗ −0.0021 0.0085
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0054) (0.0053)
Observations 2,143,282 2,143,282 2,143,282 2,143,282 2,143,282
Clusters 288 288 288 288 288
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment
groups: 20–22, 23–24, and 25–26 years of age, placebo treatment group: 27–28 years of age. Control group: 29–30 years of age.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (288 clusters).
Table A.2.3: Differences-in-differences: 27–29 as placebo treatment group and 30–31 as
control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treatment group 27–29 0.0010 0.0027 0.0038 −0.0029 −0.0009
(placebo) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0013)
Treatment group 25–26 −0.0037∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0057∗ −0.0067∗ 0.0010
(0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0031)
Treatment group 23–24 −0.0030∗∗ 0.0056∗ 0.0025 −0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0045)
Treatment group 20–22 −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0025 −0.0056∗∗ −0.0012 0.0068
(0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0054) (0.0053)
Observations 2,362,916 2,362,916 2,362,916 2,362,916 2,362,916
Clusters 300 300 300 300 300
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment
groups: 20–22, 23–24, and 25–26 years of age and placebo treatment group: 27–29 years of age. Control group: 30–31 years of
age. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (300 clusters).
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Table A.2.4: Differences-in-differences: 26 as treatment group and 27 as control group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0016)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0019 0.0019
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0026)
NEETs rate 0.0047∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0031 −0.0024 −0.0025
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Employment rate −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0118∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ 0.0041 0.0041
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0033 −0.0017 −0.0016
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Demographic controls NO YES YES YES YES
Unemployment-age dummies NO NO YES YES YES
Age-specific trends NO NO NO YES YES
Control-specific trends NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 381,495 381,495 381,495 381,495 381,495
Clusters 180 180 180 180 180
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment
group: 26 years of age. Control group: 27 years of age. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month
of birth 180 clusters).
Table A.2.5: Differences-in-differences: estimated standard errors for different levels of
clustering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treatment group 25–26 −0.0046 0.0060 0.0014 −0.0027 0.0013
Cluster(Individual) (0.0012)∗∗∗ (0.0025)∗∗ (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0020)
Cluster(Month of birth) (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0023)∗∗∗ (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0032)
Cluster(Year of birth) (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0013)∗∗∗ (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0043)
Treatment group 23–24 −0.0040)∗∗∗ 0.0022) −0.0017) −0.0145)∗∗∗ 0.0163)∗∗∗
Cluster(Individual) (0.0013)∗∗∗ (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0039)∗∗∗ (0.0030)∗∗∗
Cluster(Month of birth) (0.0015)∗∗∗ (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0047)∗∗∗ (0.0048)∗∗∗
Cluster(Year of birth) (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0059)∗∗ (0.0059)∗∗
Treatment group 20–22 −0.0040 −0.0057 −0.0097 0.0027 0.0070
Cluster(Individual) (0.0012)∗∗ (0.0024)∗∗ (0.0026)∗∗∗ (0.0035) (0.0029)∗∗
Cluster(Month of birth) (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0021)∗∗∗ (0.0027)∗∗∗ (0.0054) (0.0056)
Cluster(Year of birth) (0.0014)∗∗∗ (0.0013)∗∗∗ (0.0023)∗∗∗ (0.0056) (0.0054)
Observations 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment groups:
20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age. Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
individuals (321,474 clusters), month of birth (264 clusters) and year of birth (23 clusters).
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Table A.2.6: Differences-in-differences: entry and exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
Entry 0.0000 0.0028∗ 0.0007 0.0034 −0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0008)
Exit 0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0025 0.0060∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0024)
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
Entry −0.0004 0.0023 0.0004 0.0005 −0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0009)
Exit 0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗ −0.0026∗ −0.0027∗ 0.0058∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0024)
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
Entry −0.0011∗ −0.0031∗∗ −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0127∗∗∗ −0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0008)
Exit 0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0025∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0082∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0022)
Observations 1,588,817 1,588,817 1,588,817 1,588,817 1,588,817
Clusters 252 252 252 252 252
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment groups:
20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age. Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
month of birth (252 clusters). Entry and exit are measured relative to the relevant age population. In this way entry and exit effects are
directly comparable to the effects on the stocks, and to each other.
Table A.2.7: Differences-in-differences: treatment ef-





Treatment group 25–26 −0.0012 0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Treatment group 23–24 −0.0019∗∗ −0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0009)




Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at
the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment groups: 20–22, 23–24
and 25–26 years of age. Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters).
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Table A.2.8: Differences-in-differences: treatment effect on the probability
of being a particular household type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult children Singles Single Couples
living with parents
parent
Treatment group 25–26 −0.0002 −0.0016 −0.0020 0.0047
(0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0059)
Treatment group 23–24 −0.0019 0.0029 −0.0020 0.0036
(0.0077) (0.0039) (0.0014) (0.0074)
Treatment group 20–22 −0.0039 −0.0016 −0.0016 0.0099
(0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0012) (0.0061)
Observations 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256 1,725,256
Clusters 264 264 264 264
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period
1999–2012. Treatment groups: 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age. Control group: 27–28 years of age.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters).
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Table A.2.9: Differences-in-differences: treatment effects by household types
Adult children Singles Single Couples
living with parents
parent
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0099∗∗∗ −0.0058∗ −0.0697∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0298) (0.0010)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0006 0.0062 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0052∗
(0.0070) (0.0041) (0.0229) (0.0031)
NEETs rate −0.0094 0.0003 0.0048 0.0052
(0.0071) (0.0055) (0.0289) (0.0032)
Employment rate 0.0049 0.0063 −0.0025 −0.0082∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0300) (0.0036)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0045 −0.0067 −0.0023 0.0029
(0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0164) (0.0024)
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0096∗∗∗ −0.0056∗ −0.0731∗∗ 0.0019
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0370) (0.0015)
NEETs rate not on welfare −0.0036 0.0022 0.0893∗∗∗ 0.0021
(0.0062) (0.0046) (0.0249) (0.0039)
NEETs rate −0.0132∗∗ −0.0034 0.0162 0.0041
(0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0343) (0.0040)
Employment rate −0.0131 −0.0035 −0.0052 −0.0162∗∗∗
(0.0086) (0.0100) (0.0349) (0.0055)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0069 −0.0110 0.0122∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0091) (0.0237) (0.0051)
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0091∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0161 0.0020
(0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0387) (0.0015)
NEETs rate not on welfare −0.0129∗∗ −0.0052 0.0391 0.0098∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0267) (0.0041)
NEETs rate −0.0220∗∗∗ −0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0230 0.0118∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0401) (0.0044)
Employment rate 0.0010 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0433 0.0004
(0.0088) (0.0079) (0.0330) (0.0081)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0210∗∗∗ −0.0126 −0.0663∗∗ −0.0122
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0281) (0.0077)
Observations 605,177 361,488 23,566 714,313
Clusters 264 264 264 264
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–
2012. Treatment groups: 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age. Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters). All specifications include demographic
controls, unemployment rate-age interactions, age-specific trends and control-specific trends.
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Table A.2.10: Differences-in-differences: treatment effect by gender and ethnicity
Females Males Natives Immigrants
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0049∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0120∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0052)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0057 0.0058∗∗ 0.0019 0.0244∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0064)
NEETs rate 0.0009 0.0013 −0.0014 0.0124
(0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0079)
Employment rate −0.0030 −0.0023 −0.0002 −0.0117
(0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0090)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0021 0.0010 0.0016 −0.0007
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0066)
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0050∗∗ −0.0035∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0062
(0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0056)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0028 0.0015 −0.0017 0.0179∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0076)
NEETs rate −0.0022 −0.0020 −0.0057∗ 0.0117
(0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0094)
Employment rate −0.0071 −0.0220∗∗∗ −0.0133∗∗∗ −0.0141
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0118)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0093 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0024
(0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0094)
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0047∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0084∗
(0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0050)
NEETs rate not on welfare −0.0088∗∗ −0.0028 −0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0044
(0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0071)
NEETs rate −0.0135∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0040
(0.0044) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0090)
Employment rate 0.0179∗∗∗ −0.0117∗ −0.0019 0.0324∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0055) (0.0107)
Enrollment rate in education −0.0044 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗ −0.0285∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0095)
Observations 858,695 866,561 1,429,549 295,707
Clusters 264 264 264 264
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 1999–2012.
Treatment groups: 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26 years of age.Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters). All specifications include demographic controls,
unemployment rate-age interactions, age-specific trends and control-specific trends.
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Table A.2.11: Differences-in-differences: treatment ef-
fect by pre-reform regional unemploy-
ment rate
(1) (2)
Pre-reform regional unemployment Low High
Panel A: Treatment group 25–26
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0031∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0058)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0041 0.0081∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0035)
NEETs rate 0.0010 0.0022
(0.0035) (0.0038)
Employment rate −0.0034 −0.0024
(0.0045) (0.0046)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0024 0.0002
(0.0038) (0.0037)
Panel B: Treatment group 23–24
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0034∗∗ −0.0044∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0020)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0016 0.0032
(0.0035) (0.0037)
NEETs rate −0.0018 −0.0011
(0.0040) (0.0043)
Employment rate −0.0202∗∗∗ −0.0095
(0.0059) (0.0063)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0106∗
(0.0055) (0.0058)
Panel C: Treatment group 20–22
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0033∗∗ −0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0018)
NEETs rate not on welfare −0.0081∗∗∗ −0.0035
(0.0029) (0.0031)
NEETs rate −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0083∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0038)
Employment rate 0.0023 0.0035
(0.0064) (0.0064)




Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the
1% level. Sample period 1999–2012. Treatment groups: 20–22, 23–24 and 25–26
years of age. Control group: 27–28 years of age. Cluster-robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (264 clusters). 5 regions with on
average the lowest unemployment in 1999-2009: Utrecht, Noord-Brabant, Zee-
land, Gelderland, Noord-Holland, 7 regions with on average the highest un-
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Figure A.2.2: Regression discontinuity: pre-reform (2007–2009)
and post-reform (2010–2012) other outcome vari-
ables
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Notes: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands). Employment rates are the em-
ployed relative to the population and enrollment rates are individuals in education relative to the population.
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Figure A.2.4: Regression discontinuity: control variables rela-
tive to discontinuity (2007–2009)
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Figure A.2.5: Regression discontinuity: control variables rela-
tive to discontinuity (2010–2012)
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Table A.2.12: Regression discontinuity: pre-reform full regression results (2007–2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treat RD 0.0020 0.0011 0.0031 −0.0044 0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0022)
Age in months 0.0001 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Age in months -left from cutoff 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0001 0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Year 2008 −0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0007 −0.0015 0.0033∗∗ −0.0018
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0011)
Year 2009 0.0004 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0012)
Female 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0507∗∗∗ −0.0328∗∗∗ −0.0179∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0015)
Non-Western immigrant 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.1002∗∗∗ 0.1612∗∗∗ −0.2077∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0034)
Western immigrant 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗ −0.0881∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0037)
Observations 157,543 157,543 157,543 157,543 157,543
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2007–2009. Treatment group 25–26
and control group 27–28. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (72 clusters).
Table A.2.13: Regression discontinuity: post-reform full regression results (2010–2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treat RD −0.0014 0.0044∗∗ 0.0030 −0.0022 −0.0008
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0024)
Age in months 0.0001∗ −0.0001 0.0000 0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Age in months -left from cutoff −0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Year 2011 0.0019∗∗ −0.0008 0.0011 −0.0036∗ 0.0025
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0015)
Year 2012 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ −0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0015)
Female 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗∗ −0.0157∗∗∗ −0.0163∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0018)
Non-Western immigrant 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0969∗∗∗ 0.1539∗∗∗ −0.2164∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0039)
Western immigrant 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗∗ −0.0982∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0053) (0.0033)
Observations 158,195 158,195 158,195 158,195 158,195
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2010–2012. Treatment group 25–26
and control group 27–28. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (72 clusters).
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Table A.2.14: Regression discontinuity: different sets of control variables (2007–2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NEETs rate on welfare 0.0020 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023)
Total NEETs rate 0.0028 0.0028 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0031
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Employment rate −0.0032 −0.0031 −0.0041 −0.0035 −0.0034 −0.0044
(0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Enrollment rate in education 0.0003 0.0003 0.0012 0.0004 0.0003 0.0013
(0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0022)
Age in months squared NO YES NO NO YES NO
(Age in months) x 1(age<27) NO NO YES NO NO YES
Demographic controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 157,543 157,543 157,543 157,543 157,543 157,543
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72 72
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2007–2009. Treatment group 25–26
and control group 27–28. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (72 clusters).
Table A.2.15: Regression discontinuity: different sets of control variables (2010–2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NEETs rate on welfare −0.0018 −0.0018 −0.0017 −0.0014 −0.0014 −0.0014
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
NEETs rate not on welfare 0.0041 0.0041 0.0040 0.0045∗∗ 0.0044∗∗ 0.0044∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Total NEETs rate 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0031 0.0030 0.0030
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Employment rate 0.0005 0.0002 −0.0009 −0.0008 −0.0011 −0.0022
(0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0030)
Enrollment rate in education −0.0028 −0.0025 −0.0013 −0.0023 −0.0019 −0.0008
(0.0035) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Age in months squared NO YES NO NO YES NO
(Age in months) x 1(age<27) NO NO YES NO NO YES
Demographic controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 158,195 158,195 158,195 158,195 158,195 158,195
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72 72
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.Sample period 2010–2012. Treatment group 25–26
and control group 27–28. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (72 clusters).
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Table A.2.16: Difference-in-discontinuity: full regression results (2007–2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treat RD x 1(year>2009) −0.0033∗ 0.0032 −0.0001 0.0022 −0.0021
(0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0030)
Treat RD 0.0020 0.0011 0.0031 −0.0044 0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0022)
Age in months 0.0001 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Age in months x 1(year>2009) 0.0001 −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Age in months x 1(age<27) 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0001 0.0024 −0.0023
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Age in months x 1(age<27) −0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 −0.0004
x1(year>2009) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Year 2008 −0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0007 −0.0015 0.0033∗∗ −0.0018
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0011)
Year 2009 0.0004 0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ −0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0012)
Year 2010 0.0014 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ −0.0243∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0022)
Year 2011 0.0033∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ −0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0023)
Year 2012 0.0041∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ −0.0437∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0022)
Female 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗ −0.0242∗∗∗ −0.0171∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0011)
Non-Western immigrant 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0987∗∗∗ 0.1577∗∗∗ −0.2122∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0029)
Western immigrant 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗∗ −0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0026)
Observations 315,738 315,738 315,738 315,738 315,738
Clusters 108 108 108 108 108
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2007–2012. Treatment group 25–26
and control group 27–28. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (72 clusters).
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Table A.2.17: Difference-in-discontinuity: wider bandwith, quarter of birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treat RD x 1(year>2009) −0.0030 0.0023 −0.0007 0.0030 −0.0023
(0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0054) (0.0030)
Treat RD 0.0016 0.0017 0.0033 −0.0072 0.0039
(0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0025)
Observations 315,738 315,738 315,738 315,738 315,738
Clusters 36 36 36 36 36
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2007–2012. Treatment group
25–26 and control group 27–28. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (108).
Table A.2.18: Difference-in-discontinuity: smaller age range 26–27
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treat RD x 1(year>2009) −0.0013 0.0081 0.0068 −0.0027 −0.0041
(0.0036) (0.0059) (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0046)
Treat RD 0.0033 0.0024 0.0058 −0.0130∗∗ 0.0072∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0030)
Observations 157,399 157,399 157,399 157,399 157,399
Clusters 84 84 84 84 84
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2007–2012. Treatment group
26 and control group 27 Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (84).
Table A.2.19: Difference-in-discontinuity: wider age range 24–29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Treat RD x 1(year>2009) −0.0030∗ 0.0050∗ 0.0020 −0.0000 −0.0019
(0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0046) (0.0031)
Treat RD 0.0013 0.0009 0.0021 0.0036 −0.0057∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0024)
Observations 475,213 475,213 475,213 475,213 475,213
Clusters 132 132 132 132 132
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2007–2012. Treatment group
24–26 and control group 27–29. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (132).
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Table A.2.20: Regression discontinuity and difference-in-discontinuity: treatment
effects using donut regression discontinuity and donut difference-
in-discontinuity (2007–2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Panel A: Donut RD for the period 2007–2009
RD dummy 0.0017 –0.0011 0.0006 0.0024 –0.0031
(placebo) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0022)
Observations 137,698 137,698 137,698 137,698 137,698
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Panel B: Donut RD for the period 2010–2012
RD dummy −0.0024 0.0032 0.0008 0.0042 –0.0050∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0022)
Observations 138,456 138,456 138,456 138,456 138,456
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Panel C: Donut DRD for the period 2007–2012
DRD dummy −0.0041∗ 0.0042 0.0001 0.0018 −0.0019
(0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0033)
Observations 276,154 276,154 276,154 276,154 276,154
Clusters 108 108 108 108 108
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Sample period 2007–2012.
Treatment group 25–26 and control group 27–28. RD and DRD without observations for 3 age months before and after
the cutoff. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth. The RD parameter estimates
are for the RD dummy capturing a different intercept on the left hand side of the discontinuity, and also allow for a
different slope on the left hand side of the discontinuity, include year fixed effects and include demographic control
variables. The DRD parameter estimates are for the DRD dummy capturing the difference in the different intercept
on the left hand side of the discontinuity from the period 2007–2009 to the period 2010–2012, and also allow for a
different slope on the left hand side of the discontinuity, a change in the different slope on the left hand side of the
discontinuity, include year fixed effects and include demographic control variables.
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Table A.2.21: Difference-in-discontinuity: entry and exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEETs rate NEETs rate Total Employment Enrollment rate
on welfare not on welfare NEETs rate rate in education
Entry
DRD dummy −0.0023∗ 0.0014 −0.0005 0.0024 −0.0005
(0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0014)
Exit
DRD dummy 0.0021∗ −0.0026 −0.0001 −0.0011 0.0026
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Observations 315,495 315,495 315,495 315,495 315,495
Clusters 108 108 108 108 108
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Cluster-robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by month of birth (108 clusters). The DRD parameter estimates are for the DRD
dummy capturing the difference in the different intercept on the left hand side of the discontinuity from the period
2007–2009 to the period 2010–2012, and also allow for a different slope on the left hand side of the discontinuity,




3 The Added Worker Effect in the
Netherlands Before and During
the Great Recession
Abstract
We study the added worker effect in the Netherlands before and during
the Great Recession. We use a large administrative panel dataset for the
period 1999–2015 and employ differences-in-differences to estimate the
effect of male partner’s unemployment shock on female partner’s income.
We find a modest added worker effect of 2-5% of the male partner’s
income loss. The added worker effect disappeared in the beginning of
the Great Recession, but resurfaced a few years later. Furthermore, we
show that self-employment has become more important in dealing with
unemployment shocks.
The chapter is co-authored by Egbert Jongen en Pierre Koning. We are grateful
for comments and suggestions by seminar and conference participants at CPB Nether-
lands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and the IIPF 2018 Conference in Tampere.
Remaining errors are my own.
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
68 The Added Worker Effect Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
Since the start of the Great Recession, policymakers and academics have
shown increased interest in the effect of unemployment shocks on the
labor supply of partners of the unemployed workers – also known as
the added worker effect (henceforth AWE). While the empirical literature
generally finds the AWE to be small – see e.g. Hardoy and Schøne (2014),
Halla et al. (2018) and Bredtmann et al. (2018) for recent contributions
– a pertaining question is whether the AWE has grown in importance
in the years following the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. With
markedly higher unemployment risks and larger shocks in wage earnings
that have occurred in this period, one may expect the AWE to have
become more sizable. At the same time, however, increases in labor
supply may to a lesser extent have been translated into more employment
during an economic downturn and high unemployment rates may have
discouraged partners from entering the labor market. From a theoretical
perspective, the overall effect of changes in business cycles on the AWE is
thus ambiguous.
This paper studies how the AWE is related to changes over the business
cycle in the Netherlands during the period 2003-2015. For this purpose,
we use administrative data from the Labour Market Panel of Statistics
Netherlands. The Labour Market Panel tracks the labor market histories
of 1.8 million individuals for the period 1999-2015, as well as their social
security records and profits from self-employment. In addition, the panel
contains information on demographics, household characteristics and
education levels of individuals.
We contribute to the literature by investigating how AWE changed over
the business cycle in the Netherlands, using data that cover periods before
and during the Great Recession. We study the AWE for couples who are
confronted with large and persistent income shocks in comparison with
other studies on the AWE. These larger income shocks follow both from the
Great Recession and from studying the effects of entering unemployment
insurance (UI) rather than studying the effects of mass layoffs.1 We further
1In contrast with studies on mass layoffs, we do not study the effects for households
that were displaced but never entered UI.
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shed light on two distinctive features of the Dutch labour market. First,
we assess the importance of the substantial and increasing share of self-
employed that may have provided increasing opportunities to mitigate
partners’ income shocks. Second, the Netherlands is a country that has
seen a steep rise in the employment rate of women, while remaining the
country with the highest share of part-time employment in the OECD.
In this context, it is interesting to study the AWE at the extensive and
intensive margin, and potential changes in the role of these margins over
time.
Our research strategy compares women with male partners who be-
came unemployed to women with male partners that remained employed
in a given year. Using a differences-in-differences design with individual
fixed effects, we estimate the impact of a male partners unemployment
shock in a particular year on the earnings of both partners, the employ-
ment of the female partner, income from unemployment insurance (UI)
and other social benefits, and profits from self-employment – all measured
over a time window from 4 years before entering UI, the year of enter-
ing UI and 3 years after entering UI. With these results, we assess the
importance of a rich set of income sources that may mitigate the drop
in household income due to the job loss of the male partner. By taking
different reference years for the unemployment shocks occurring in our
sample, we assess how the effects vary over the business cycle and over
time more broadly.
Throughout the empirical analysis, a key challenge is to construct
treatment and control groups that have common time effects. For this
reason, we select a sample of individuals between the age of 25 and 55 who
received annual earnings from labor of at least 5,000 euro and no income
from benefits in the 4 years preceding the possible receipt of UI benefits.
As such, each yearly cohort consists of individuals with relatively stable
positions on the labour market for which income shocks are plausibly
exogenous. In addition, the inclusion of time dummies in the two years
before becoming unemployed allows us to conduct placebo analyses on
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Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the unemploy-
ment shock of a male partner, causing a loss in gross income of 20 to 30
thousand euro, has a small, positive and statistically significant AWE of
2-5% (500-1,000 euros). This is comparable to the AWE estimates of Juhn
and Potter (2007), Hardoy and Schøne (2014), Starr (2014), Halla et al.
(2018) and Bredtmann et al. (2018).2 Second, the AWE that we estimate
largely disappears during the first years of the Great Recession (2008-2009).
While this may appear at odds with earlier research in this field – see e.g.
Mattingly and Smith (2010) and Bredtmann et al. (2018) – it is in line with
Halla et al. (2018) who find AWE on earnings to be confined to districts
with low unemployment rates.3 Third, our findings point to the existence
of both intensive and extensive margin added worker effects. As such,
we add to a literature that provides mixed evidence on the importance
of intensive and extensive margin effects – see e.g. Hardoy and Schøne
(2014), Halla et al. (2018) and Bredtmann et al. (2018). The decrease in the
AWE at the start of the Great Recession is mostly driven by decreases at
the intensive margin, i.e. less additional hours worked by partners that
were already employed. Finally, we find an AWE of about 2% (500 euro)
of profits from self-employment of the female partner and the treatment
effect on male partner’s profits more than doubled from about 2,000 euro
3 years after entering UI in 2004 to about 4,500 euro 3 years after entering
UI in 2012.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 gives background
information on the Dutch labor market and the UI system. Section 3.3
considers the empirical methodology. Section 3.4 discusses the dataset
and gives descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 presents the estimation results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
2Table A.3.1 in the appendix gives a detailed overview of the literature on the AWE.
3In addition, Juhn and Potter (2007) and Bryan and Longhi (2013) find evidence of
positive labor force participation effects of partners in an economic downturn that do not
translate into increases of employment.
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Institutional setting 3.2
Bearing in mind that the room for an AWE is likely to be driven by
contextual factors, this section sheds light on the institutions and the labor
market situation in the Netherlands in the time period under investigation.
In particular, we highlight the high share of part-time employment among
women and the increasing and substantial share of self-employment in the
labor force.
Figure 3.1a presents the labor force participation rates for women
in 2000 and 2015 for 16 developed OECD countries. The Netherlands
has experienced one of the fastest increases in the female labor force
participation rate over the period 2000-2015 (amounting to almost 10
percentage points). As a result, the Netherlands has reached female
participation levels that are close to those in Scandinavian countries.4 As
Bredtmann et al. (2018) argue, higher female labor force participation rates
are expected to limit the room for extensive margin effects. At the same
time, panel (b) of Figure 3.1 suggests that the high share of part-time
employment still provides room for women to increase working hours.
This makes the Netherlands a particularly interesting case to study AWE
effects at the intensive margin.
Between 2000 and 2015, the Dutch labour market has also been marked
by a strong increase in the share of employees on fixed-term contracts
and the increase in the share of self-employed. The share of employees
on fixed-term contracts increased from around 15% in 2000 to slightly
more than 20% in 2016, which is one of the highest across OECD countries
(OECD 2018c). As panel (c) of Figure 3.1 shows, the increase in the share
of self-employed in the Netherlands was the largest for OECD countries
(OECD 2018c). Self-employment may have increasingly been used to
mitigate income shocks caused by unemployment (OECD 2018c).
To provide insight in the economic conditions over time, Figure 3.1d
shows the unemployment rate for the Netherlands and several other OECD
countries. The unemployment rate of the Netherlands, denoted by the
blue dotted line, was very low from an international perspective in the
4For men, the Netherlands has the third highest labor force participation rate of the
OECD in 2015, see Figure A.3.1 in the Supplementary Material.
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
72 The Added Worker Effect Chapter 3
Figure 3.1: International comparison of labor markets
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Notes: Data are obtained from OECD (2018a,d,e, 2019a,b) and from Statistics Netherlands (Statline).
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beginning of the 21st century. The unemployment rate increased from
3.1 in 2001 to almost 5.8 percent in 2005 due to the burst of the dot-com
bubble, after which it decreased again to 3.7% in 2008. The increase in the
unemployment rate in 2009 was smaller in the Netherlands than in most
other OECD countries affected by the Great Recession, but the increase
persisted for a longer period of time, reaching a peak of 7.4% in 2014. To
complement this data, Figure 3.1e pictures the vacancy-to-unemployment
ratio in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2015. This shows that there
was an economic downturn in the years 2003-2005 and 2009-2015.
Finally, it is worth noting that UI reforms were implemented in 2006.
This implied that the maximum entitlement period was reduced from 60
to 38 months. As panel (f) of Figure 3.1 shows, this has caused a drop in
the net replacement rate for individuals that are long-term unemployed,
from about 70% to 50%. This in turn may have increased the need for
intra-household insurance via an AWE.
Empirical strategy 3.3
Essentially, empirical analyses on the AWE require two major ingredients.
First, the idea is to follow behavioral responses to an income shock that
is plausibly exogenous and cannot be anticipated by workers’ partners.
Obvious candidates for such shocks are plant closures, mass layoffs or
involuntary firings. Second, one needs to construct control groups of
workers that are not hit by these shocks, but do have time effects that
are common to the treatment group. Accordingly, the estimation of AWE
typically follows a differences-in-differences design to estimate the effect
of income shocks on outcome measures. This is also the approach we
follow.
While most studies consider the effect of bankruptcies or mass-layoffs
to define treatment groups – see e.g. Hardoy and Schøne (2014) and Halla
et al. (2018) – we use the inflow into UI benefits. Bearing in mind that
the UI benefits are only received for those fired involuntarily, our key
assumption is that workers cannot anticipate the timing of this event. We
argue that this assumption is not necessarily stronger than in the case of
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
74 The Added Worker Effect Chapter 3
mass layoffs or plant closures. Similar to these cases, testing potential
anticipation effects remains a crucial part of our estimation approach. An
advantage of our approach is that we consider income shocks that are
expected to be more sizable than income shocks in case of mass-layoffs.
In particular, including couples with male partners finding a job after
displacement would limit the shock effect, making it harder to infer an
AWE, which are typically found to be relatively small.
As a second ingredient of our analysis, we select couples 25–55 years
of age with male partners with an income from work of at least 5,000
euro and with no income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in
the years before becoming unemployed. These sample selection criteria
ensure that the treatment and control groups have similar (stable) labor
market positions for a long stretch of time.
To formalize matters, we define the treatment group as those women
with a partner who worked in t-1 and started receiving UI benefits in
period t. The control group contains women with a partner who did
not receive UI benefits in both period t-1 and t. For each year in our
sample, we construct treatment and cohort groups this way. In effect, this
means that we have 10 cohort years (2003-2012) for which we constructed
balanced samples including 4 years before becoming unemployed, the
year of the income shock, and 3 years thereafter. For these samples, we
estimate linear models that are specified as follows:




d jit γj + �it. (3.1)
for individual i in year t. In the above specification, the outcome variables
Y are regressed on a set of time-varying demographic controls (age) Xit,
year fixed effects (τt), individual fixed effects (αi), and the treatment
dummies d jit which are equal to one if the partner of woman i became
unemployed in year t, j years from year t, and zero otherwise. The residual
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term �it is assumed to be i.i.d.5 Equation [3.1] can be estimated with fixed
effects estimation.6 As such, we control for a priori differences in outcome
values between the treatment and control groups.
Our parameters of interest that describe the AWE are included in
vector γ. For values of j that are zero or positive, γ equals the short- and
longer-term effects of the unemployment shock. For the two pre-treatment
dummies, the values of j are negative and γ captures potential anticipation
effects or different trends in the two years before the husbands’ income
shock, hence these are placebo tests.
Data 3.4
We use administrative data from the Labour Market Panel (In Dutch:
Arbeidsmarktpanel) of Statistics Netherlands (2015). The Labour Market
Panel is a large and rich household panel data set, tracking 1.8 million
individuals over the period 1999–2015. The main outcome variables we
consider are female partner’s wages and profits from self-employment,
male partner’s wages and profits from self-employment, income from UI
benefits, social assistance benefits, welfare benefits, disability benefits and
other benefits. In addition, we estimate the AWE on the participation rate
and on the number of hours worked that are observed in the data.7 All
variables are measured on an annual basis.
As argued earlier, we select couples in which both partners are 25–
55 years of age to make sure that the treatment and control group are
comparable. While younger individuals are often studying or living with
their parents, older individuals may anticipate old age benefits in the years
before retirement. Also, note that we restrict the sample to heterosexual
5In the results section we consider different levels of clustering of the standard error,
which may be at the level of provinces, provinces interacted with nationality and the
individual level, and show that our results are robust in terms of statistical significance
using different levels of clustering.
6Note that the group dummy is absorbed by the individual fixed effects.
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couples, who also stay together during the full 8 years in the balanced
samples.8
Table 3.1 presents sample characteristics for our balanced panel consist-
ing of ‘treated’ individuals and untreated individuals, for selected cohorts
(2004, 2008 and 2012) to ease the exposition. The table shows the values
that are averaged over the pre-treatment period, consisting of the four
periods before the ‘treated’ individuals enter UI. First, the table shows
the mean values of demographic variables. Comparing treatment and
control groups, we find relatively small differences in age for both male
and female partners. There are some differences in the treatment group
and control group regarding ethnicity and the level of education, however,
below we show that we obtain similar results for the AWE when we ex-
clude or include demographic control variables (and exclude individual
fixed effects).
Regarding the outcome variables in our analysis, Table 3.1 shows some
differences in earnings in the pre-treatment period for the treatment and
control groups. Men in the treatment group earned 3,000-4,000 euro (about
8%) less in the treatment group compared to the control group for the
treatment years 2004 and 2012, whereas men who became unemployed in
2008 earned slightly more than the control group. Male partner’s income
from profits is slightly smaller in the treatment group than in the control
group for the treatment years 2008 and 2012. Female partner’s income
from work and from profits as well as their employment rates are all about
the same for the treatment and control groups for the different treatment
years.
8We do not consider same-sex couples because the distinction between same-sex
couples and friends living together is harder to make with the data. Furthermore, we do
not consider the effect of entering UI on the stability of relationships.
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Table 3.1: Sample characteristics (standard deviations in parentheses)
2004 2008 2012
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
group group group group group group




Age 40.908 41.190 42.349 42.151 43.459 43.430
(7.534) (7.322) (7.069) (7.023) (6.840) (6.653)
Western immigrant 0.087 0.067 0.087 0.066 0.068 0.064
(0.281) (0.250) (0.282) (0.248) (0.251) (0.245)
Non-Western immigrant 0.068 0.033 0.065 0.043 0.064 0.050
(0.252) (0.180) (0.247) (0.202) (0.244) (0.218)
Medium education level 0.447 0.434 0.427 0.439 0.455 0.446
(0.497) (0.496) (0.495) (0.496) (0.498) (0.497)
High education level 0.272 0.334 0.334 0.344 0.283 0.350
(0.445) (0.472) (0.472) (0.475) (0.451) (0.477)
Women
Age 38.745 39.051 40.216 40.018 41.306 41.338
(7.592) (7.376) (7.245) (7.140) (6.989) (6.833)
Western immigrant 0.087 0.075 0.112 0.075 0.071 0.075
(0.281) (0.263) (0.316) (0.263) (0.257) (0.263)
Non-Western immigrant 0.067 0.037 0.066 0.048 0.071 0.055
(0.251) (0.190) (0.248) (0.214) (0.256) (0.229)
Medium education level 0.436 0.471 0.435 0.485 0.491 0.497
(0.496) (0.499) (0.496) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
High education level 0.253 0.247 0.281 0.275 0.265 0.294
(0.435) (0.431) (0.449) (0.446) (0.441) (0.455)
Number of children 1.435 1.558 1.540 1.655 1.675 1.749
(1.082) (1.128) (1.091) (1.088) (1.044) (1.048)
Dependent variables
Men
Income from work 36,627 39,710 46,622 45,793 49,999 53,978
(21,578) (23,953) (45,905) (32,151) (35,841) (39,956)
Income from profits 170 189 151 311 −58 294
(7,722) (4,826) (3,978) (6,340) (10,520) (7,273)
Women
Income from work 12,609 12,353 14,900 15,082 18,651 18,950
(12,357) (12,141) (14,478) (15,322) (17,219) (17,583)
Income from profits 626 420 857 626 912 1040
(7,329) (4,904) (8,235) (6,411) (7,832) (9,009)
Employment rate 0.752 0.757 0.765 0.796 0.801 0.826
(0.432) (0.429) (0.424) (0.403) (0.399) (0.379)
Hours worked 876 817 885 882 925 944
(974) (916) (920) (968) (667) (639)
Observations 7,952 483,240 3,632 437,252 8,552 353,204
Number of individuals 1,988 120,810 908 109,313 2,138 88,301
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 The added worker effect
Figure 3.2 presents graphical evidence of the AWE, showing the average
income of female partners from 4 years before the male partner starts to
receive UI benefits until 3 years thereafter. The solid black lines denote the
control group (women whose male partner did not enter UI), the dashed
red lines denote the ‘treatment’ group (women whose partner did enter
UI) and the dotted blue lines denote the differences between the treatment
group and the control group. For the years 2003–2006 and 2010–2012,
income from work for both groups appears to move parallel, consistent
with the assumption of common time effects. Similar eyeball tests suggests
the presence of small and positive AWE in most years. For the years 2007–
2009, however, we observe small differences in the time pattern between
the treatment and control group before the unemployment shock. In what
follows, we thus should interpret the estimation results for these years
with the appropriate care.
Table 3.2 gives the ‘treatment effect’ on the income of the male partner,
i.e. the direct effect of the unemployment shock on the wage income of
the male partner. The different columns present the results for different
treatment years (years in which male partners enter UI) and the rows
show the treatment effect from two years before the treatment (t-2) up to 3
years after the treatment (t+3). The pre-treatment placebo dummies are
(typically) small and statistically insignificant.9 For most treatment years
we observe a negative treatment effect on male partner’s income of about
15 thousand euro in the year that the male partner becomes unemployed.
This effect increases to about 25 thousand euro in the year after becoming
unemployed, which is more than 50% of the income before unemployment.
This increase from year t to year t + 1 stems from the fact that we use
annual data wherein not all male partners become unemployed in the
beginning of the year. Three years after the unemployment shock, we
still observe a negative treatment effect of about 20 thousand euro. This
9The proverbial exception is the placebo for 2006, which is however still small when
compared to the ‘treatment effect’ that follows.
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indicates a sizable, persistent negative effect of becoming unemployed
on income, which is substantially larger than the loss in income that
is typically observed in the literature. Using mass layoffs, Hardoy and
Schøne (2014) find a 5% reduction in income which remains approximately
the same level in the 4 years after displacement and Halla et al. (2018) find a
relatively stable decrease of 21-24% of the pre-displacement mean earnings.
As argued earlier, our treatment group does not include men that did
not transit to a new job without going through UI. To further understand
the large income drop in our case, Table A.3.2 in the appendix shows the
treatment effect on male partner’s probability of being employed. For
most treatment years, the employment rate is about 22 percentage points
lower in the year after the unemployment shock. Hence, 40 to 45% of
the negative treatment effect on men’s wage income can be explained by
being unemployed and more than half appears to be due to lower wages
in subsequent employment. This is more than is typically found in the
literature using mass layoffs. Deelen et al. (2018) estimate a decrease in the
employment rate in the year after displacement of 18 percentage points
for older age workers (45-54) and 12 percentage points for prime-age
workers (35-44) in the Netherlands. Meekes and Hassink (2019) find a
displacement effect on employment of –20% for the Netherlands, which
remains stable between 1 and 3 years after displacement. Also, both
Deelen et al. (2018) and Meekes and Hassink (2019) find substantially
lower but stable treatment effects on wages, ranging from –3 to –8%.
Table 3.3 shows the AWE estimates – that is, the treatment effect on
the female partner’s wage income from work for all year cohorts in our
sample. First, we consider the placebo treatment dummies for t-2 and t-1,
which are typically small and statistically insignificant.10 The treatment
effect varies across years, but is typically in the order of 500-1,000 euro in
the years after the male partner enters UI. The AWE is rather stable over
the years following entry into UI, corresponding to 2–5% of the income
shock for the male partner. Hardoy and Schøne (2014) find an AWE of
7–18% of a much smaller income shock and Halla et al. (2018) find an
10Again with one exception, the dummy for t-1 for female partners of male partners
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Figure 3.2: Wage income for women whose male partner en-
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Notes: Own calculations using the Labour Market Panel (Statistics Netherlands). The solid black lines denotes
the control groups, the red lines denote the treatment groups and the dotted blue lines denote the differences
between the treatment group and the control group. Figures for individual treatment years are based on a
sample of individuals: with observations available for the full 8-year period, couples that stay together during
the full period, 25-55 years of age for both the female and male partner in the year before the treatment year,
and with husbands that earn at least 5,000 euro and receive no UI, social assistance or other benefits in the
years before the treatment.
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Table 3.2: Treatment effect of entering UI on wage income male partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 407 −560 −696 −273 −211
(412) (463) (564) (681) (820)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −106 −273 −382 1,364∗∗ 152
(412) (463) (564) (681) (820)
Male partner displaced in t −12,223∗∗∗ −13,176∗∗∗ −12,621∗∗∗ −17,005∗∗∗ −13,417∗∗∗
(412) (463) (564) (681) (820)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −21,793∗∗∗ −19,532∗∗∗ −21,599∗∗∗ −23,434∗∗∗ −21,498∗∗∗
(412) (463) (564) (681) (820)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −17,697∗∗∗ −15,953∗∗∗ −17,882∗∗∗ −19,751∗∗∗ −19,575∗∗∗
(412) (463) (564) (681) (820)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −16,091∗∗∗ −13,733∗∗∗ −17,011∗∗∗ −20,279∗∗∗ −20,112∗∗∗
(412) (463) (564) (681) (820)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 999,744 982,384 966,104 940,136 912,104
Number of individuals 124,968 122,798 120,763 117,517 114,014
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −48 −221 −224 124 −599
(879) (545) (544) (605) (680)
Male partner displaced in t-1 1,666∗ −830 −1,015∗ −367 −883
(879) (545) (544) (605) (680)
Male partner displaced in t −14,710∗∗∗ −16,945∗∗∗ −19,471∗∗∗ −17,566∗∗∗ −18,613∗∗∗
(879) (545) (544) (605) (680)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −26,172∗∗∗ −26,377∗∗∗ −27,116∗∗∗ −27,204∗∗∗ −30,220∗∗∗
(879) (545) (544) (605) (680)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −22,810∗∗∗ −20,898∗∗∗ −24,107∗∗∗ −23,696∗∗∗ −25,387∗∗∗
(879) (545) (544) (605) (680)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −21,108∗∗∗ −19,790∗∗∗ −22,834∗∗∗ −22,565∗∗∗ −23,893∗∗∗
(879) (545) (544) (605) (680)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 881,768 853,176 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 110,222 106,648 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our
sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in
which the male partner has an annual income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and
does not receive UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include year dummies,
time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table 3.3: Treatment effect wage income female partner (added worker effect via
wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 −1 105 −182 151 220
(136) (155) (182) (226) (299)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −31 96 −176 112 528∗
(136) (155) (182) (226) (299)
Male partner displaced in t 495∗∗∗ 607∗∗∗ 24 557∗∗ 669∗∗
(136) (155) (182) (226) (299)
Male partner displaced in t+1 926∗∗∗ 998∗∗∗ 225 849∗∗∗ 1,102∗∗∗
(136) (155) (182) (226) (299)
Male partner displaced in t+2 855∗∗∗ 858∗∗∗ 396∗∗ 729∗∗∗ 897∗∗∗
(136) (155) (182) (226) (299)
Male partner displaced in t+3 968∗∗∗ 970∗∗∗ 107 297 1,482∗∗∗
(136) (155) (182) (226) (299)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 999,744 982,384 966,104 940,136 912,104
Number of individuals 124,968 122,798 120,763 117,517 114,014
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −214 −178 53 −86 −26
(313) (188) (187) (217) (181)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −392 −308 38 68 2
(313) (188) (187) (217) (181)
Male partner displaced in t −124 −99 285 293 604∗∗∗
(313) (188) (187) (217) (181)
Male partner displaced in t+1 195 344∗ 470∗∗ 585∗∗∗ 761∗∗∗
(313) (188) (187) (217) (181)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −77 294 501∗∗∗ 574∗∗∗ 992∗∗∗
(313) (188) (187) (217) (181)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −80 156 461∗∗ 718∗∗∗ 1,001∗∗∗
(313) (188) (187) (217) (181)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 881,768 853,176 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 110,222 106,648 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select
couples in which the male partner has an annual income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the
treatment and does not receive UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table 3.4: Treatment effect female partner’s income from work and profits (‘total’
added worker effect)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 -99 119 -138 352 216
(155) (174) (201) (248) (323)
Male partner displaced in t-1 -131 161 -137 242 626∗
(155) (174) (201) (248) (323)
Male partner displaced in t 624∗∗∗ 618∗∗∗ 217 1,095∗∗∗ 842∗∗∗
(155) (174) (201) (248) (323)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,152∗∗∗ 994∗∗∗ 506∗∗ 1,026∗∗∗ 1,703∗∗∗
(155) (174) (201) (248) (323)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,122∗∗∗ 1,102∗∗∗ 749∗∗∗ 1,076∗∗∗ 1,393∗∗∗
(155) (174) (201) (248) (323)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,313∗∗∗ 1,322∗∗∗ 798∗∗∗ 850∗∗∗ 2,151∗∗∗
(155) (174) (201) (248) (323)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 999,744 982,384 966,104 940,136 912,104
Number of individuals 124,968 122,798 120,763 117,517 114,014
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 115 -178 38 -26 12
(336) (204) (203) (236) (201)
Male partner displaced in t-1 -3 -147 51 214 -104
(336) (204) (203) (236) (201)
Male partner displaced in t 697∗∗ 174 283 673∗∗∗ 658∗∗∗
(336) (204) (203) (236) (201)
Male partner displaced in t+1 882∗∗∗ 727∗∗∗ 593∗∗∗ 1,064∗∗∗ 853∗∗∗
(336) (204) (203) (236) (201)
Male partner displaced in t+2 737∗∗ 661∗∗∗ 839∗∗∗ 1,100∗∗∗ 979∗∗∗
(336) (204) (203) (236) (201)
Male partner displaced in t+3 623∗ 565∗∗∗ 611∗∗∗ 1,272∗∗∗ 865∗∗∗
(336) (204) (203) (236) (201)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 881,768 853,176 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 110,222 106,648 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select
couples in which the male partner has an annual income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the
treatment and does not receive UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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AWE of 0.6–1.5%. For 2008 and 2009, the start of the Great Recession, AWE
estimates on female partner’s wage income from work are statistically
insignificant.11 In line with the findings of Halla et al. (2018), depressed
labour demand may have muted the AWE on realized income increases,
as female partners could not find a job or extend their working hours.
Finding a smaller AWE, during an economic downturn is also in line with
Maloney (1987), Maloney (1991), Juhn and Potter (2007) and Bryan and
Longhi (2013). Later on, from 2010 onwards, the AWE resurfaces.
We next broaden our analysis to income from profits of female partners
as self-employed, defining the ‘total AWE’ as the effect on the sum of wage
and profits. Table 3.4 presents this combined treatment effect on female
partner’s wage income and female partner’s profits from self-employment.
Again, the placebo dummies are typically small and statistically insignifi-
cant.12 We find a total AWE for the different treatment years, in the order
of 800-2,100 euro, which is 3–10% of male partner’s income loss. Table
A.3.3 shows the effects on mere profits, which contains the difference
between Table 3.3 and 3.4. According to these estimates, there is a positive
AWE via profits of the female partner rising to about 500 euro three years
after the male entered UI.
Robustness checks and additional analyses 3.5.2
Some robustness checks and a heterogeneity analysis are given in the
appendix to this paper. For expositional reasons, most tables in the
appendix present our results on the ‘total’ AWE (that includes profit) for
the years 2004, 2008 and 2012. Table A.3.4 shows the results for different
model specifications. The first column presents the results when the model
only controls for year fixed effects and a group dummy. Demographic
controls are added in the second model and the third model gives our
preferred model where we add individual fixed effects. The results hardly
change over these three models. Table A.3.5 shows that the levels of
11However, Table 3.4 shows that we still find an AWE for 2008 en 2009 on female
partner’s profits.
12Again with the exception of the dummy for t-1 for male partners that become
unemployed in 2007, where the placebo dummy is significant at the 10% level.
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significance do not change when we use different levels of clustering of
the standard errors.13 We consider cluster-robust standard errors at the
level of province, province interacted with ethnicity, individual and no
clustering at all. Following Angrist and Pischke (2008), we prefer to be
conservative by reporting the largest standard errors.
Next to considering couples where the male partner enters into UI, we
also have estimated the total AWE induced by a large negative shock on
male partner’s (total) income (wages plus profits). Table A.3.6 and Table
A.3.7 consider the AWE of a negative income shock of 20 and 50%, re-
spectively, in total income of the male. Many of the pre-treatment placebo
dummies are statistically significant for this treatment group, which vio-
lates the assumption of common time effects. Hence, this appears to be a
problematic research strategy, and we do not consider the treatment effects.
This violation of the assumption of common time effects when considering
income shocks provides additional evidence that not finding significant
pre-treatment placebo dummies for unemployment shocks means that
the unemployment shocks are indeed exogenous as endogenous shocks
would cause significant anticipation effects. As another robustness test,
we also varied our sample by using different threshold values for the male
partners earned income. As Table A.3.8 shows, excluding couples in which
the male partners earned an income of less than 0, 5,000 or 15,000 euro in
the years before the male partner became unemployed yields similar AWE
estimates.14 We also find a similar AWE when we shorten our samples to
6 year periods in which we observe couples that are together and observed
in the data for 6 years, see Table A.3.10.15 Using 6-year samples also allows
13The exception is the placebo for t − 1 for 2008 that changes from statistically signif-
icant at the 10% level in our preferred specification with ‘clustering’ at the individual
level to insignificant with the other levels of clustering.
14In Table A.3.9 we exclude couples working in the same sector, so that the AWE is not
contaminated by common sectoral shocks. This yields AWE estimates that are slightly
larger (one tenth to one fifth), indicating that we may underestimate the AWE somewhat
in our base specification because of common sectoral shocks (Hardoy and Schøne 2014).
15Using a 6 year rather than an 8 year period addresses the concern that our samples
may not be representative for the full population. About 40% of our couples are excluded
from our samples because they do not stay together for 8 years or are not observed
during the full 8-year period. Finding a slightly smaller AWE for our 6 year samples
suggests a slightly lower willingness to compensate for each others income shocks when
partners are together for a shorter period.
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us to study the effect for the years 2013 and 2014, for which we find an
AWE of 700 and 510 euro one year after the male entered UI.
We also analyze whether the AWE has operated mainly at the extensive
or the intensive margin. Tables A.3.11 and A.3.12 give the treatment
effect on female partner’s income from work at the extensive and the
intensive margin, respectively. The extensive margin refers to the increase
in employment by female partners who didn’t work, whereas the intensive
margin refers to the intensity of work supplied by female partners already
in work. In the current context, the extensive margin effect gives the effect
on female partner’s wage income for a sample of households in which
the female partner was not employed in year t-4. The intensive margin
effect gives the effect on female partner’s wage income for the remaining
sample of households in which the female partner was employed in year
t-4. Generally, extensive margin effects are larger than intensive margin
effects for the treatment years 2003-2009. For the treatment years 2010-
2012, however, extensive margin effects seem absent.16 When interpreting
these findings, one should bear in mind that there was a strong increase in
the female employment rate in the time period under consideration. This
trend may have limited the room for extensive margin effects over time.
In addition, Table A.3.12 shows no evidence of intensive margin effects
during the first years of the Great Recession (2008-2010), whereas the
extensive margin effect is not affected by the business cycle. This is in
line with Bredtmann et al. (2018), who argue that firms might first cut
down the working hours of those already employed, before having to
rely on layoffs to reduce their overall costs. These hoarding effects may
render it difficult to increase hours worked in the firm in which someone
is employed than to find a job at another firm during the beginning of a
recession.
To shed more light on intensive and extensive margin effects, Table
A.3.14 shows the effect on female partner’s participation instead of female
partner’s income. Participation is measured by either being employed or
16We have to interpret the results of Table A.3.11 for the treatment year 2012 with
the appropriate care, as we find counter-intuitive negative treatment effects as well as a
negative statistically significant pre-treatment placebo dummy. We do not find negative
effects when we consider the extensive margin effect on participation (rather than on
income) – see Table A.3.13.
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having an income from profits. For most treatment years the treatment
effect estimates of the participation rate are about 1–2 percentage points
for the full sample, which is 1–3% relative to the participation rate in the
years before entering UI.17 Table A.3.15 shows that the treatment effect on
female partner’s annual hours worked for the treatment years 2010-2012
is 21-43 hours three years after the treatment.18 This is 2-5% relative to the
hours worked in the years before entering UI.
Finally, we study the AWE for various demographic and income groups
for the treatment years 2004, 2008 and 2012. Table A.3.16 gives the AWE
for different age groups. For the treatment years 2004 and 2012, we find
a larger AWE for young (25–35) and middle aged (36–45) women, but
no AWE effect for women 46-55 years of age. For the treatment year
2008, there only is evidence for AWE for the middle aged but not for
the young. Hence, not finding an overall AWE on wage income for 2008
can be explained by not finding an AWE for the young (25–35). The
reason for this may be that it was more difficult for young individuals
to increase employment at the beginning of the Great Recession. Table
A.3.17 shows the AWE for couples with and without children. The AWE
for couples with children is about half the size of the AWE for couples
without children. A plausible explanation is that the costs of changing
roles within the household are larger when couples have children. Table
A.3.18 presents the AWE for women with a low, middle or high level of
education. For high educated women, we find a higher AWE and for
low educated women we find no AWE at all. This could be explained by
difficulties for low educated women to find a job, especially if they have not
been employed for years. Table A.3.19 gives the AWE for female partners
with different ethnicities. The largest effects are obtained for natives and
Western-immigrants and no effect for Non-Western immigrants. For the
treatment year 2008, the treatment effect on female partner’s income for
Western and Non-Western immigrants is negative. This may be explained
by correlated shocks for male and female partner, as immigrants may
be disproportionately affected at the beginning of the Great Recession.
17Table A.3.13 shows that the effects on participation for the extensive margin sample,
consisting of women who did not yet work in t-4, is 3–7 percentage points.
18Data on hours worked is only available for the shorter period 2006-2015.
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Finally, Table A.3.20 shows the AWE for women with male partners within
different income groups (measured before unemployment shock). The
AWE increases with the income of the male partner (before unemployment
shock). This larger AWE for women with high-income partners could be
explained by a larger income shock for these households.
How much of the income shock is covered? 3.5.3
Following Hardoy and Schøne (2014), we consider how much of the
income shock from unemployment is covered by various types of benefits
and other sources of income, such as the AWE, and how much remains
uncovered. To ease the exposition, we only report results for a number of
representative years: 2004, 2008 and 2012; these are shown in Table 3.5, 3.6
and 3.7, respectively.
Table 3.5 shows the effect of a male worker entering UI on different
income sources, for treatment year 2004. Column (1) shows a negative
effect on male partner’s wage income of –19,532 euro in the year after
becoming unemployed, which then becomes less negative over time, to
–13,733 three years after entering UI. Income from self-employment for the
worker increase up to 2,139 euro three years after entering UI (column
(2)). UI benefits compensate 8,777 euro of the wage loss in the year of the
unemployment shock, but this drops to only 2,376 euro three years after
the unemployment shock (column (3)). Treatment effects on income from
welfare benefits, disability benefits and other benefits, which are relatively
small, are given in columns (4), (5) and (6). The AWE operating via wage
and profit income is presented in columns (7) and (8), respectively. Three
years after the unemployment shock, the AWE from wage income is 970
euro and from profits is 352 euro. Finally, column (9) gives the total amount
of the wage income loss that is covered. The total compensated amount is
10,254 euro in year t, 11,103 euro in year t+1 and this decreases to 6,598
euro in t+3. This implies that about 78% of the income loss is compensated
in the year of the unemployment shock, and subsequently decreases to
48% of the remaining wage income shock 3 years after entering UI. The
main reason for the lower ‘coverage rate’ is the drop in UI benefits. The
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Table 3.5: Effect of male partner becoming unemployed in 2004 on different income sources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemp. Welfare Disab. Other
Wage Profit benefits benefits benefits benefits
man man man man man man
2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
Male partner displaced in t-2 −560 −243 −0 0 −0 −1
(463) (166) (35) (2) (25) (39)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −273 −365∗∗ −0 0 −1 −2
(463) (166) (35) (2) (25) (39)
Male partner displaced in t −13,176∗∗∗ 143 8,777∗∗∗ 0 174∗∗∗ 542∗∗∗
(463) (166) (35) (2) (25) (39)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −19,532∗∗∗ 1,181∗∗∗ 7,859∗∗∗ 7∗∗∗ 177∗∗∗ 885∗∗∗
(463) (166) (35) (2) (25) (39)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −15,953∗∗∗ 1,679∗∗∗ 4,481∗∗∗ 18∗∗∗ 169∗∗∗ 787∗∗∗
(463) (166) (35) (2) (25) (39)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −13,733∗∗∗ 2,139∗∗∗ 2,376∗∗∗ 27∗∗∗ 232∗∗∗ 502∗∗∗
(463) (166) (35) (2) (25) (39)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 982,384 982,384 982,384 982,384 982,384 982,384
Number of individuals 122,798 122,798 122,798 122,798 122,798 122,798
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Wage Profit Total Total
woman woman Comp. Comp. in %
2004 2004 2004 2004
Male partner displaced in t-2 105 15 −125
(155) (101) (256)
Male partner displaced in t-1 96 65 −207
(155) (101) (256)
Male partner displaced in t 607∗∗∗ 11 10,254∗∗∗ 77.8%
(155) (101) (256)
Male partner displaced in t+1 998∗∗∗ −4 11,103∗∗∗ 56.8%
(155) (101) (256)
Male partner displaced in t+2 858∗∗∗ 243∗∗ 8,236∗∗∗ 51.6%
(155) (101) (256)
Male partner displaced in t+3 970∗∗∗ 352∗∗∗ 6,598∗∗∗ 48.0%
(155) (101) (256)
Demographic controls YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 982,384 982,384 982,384
Number of individuals 122,798 122,798 122,798
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists
of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual
income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving income from UI, social
assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age)
and individual fixed effects.
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Table 3.6: Effect of male partner becoming unemployed in 2008 on different income sources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemp. Welfare Disab. Other
Wage Profit benefits benefits benefits benefits
man man man man man man
2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008
Male partner displaced in t-2 −48 46 −2 0 −1 −1
(879) (312) (71) (5) (38) (59)
Male partner displaced in t-1 1,666∗ 37 −2 0 −1 −1
(879) (312) (71) (5) (38) (59)
Male partner displaced in t −14,710∗∗∗ 1,031∗∗∗ 8,139∗∗∗ 0 −14 353∗∗∗
(879) (312) (71) (5) (38) (59)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −26,172∗∗∗ 2,578∗∗∗ 9,678∗∗∗ 10∗∗ 10 1,054∗∗∗
(879) (312) (71) (5) (38) (59)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −22,810∗∗∗ 3,410∗∗∗ 5,772∗∗∗ 64∗∗∗ 97∗∗ 1,133∗∗∗
(879) (312) (71) (5) (38) (59)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −21,108∗∗∗ 2,986∗∗∗ 3,430∗∗∗ 123∗∗∗ 256∗∗∗ 1,112∗∗∗
(879) (312) (71) (5) (38) (59)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 881,768 881,768 881,768 881,768 881,768 881,768
Number of individuals 110,222 110,222 110,222 110,222 110,222 110,222
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Wage Profit Total Total
woman woman Comp. Comp. in %
2008 2008 2008 2008
Male partner displaced in t-2 −214 330∗ 156
(313) (182) (478)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −392 389∗∗ 31
(313) (182) (478)
Male partner displaced in t −124 821∗∗∗ 10,206∗∗∗ 69.4%
(313) (182) (478)
Male partner displaced in t+1 195 687∗∗∗ 14,213∗∗∗ 54.3%
(313) (182) (478)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −77 814∗∗∗ 11,213∗∗∗ 49.2%
(313) (182) (478)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −80 703∗∗∗ 8,530∗∗∗ 40.4%
(313) (182) (478)
Demographic controls YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 881,768 881,768 881,768
Number of individuals 110,222 110,222 110,222
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists
of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual
income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving income from UI, social
assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age)
and individual fixed effects.
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Table 3.7: Effect of male partner becoming unemployed in 2012 on different income sources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemp. Welfare Disab. Other
Wage Profit benefits benefits benefits benefits
man man man man man man
2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −599 108 −2 0 −0 −1
(680) (190) (56) (3) (26) (129)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −883 −436∗∗ −2 0 −0 −2
(680) (190) (56) (3) (26) (129)
Male partner displaced in t −18,613∗∗∗ 469∗∗ 10,968∗∗∗ −0 −14 906∗∗∗
(680) (190) (56) (3) (26) (129)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −30,220∗∗∗ 2,747∗∗∗ 11,654∗∗∗ 14∗∗∗ −36 717∗∗∗
(680) (190) (56) (3) (26) (129)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −25,387∗∗∗ 3,997∗∗∗ 6,865∗∗∗ 51∗∗∗ 4 839∗∗∗
(680) (190) (56) (3) (26) (129)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −23,893∗∗∗ 4,499∗∗∗ 3,110∗∗∗ 127∗∗∗ 304∗∗∗ 374∗∗∗
(680) (190) (56) (3) (26) (129)
Demographic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 723,512 723,512 723,512 723,512 723,512 723,512
Number of individuals 90,441 90,441 90,441 90,441 90,441 90,441
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Wage Profit Total Total
woman woman Comp. Comp. in%
2012 2012 2012 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −26 38 116
(181) (129) (319)
Male partner displaced in t-1 2 −105 −544∗
(181) (129) (319)
Male partner displaced in t 604∗∗∗ 54 12,986∗∗∗ 69.8%
(181) (129) (319)
Male partner displaced in t+1 761∗∗∗ 92 15,949∗∗∗ 52.8%
(181) (129) (319)
Male partner displaced in t+2 992∗∗∗ −13 12,735∗∗∗ 50.2%
(181) (129) (319)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,001∗∗∗ −137 9,279∗∗∗ 38.8%
(181) (129) (319)
Demographic controls YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Individual fiixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 723,512 723,512 723,512
Number of individuals 90,441 90,441 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample
consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has
an annual income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving income from
UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include year dummies, time-varying demographic
controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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AWE covered only 10% of the remaining wage income shock 3 years after
entering UI, which is only a fraction of the shock.
Table 3.6 provides the results for couples where the male enters UI in
2008, the year the Great Recession started. The negative treatment effects
on the wage income of the male are larger and more persistent than in
2004. Compensation from the UI of the male partner increases as well, but
decreases as a percentage of the wage income shock. Compensation from
the profit income from the male partners increases. There is no significant
AWE from wage income of the female, as noted before, though there does
appear to be a positive AWE from profit income.19 The total compensated
amount is higher in 2008 compared to 2004, but is a smaller percentage of
the (larger) loss in wage income of the male, leaving a larger part of this
negative shock uncompensated.
Finally, Table 3.7 gives the results for couples where the male enters UI
in 2012, which was the second period (‘double dip’) of the Great Recession
in the Netherlands. The loss in wage income of the male is larger than
for 2008, but the treatment effect on male partner’s profits is also larger
than in the earlier years, rising to 4,499 euros three years after entering
UI. It thus seems that the extent to which self-employment contributes
to compensating male partner’s wage loss has increased over time. We
further find that for the 2012 period, the AWE returns.
Conclusion 3.6
In this paper we have studied the AWE in the Netherlands before and
during the Great Recession, using a large and rich administrative panel
dataset for the period 1999-2015. We have used a differences-in-differences
setup with couples where the men enter UI as the treatment group and
couples where the men do not enter UI as the control group. We find
a negative and persistent effect of the male partner’s unemployment
shock on his income from work, of about 25 thousand euro one year after
becoming unemployed. This corresponds to more than 50% of his income
19However, the statistically significant placebo for the women’s profit income suggests
that we should interpret this latter AWE with the appropriate care.
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before becoming unemployed. This loss in wage income from the male
leads to a small positive added worker effect on the wage income of the
females of about 500-1,000 euro, which compensates 2-5% of the income
loss of the male partner. The AWE estimate on wage income is statistically
insignificant during the first period of the Great Recession (2008-2009), but
resurfaces during the second period of the Great Recession (2010-2015).
The AWE at the extensive margin decreased over time, probably because
of the strong increase in female employment in the time period under
consideration. We also find that profit income becomes a more important
insurance tool for dealing with negative wage income shocks over time,
from 2,139 euro 3 years after the unemployment shock in 2004 to 4,499
euro 3 years after the unemployment shock in 2012. Finally, when we
consider all sources of compensation, including different types of benefits,
only 40-50% of the wage income loss from unemployment is compensated
three years after entering UI.
In this paper we have looked at the AWE for couples where the man
enters UI, whereas most of the literature has focused on mass layoffs. Our
approach yields much larger impulse estimates that are expected to cause
larger behavioural responses. We show that our approach of entering
UI also gives plausibly exogenous variation in male incomes. In future
research it would be interesting to split the analysis of individuals that
are laid off during mass layoffs into workers that go straight to another
job and workers that first go through UI, and consider whether there
is a different AWE for these groups. Decomposing these effects gives
insights in the importance of the size of the income shock for the AWE.
Further, we study the AWE on employment and income and not on labor
supply or job search effort. Future research is needed to study if the
AWE is small (even for the large negative shocks we study) because of
small labor supply responses or because increases in labor supply do not
translate into increases in employment (Juhn and Potter 2007; Bryan and
Longhi 2013). The latter could be explained by difficulties in finding a job
or getting working hours extended. This is expected to be particularly
relevant during an economic downturn because demand side constraints
are making it harder to find a job or to increase working hours. Studying
both labor supply responses and employment responses in one study
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could resolve that some studies (e.g. Bredtmann et al. (2018)) find the
AWE to be larger when unemployment is higher and others find the AWE
to be smaller when unemployment is higher (e.g. Halla et al. (2018)).
Furthermore, in this paper we have focused on the effect of entering
UI by the male on subsequent income and employment of the male and
the female. Future research could look at the effect of entering UI on other
outcomes, like the stability of relations and fertility, as in Halla et al. (2018),
and outcomes like health and happiness.
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Table A.3.2: Treatment effect on male partner’s employment probabil-
ity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Male partner displaced in t −0.092∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −0.235∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −0.193∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −0.161∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 917,712 904,704 891,112 868,920 844,944
Number of individuals 114,714 113,088 111,389 108,615 105,618
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male partner displaced in t −0.051∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −0.217∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −0.201∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −0.183∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 817,688 779,560 743,528 661,744 581,808
Number of individuals 102,211 97,445 92,941 82,718 72,726
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.3: Treatment effect on female partner’s income from profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 −98 15 44 200 −4
(91) (101) (117) (145) (175)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −100 65 38 130 98
(91) (101) (117) (145) (175)
Male partner displaced in t 129 11 193∗ 538∗∗∗ 173
(91) (101) (117) (145) (175)
Male partner displaced in t+1 226∗∗ −4 281∗∗ 177 600∗∗∗
(91) (101) (117) (145) (175)
Male partner displaced in t+2 267∗∗∗ 243∗∗ 354∗∗∗ 347∗∗ 496∗∗∗
(91) (101) (117) (145) (175)
Male partner displaced in t+3 345∗∗∗ 352∗∗∗ 692∗∗∗ 553∗∗∗ 669∗∗∗
(91) (101) (117) (145) (175)
Observations 999,744 982,384 966,104 940,136 912,104
Number of individuals 124,968 122,798 120,763 117,517 114,014
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 330∗ 0 −15 60 38
(182) (118) (120) (141) (129)
Male partner displaced in t-1 389∗∗ 160 13 146 −105
(182) (118) (120) (141) (129)
Male partner displaced in t 821∗∗∗ 273∗∗ −2 380∗∗∗ 54
(182) (118) (120) (141) (129)
Male partner displaced in t+1 687∗∗∗ 383∗∗∗ 124 479∗∗∗ 92
(182) (118) (120) (141) (129)
Male partner displaced in t+2 814∗∗∗ 367∗∗∗ 338∗∗∗ 526∗∗∗ −13
(182) (118) (120) (141) (129)
Male partner displaced in t+3 703∗∗∗ 409∗∗∗ 150 554∗∗∗ −137
(182) (118) (120) (141) (129)
Observations 881,768 853,176 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 110,222 106,648 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the male partner has an annual income
from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and does not receive UI, social
assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include year dummies,
time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.4: Treatment effect on female partner’s




Male partner displaced in t-2 119 118 119
(175) (174) (174)
Male partner displaced in t-1 157 162 161
(175) (174) (174)
Male partner displaced in t 591∗∗∗ 616∗∗∗ 618∗∗∗
(175) (174) (174)
Male partner displaced in t+1 950∗∗∗ 990∗∗∗ 994∗∗∗
(175) (174) (174)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,046∗∗∗ 1,097∗∗∗ 1,102∗∗∗
(175) (174) (174)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,260∗∗∗ 1,319∗∗∗ 1,322∗∗∗
(175) (174) (174)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Demographic controls (age) NO YES YES
Fixed Effects NO NO YES
Observations 982,384 982,384 982,384
Number of individuals 122,798 122,798 122,798
(4) (5) (6)
2008 2008 2008
Male partner displaced in t-2 121 117 115
(336) (336) (336)
Male partner displaced in t-1 3 −2 −3
(336) (336) (336)
Male partner displaced in t 700∗∗ 696∗∗ 697∗∗
(336) (336) (336)
Male partner displaced in t+1 882∗∗∗ 883∗∗∗ 882∗∗∗
(336) (336) (336)
Male partner displaced in t+2 728∗∗ 737∗∗ 737∗∗
(336) (336) (336)
Male partner displaced in t+3 602∗ 624∗ 623∗
(336) (336) (336)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Demographic controls (age) NO YES YES
Individual fixed effects NO NO YES
Observations 881,768 881,768 881,768
Number of individuals 110,222 110,222 110,222
(7) (8) (9)
2012 2012 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 22 13 12
(201) (201) (201)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −99 −103 −104
(201) (201) (201)
Male partner displaced in t 658∗∗∗ 657∗∗∗ 658∗∗∗
(201) (201) (201)
Male partner displaced in t+1 840∗∗∗ 852∗∗∗ 853∗∗∗
(201) (201) (201)
Male partner displaced in t+2 959∗∗∗ 976∗∗∗ 979∗∗∗
(201) (201) (201)
Male partner displaced in t+3 831∗∗∗ 863∗∗∗ 865∗∗∗
(201) (201) (201)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Demographic controls (age) NO YES YES
Fixed Effects NO NO YES
Observations 723,512 723,512 723,512
Number of individuals 90,441 90,441 90,441
Notes: *denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and ***
at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of
couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock.
Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income
from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment
and with the husband not receiving income from UI, social assistance
or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include
year dummies and a group dummy.
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Table A.3.5: Treatment effect on female partner’s income from
work - different ways of clustering standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2004 2004 2004 2004
Level of clustering None Individual Province Province*
ethnicity
Male partner displaced in t-2 105 105 104 104
(155) (121) (146) (130)
Male partner displaced in t-1 96 96 77 77
(155) (146) (130) (161)
Male partner displaced in t 607∗∗∗ 607∗∗∗ 605∗∗∗ 605∗∗∗
(155) (178) (132) (196)
Male partner displaced in t+1 998∗∗∗ 998∗∗∗ 805∗∗∗ 805∗∗∗
(155) (207) (160) (176)
Male partner displaced in t+2 858∗∗∗ 858∗∗∗ 715∗∗∗ 715∗∗∗
(155) (217) (142) (190)
Male partner displaced in t+3 970∗∗∗ 970∗∗∗ 804∗∗∗ 804∗∗∗
(155) (252) (144) (173)
Observations 982,384 982,392 942,624 942,624
Number of individuals 122,798 122,799 117,828 117,828
(5) (6) (7) (8)
2008 2008 2008 2008
Level of clustering None Individual Province Province*
ethnicity
Male partner displaced in t-2 −214 −214 −151 −151
(313) (194) (162) (159)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −392 −392∗ −333 −333
(313) (231) (188) (202)
Male partner displaced in t −124 −124 −100 −100
(313) (303) (198) (247)
Male partner displaced in t+1 195 195 106 106
(313) (418) (418) (330)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −77 −77 −115 −115
(313) (450) (457) (358)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −80 −80 −111 −111
(313) (471) (443) (405)
Observations 881,768 881,768 855,608 855,608
Number of individuals 110,222 110,222 106,951 106,951
(9) (10) (11) (12)
2012 2012 2012 2012
Level of clustering None Individual Province Province*
ethnicity
Male partner displaced in t-2 −26 −26 −13 −13
(181) (120) (106) (121)
Male partner displaced in t-1 2 2 13 13
(181) (169) (184) (198)
Male partner displaced in t 604∗∗∗ 604∗∗∗ 588∗∗ 588∗∗
(181) (200) (217) (220)
Male partner displaced in t+1 761∗∗∗ 761∗∗∗ 706∗∗∗ 706∗∗∗
(181) (225) (206) (231)
Male partner displaced in t+2 992∗∗∗ 992∗∗∗ 955∗∗∗ 955∗∗∗
(181) (256) (253) (273)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,001∗∗∗ 1,001∗∗∗ 944∗∗∗ 944∗∗∗
(181) (280) (291) (307)
Observations 723,512 723,512 710,456 710,456
Number of individuals 90,441 90,441 88,807 88,807
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before
the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual
income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the
husband not receiving income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment
period. All specifications include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age)
and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.6: Treatment effect of male partner’s income shock of 20%
on female partner’s income (wage+profit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 2 80 −160 64 203
(104) (115) (121) (134) (159)
Male partner displaced in t-1 237∗∗ 90 237∗∗ 543∗∗∗ 435∗∗∗
(104) (115) (121) (134) (159)
Male partner displaced in t 210∗∗ 60 −358∗∗∗ −41 −202
(104) (115) (121) (134) (159)
Male partner displaced in t+1 672∗∗∗ 491∗∗∗ 411∗∗∗ 381∗∗∗ 71
(104) (115) (121) (134) (159)
Male partner displaced in t+2 800∗∗∗ 691∗∗∗ 609∗∗∗ 519∗∗∗ 96
(104) (115) (121) (134) (159)
Male partner displaced in t+3 935∗∗∗ 855∗∗∗ 503∗∗∗ 517∗∗∗ 318∗∗
(104) (115) (121) (134) (159)
Observations 999,744 982,384 966,104 940,136 912,104
Number of individuals 124,968 122,798 120,763 117,517 114,014
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −118 −379∗∗∗ −599∗∗∗ −234 55
(166) (146) (148) (172) (157)
Male partner displaced in t-1 15 −257∗ −285∗ 143 48
(166) (146) (148) (172) (157)
Male partner displaced in t −820∗∗∗ −1,015∗∗∗ −822∗∗∗ −21 64
(166) (146) (148) (172) (157)
Male partner displaced in t+1 95 −543∗∗∗ −109 818∗∗∗ 567∗∗∗
(166) (146) (148) (172) (157)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −20 61 121 1,222∗∗∗ 727∗∗∗
(166) (146) (148) (172) (157)
Male partner displaced in t+3 2 378∗∗∗ 166 1,175∗∗∗ 855∗∗∗
(166) (146) (148) (172) (157)
Observations 881,768 853,176 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 110,222 106,648 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.7: Treatment effect of male partner’s income shock of 50%
on female partner’s income (wage+profit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 138 −79 −81 −37 736∗∗∗
(158) (180) (184) (206) (272)
Male partner displaced in t-1 264∗ −11 350∗ 763∗∗∗ 838∗∗∗
(158) (180) (184) (206) (272)
Male partner displaced in t 298∗ −435∗∗ −581∗∗∗ −533∗∗∗ −701∗∗∗
(158) (180) (184) (206) (272)
Male partner displaced in t+1 911∗∗∗ 363∗∗ 399∗∗ 198 −474∗
(158) (180) (184) (206) (272)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,312∗∗∗ 358∗∗ 914∗∗∗ 780∗∗∗ −27
(158) (180) (184) (206) (272)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,51∗∗∗ 258 690∗∗∗ 844∗∗∗ 431
(158) (180) (184) (206) (272)
Observations 999,744 982,384 966,104 940,136 912,104
Number of individuals 124,968 122,798 120,763 117,517 114,014
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −55 −786∗∗∗ −391 −891∗∗∗ 393
(264) (236) (241) (294) (267)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −96 −372 78 −266 −256
(264) (236) (241) (294) (267)
Male partner displaced in t −1,777∗∗∗ −1,957∗∗∗ −742∗∗∗ −1,126∗∗∗ −760∗∗∗
(264) (236) (241) (294) (267)
Male partner displaced in t+1 519∗∗ −586∗∗ 86 307 −125
(264) (236) (241) (294) (267)
Male partner displaced in t+2 237 −119 576∗∗ 756∗∗ 483∗
(264) (236) (241) (294) (267)
Male partner displaced in t+3 125 −246 502∗∗ 564∗ 1,145∗∗∗
(264) (236) (241) (294) (267)
Observations 881,768 853,176 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 110,222 106,648 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.8: Treatment effect on female partner’s in-
come from work - different samples
(1) (2) (3)
2004 2004 2004
Male partners income >0 >5000 >15000
Male partner displaced in t-2 104 105 100
(158) (155) (146)
Male partner displaced in t-1 107 96 80
(158) (155) (146)
Male partner displaced in t 644∗∗∗ 607∗∗∗ 605∗∗∗
(158) (155) (146)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,001∗∗∗ 998∗∗∗ 1,03∗∗∗
(158) (155) (146)
Male partner displaced in t+2 806∗∗∗ 858∗∗∗ 878∗∗∗
(158) (155) (146)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,052∗∗∗ 970∗∗∗ 995∗∗∗
(158) (155) (146)
Observations 1.131.768 982,384 964,352
Number of individuals 141,471 122,798 120,544
(4) (5) (6)
2008 2008 2008
Male partners income >0 >5000 >15000
Male partner displaced in t-2 −80 −214 −229
(309) (313) (299)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −103 −392 −436
(309) (313) (299)
Male partner displaced in t 212 −124 −143
(309) (313) (299)
Male partner displaced in t+1 541∗ 195 194
(309) (313) (299)
Male partner displaced in t+2 198 −77 −76
(309) (313) (299)
Male partner displaced in t+3 175 −80 −138
(309) (313) (299)
Observations 1,021,432 881,768 866,064
Number of individuals 127,680 110,222 108,259
(7) (8) (9)
2012 2012 2012
Male partners income >0 >5000 >15000
Male partner displaced in t-2 53 −26 −14
(187) (182) (183)
Male partner displaced in t-1 70 2 −6
(187) (182) (183)
Male partner displaced in t 1,011∗∗∗ 921∗∗∗ 953∗∗∗
(186) (181) (182)
Male partner displaced in t+1 175 209 239
(186) (181) (182)
Male partner displaced in t+2 717∗∗∗ 751∗∗∗ 785∗∗∗
(186) (181) (182)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,395∗∗∗ 1,479∗∗∗ 1,478∗∗∗
(186) (181) (182)
Observations 849,136 723,512 714,008
Number of individuals 106,144 90,441 89,253
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the
1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples
25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we
select couples in which the husband has an annual income from work of at
least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband
not receiving income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-
treatment period. All specifications include year dummies, time-varying
demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.9: Treatment effect on female partner’s income from work
in sample without partners working in the same sector in
the years before husband’s unemployment shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 24 109 −188 183 129
(134) (155) (179) (212) (265)
Male partner displaced in t-1 26 140 −178 183 641∗∗
(134) (155) (179) (212) (265)
Male partner displaced in t 548∗∗∗ 714∗∗∗ 82 581∗∗∗ 708∗∗∗
(134) (155) (179) (212) (265)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,025∗∗∗ 1,094∗∗∗ 426∗∗ 996∗∗∗ 1,187∗∗∗
(134) (155) (179) (212) (265)
Male partner displaced in t+2 960∗∗∗ 944∗∗∗ 539∗∗∗ 931∗∗∗ 901∗∗∗
(134) (155) (179) (212) (265)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,089∗∗∗ 1,083∗∗∗ 249 474∗∗ 1,327∗∗∗
(134) (155) (179) (212) (265)
Observations 918,288 901,264 884,776 862,096 835,632
Number of individuals 114,786 112,658 110,597 107,762 104,455
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −140 −101 62 79 18
(301) (178) (171) (221) (182)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −360 −223 37 207 179
(301) (178) (171) (221) (182)
Male partner displaced in t −118 94 336∗∗ 594∗∗∗ 787∗∗∗
(301) (178) (171) (221) (182)
Male partner displaced in t+1 333 597∗∗∗ 586∗∗∗ 829∗∗∗ 1,066∗∗∗
(301) (178) (171) (221) (182)
Male partner displaced in t+2 19 606∗∗∗ 574∗∗∗ 798∗∗∗ 1,272∗∗∗
(301) (178) (171) (221) (182)
Male partner displaced in t+3 41 493∗∗∗ 543∗∗∗ 935∗∗∗ 1,245∗∗∗
(301) (178) (171) (221) (182)
Observations 807,448 781,200 745,672 705,632 665,848
Number of individuals 100,932 97,651 93,210 88,205 83,233
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.10: Treatment effect on female partner’s income from work
in 6-year samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 −20 93 −199 133 237
(119) (138) (160) (190) (258)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −14 112 −171 82 531∗∗
(119) (138) (160) (190) (258)
Male partner displaced in t 468∗∗∗ 558∗∗∗ 28 486∗∗ 695∗∗∗
(119) (138) (160) (190) (258)
Male partner displaced in t+1 853∗∗∗ 951∗∗∗ 240 717∗∗∗ 1,026∗∗∗
(119) (138) (160) (190) (258)
Observations 767,820 757,242 747,294 730,152 709,398
Number of individuals 127,970 126,207 124,549 121,692 118,233
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −259 −182 133 −95 −59
(289) (176) (174) (173) (157)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −458 −336∗ 85 41 −60
(289) (176) (174) (173) (157)
Male partner displaced in t −165 −78 383∗∗ 322∗ 532∗∗∗
(289) (176) (174) (173) (157)
Male partner displaced in t+1 130 293∗ 701∗∗∗ 538∗∗∗ 687∗∗∗
(289) (176) (174) (173) (157)
(11) (12)
2013 2014
Male partner displaced in t-2 33 −78
(175) (136)
Male partner displaced in t-1 96 −106
(175) (136)
Male partner displaced in t 486∗∗∗ 283∗∗
(175) (136)
Male partner displaced in t+1 700∗∗∗ 510∗∗∗
(175) (136)
Observations 522,888 795,834
Number of individuals 87,149 132,639
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.11: Treatment effect on female partner’s income from work -
extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 165 23 17 −118 534
(167) (186) (230) (264) (340)
Male partner displaced in t-1 317∗ 119 294 56 208
(167) (186) (230) (264) (340)
Male partner displaced in t 644∗∗∗ 763∗∗∗ 371 665∗∗ 762∗∗
(167) (186) (230) (264) (340)
Male partner displaced in t+1 768∗∗∗ 1,188∗∗∗ 813∗∗∗ 1,093∗∗∗ 980∗∗∗
(167) (186) (230) (264) (340)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,024∗∗∗ 1,141∗∗∗ 1,090∗∗∗ 971∗∗∗ 789∗∗
(167) (186) (230) (264) (340)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,238∗∗∗ 1,280∗∗∗ 1,195∗∗∗ 586∗∗ 1,135∗∗∗
(167) (186) (230) (264) (340)
Observations 285,808 257,376 220,560 204,632 191,560
Number of individuals 35,726 32,172 27,570 25,579 23,945
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −49 62 247 308 −393
(375) (245) (251) (311) (281)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −17 13 565∗∗ −162 −488∗
(375) (245) (251) (311) (281)
Male partner displaced in t 57 414∗ 772∗∗∗ 25 −516∗
(375) (245) (251) (311) (281)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,619∗∗∗ 692∗∗∗ 914∗∗∗ 121 −587∗∗
(375) (245) (251) (311) (281)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,127∗∗∗ 582∗∗ 930∗∗∗ 273 −508∗
(375) (245) (251) (311) (281)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,300∗∗∗ 971∗∗∗ 785∗∗∗ 552∗ −614∗∗
(375) (245) (251) (311) (281)
Observations 183,920 174,216 156,944 137,168 122,752
Number of individuals 22,990 21,777 19,618 17,146 15,344
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.12: Treatment effect on female partner’s income from work -
intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 −71 133 −240 209 103
(179) (198) (225) (284) (374)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −184 93 −308 77 632∗
(179) (198) (225) (284) (374)
Male partner displaced in t 417∗∗ 558∗∗∗ −79 469∗ 652∗
(179) (198) (225) (284) (374)
Male partner displaced in t+1 971∗∗∗ 936∗∗∗ 45 715∗∗ 1,171∗∗∗
(179) (198) (225) (284) (374)
Male partner displaced in t+2 762∗∗∗ 762∗∗∗ 181 614∗∗ 969∗∗∗
(179) (198) (225) (284) (374)
Male partner displaced in t+3 838∗∗∗ 863∗∗∗ −229 172 1,637∗∗∗
(179) (198) (225) (284) (374)
Observations 713,936 725,008 745,544 735,504 720,544
Number of individuals 89,242 90,626 93,193 91,938 90,069
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −262 −247 2 −164 49
(387) (228) (224) (254) (212)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −506 −400∗ −94 121 101
(387) (228) (224) (254) (212)
Male partner displaced in t −171 −245 161 349 850∗∗∗
(387) (228) (224) (254) (212)
Male partner displaced in t+1 −213 239 353 679∗∗∗ 1,028∗∗∗
(387) (228) (224) (254) (212)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −416 203 384∗ 651∗∗ 1,295∗∗∗
(387) (228) (224) (254) (212)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −469 −74 368 765∗∗∗ 1,335∗∗∗
(387) (228) (224) (254) (212)
Observations 697,848 678,960 652,984 631,008 600,752
Number of individuals 87,232 84,871 81,624 78,877 75,095
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.13: Treatment effect on female partner’s participation (em-
ployed or self-employed) - extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 -0.0112 -0.0204 -0.0080 -0.0277 0.0141
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0231)
Male partner displaced in t-1 0.0058 0.0031 0.0120 0.0115 -0.0184
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0231)
Male partner displaced in t 0.0323∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0340∗ 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.0285
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0231)
Male partner displaced in t+1 0.0196 0.0621∗∗∗ 0.0106 0.0720∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0231)
Male partner displaced in t+2 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0276∗ 0.0120 0.0533∗∗∗ 0.0233
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0231)
Male partner displaced in t+3 0.0374∗∗ 0.0352∗∗ 0.0095 0.0353∗ 0.0137
(0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0231)
Observations 285,808 257,376 220,560 204,632 191,560
Number of individuals 35,726 32,172 27,570 25,579 23,945
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 0.0328 0.0054 0.0053 0.0216 0.0060
(0.0244) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0155)
Male partner displaced in t-1 0.0162 0.0001 0.0122 0.0145 -0.0240
(0.0244) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0155)
Male partner displaced in t 0.0043 0.0382∗∗ 0.0370∗∗ 0.0394∗∗ -0.0123
(0.0244) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0155)
Male partner displaced in t+1 0.0334 0.0356∗∗ 0.0506∗∗∗ 0.0443∗∗ -0.0234
(0.0244) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0155)
Male partner displaced in t+2 0.0105 0.0211 0.0381∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0244) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0155)
Male partner displaced in t+3 -0.0013 0.0298∗ 0.0469∗∗∗ 0.0167 0.0266∗
(0.0244) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0155)
Observations 183,920 174,216 156,944 137,168 122,752
Number of individuals 22,990 21,777 19,618 17,146 15,344
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the
unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from
work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving
income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.14: Treatment effect on female partner’s participation (em-
ployed or self-employed)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male partner displaced in t-2 −0.0064 −0.0100 −0.0069 −0.0057 0.0029
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0080)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −0.0034 −0.0038 −0.0094 0.0080 0.0015
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0080)
Male partner displaced in t 0.0068 0.0068 −0.0012 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0114
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0080)
Male partner displaced in t+1 0.0042 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0122
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0080)
Male partner displaced in t+2 0.0147∗∗ 0.0053 −0.0008 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0144∗
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0080)
Male partner displaced in t+3 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0117∗ −0.0021 0.0161∗∗ 0.0161∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0080)
Observations 999,744 982,384 966,104 940,136 912,104
Number of individuals 124,968 122,798 120,763 117,517 114,014
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −0.0058 −0.0009 0.0010 0.0006 0.0024
(0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0046)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −0.0125 −0.0024 0.0028 0.0029 −0.0090∗
(0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0046)
Male partner displaced in t −0.0045 0.0089∗ 0.0019 0.0054 −0.0010
(0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0046)
Male partner displaced in t+1 0.0072 0.0112∗∗ 0.0023 0.0101∗ −0.0020
(0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0046)
Male partner displaced in t+2 0.0153∗ 0.0075 0.0006 0.0046 0.0054
(0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0046)
Male partner displaced in t+3 0.0089 0.0085∗ 0.0018 −0.0005 0.0109∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0046)
Observations 881,768 853,176 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 110,222 106,648 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors
in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment
shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income from work of at least
5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving income from UI,
social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include year dummies,
time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.15: Treatment effect on female partner’s
annual hours worked
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES 2010 2011 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 3 −2 −7
(7) (8) (7)
Male partner displaced in t-1 7 −1 2
(7) (8) (7)
Male partner displaced in t 23∗∗∗ 11 20∗∗∗
(7) (8) (7)
Male partner displaced in t+1 26∗∗∗ 20∗∗ 36∗∗∗
(7) (8) (7)
Male partner displaced in t+2 27∗∗∗ 23∗∗∗ 40∗∗∗
(7) (8) (7)
Male partner displaced in t+3 28∗∗∗ 21∗∗∗ 43∗∗∗
(7) (8) (7)
Observations 809,928 768,176 723,512
Number of individuals 101,242 96,023 90,441
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and ***
at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of
couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock.
Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income
from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment
and with the husband not receiving income from UI, social assistance
or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include
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Table A.3.16: Effect of male partner being dis-
placed on female partner’s income




Age female partner 25-35 36-45 46-55
Male partner displaced in t-2 355 −10 −174
(368) (290) (363)
Male partner displaced in t-1 411 −130 243
(368) (290) (363)
Male partner displaced in t 1,104∗∗∗ 599∗∗ 63
(368) (290) (363)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,228∗∗∗ 1,061∗∗∗ 412
(368) (290) (363)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,117∗∗∗ 1,152∗∗∗ 581
(368) (290) (363)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,578∗∗∗ 1,325∗∗∗ 595
(368) (290) (363)
Observations 301,256 467,728 302,960
Number of individuals 37,657 58,466 37,870
(4) (5) (6)
2008 2008 2008
Age female partner 25-35 36-45 46-55
Male partner displaced in t-2 −134 302 −179
(613) (590) (595)
Male partner displaced in t-1 166 −258 −187
(613) (590) (595)
Male partner displaced in t 733 958 138
(613) (590) (595)
Male partner displaced in t+1 390 1,370∗∗ 804
(613) (590) (595)
Male partner displaced in t+2 513 789 998∗
(613) (590) (595)
Male partner displaced in t+3 451 979∗ 470
(613) (590) (595)
Observations 212,608 445,312 312,480
Number of individuals 26,576 55,665 39,060
(7) (8) (9)
2012 2012 2012
Age wife 25-35 36-45 46-55
Male partner displaced in t-2 126 −35 78
(448) (325) (356)
Male partner displaced in t-1 629 38 −556
(448) (325) (356)
Male partner displaced in t 1,225∗∗∗ 804∗∗ 350
(448) (325) (356)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,657∗∗∗ 1,013∗∗∗ 214
(448) (325) (356)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,084∗∗ 1,291∗∗∗ 396
(448) (325) (356)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,418∗∗∗ 909∗∗∗ 584
(448) (325) (356)
Observations 129,424 367,648 311,048
Number of individuals 16,179 45,956 38,881
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and ***
at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of
couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock.
Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income
from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment
and with the husband not receiving income from UI, social assistance
or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include
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Table A.3.17: Treatment effect on female partner’s income (wage + profit)- Couple
with and without children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Couples Couples Couples Couples Couples Couples
with with with without without without
children children children children children children
2004 2008 2012 2004 2008 2012
Male partner displaced in t-2 −31 −70 13 566 793 90
(193) (391) (217) (373) (644) (521)
Male partner displaced in t-1 43 −204 −225 598 761 567
(193) (391) (217) (373) (644) (521)
Male partner displaced in t 481∗∗ 374 428∗∗ 1,102∗∗∗ 1,875∗∗∗ 1,858∗∗∗
(193) (391) (217) (373) (644) (521)
Male partner displaced in t+1 772∗∗∗ 626 857∗∗∗ 1,691∗∗∗ 1,871∗∗∗ 970∗
(193) (391) (217) (373) (644) (521)
Male partner displaced in t+2 824∗∗∗ 508 917∗∗∗ 1,923∗∗∗ 1,670∗∗∗ 1,420∗∗∗
(193) (391) (217) (373) (644) (521)
Male partner displaced in t+3 967∗∗∗ 251 690∗∗∗ 2,331∗∗∗ 2,041∗∗∗ 1,836∗∗∗
(193) (391) (217) (373) (644) (521)
Observations 722,768 693,744 603,560 259,600 188,024 119,944
Number of individuals 90,346 86,719 75,446 32,450 23,503 14,993
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples
in which the husband has an annual income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and
with the husband not receiving income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All
specifications include year dummies, time-varying demographic controls (age) and individual fixed effects.
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Table A.3.18: Effect of male partner being dis-
placed on female partner’s income




Level of education wife Low Middle High
Male partner displaced in t-2 −348 115 284
(315) (253) (492)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −369 139 514
(315) (253) (492)
Male partner displaced in t −311 631∗∗ 1,428∗∗∗
(315) (253) (492)
Male partner displaced in t+1 116 890∗∗∗ 1,813∗∗∗
(315) (253) (492)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −20 923∗∗∗ 2,128∗∗∗
(315) (253) (492)
Male partner displaced in t+3 107 1,113∗∗∗ 2,531∗∗∗
(315) (253) (492)
Observations 298,688 506,744 263,872
Number of individuals 37,336 63,343 32,984
(4) (5) (6)
2008 2008 2008
Level of education wife Low Middle High
Male partner displaced in t-2 −4 −204 460
(520) (405) (977)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −165 −33 −235
(520) (405) (977)
Male partner displaced in t 397 327 1,398
(520) (405) (977)
Male partner displaced in t+1 503 882∗∗ 1,620∗
(520) (405) (977)
Male partner displaced in t+2 866∗ 871∗∗ 718
(520) (405) (977)
Male partner displaced in t+3 309 1,345∗∗∗ 211
(520) (405) (977)
Observations 230,568 472,536 264,872
Number of individuals 28,821 59,067 33,109
(7) (8) (9)
2012 2012 2012
Level of education wife Low Middle High
Male partner displaced in t-2 484∗ −110 −84
(287) (241) (593)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −93 −40 −128
(287) (241) (593)
Male partner displaced in t 292 655∗∗∗ 1,283∗∗
(287) (241) (593)
Male partner displaced in t+1 52 861∗∗∗ 1,437∗∗
(287) (241) (593)
Male partner displaced in t+2 −159 1,055∗∗∗ 1,680∗∗∗
(287) (241) (593)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −171 1,288∗∗∗ 1,271∗∗
(287) (241) (593)
Observations 169,088 402,512 234,576
Number of individuals 21,136 50,314 29,322
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and ***
at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of
couples 25–55 years of age in the year before the unemployment shock.
Further, we select couples in which the husband has an annual income
from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment
and with the husband not receiving income from UI, social assistance
or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications include
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Table A.3.19: Effect of male partner being displaced on






Male partner displaced in t-2 184 −426 −167
(188) (629) (655)
Male partner displaced in t-1 162 −56 274
(188) (629) (655)
Male partner displaced in t 705∗∗∗ −253 515
(188) (630) (655)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,094∗∗∗ 552 199
(188) (630) (655)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,125∗∗∗ 1,556∗∗ 114
(188) (630) (655)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,510∗∗∗ 643 −271
(188) (630) (655)
Observations 871,568 73,608 37,208





Male partner displaced in t-2 224 −857 267
(373) (1,002) (1,072)
Male partner displaced in t-1 214 −1,474 −344
(373) (1,002) (1,072)
Male partner displaced in t 1,022∗∗∗ −997 −767
(373) (1,002) (1,072)
Male partner displaced in t+1 1,351∗∗∗ −1,633 −804
(373) (1,002) (1,073)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,410∗∗∗ −1,897∗ −3,285∗∗∗
(373) (1,002) (1,073)
Male partner displaced in t+3 1,403∗∗∗ −2,717∗∗∗ −3,574∗∗∗
(373) (1,002) (1,073)
Observations 773,032 66,360 42,376





Male partner displaced in t-2 26 93 −279
(216) (852) (685)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −128 −136 163
(216) (852) (685)
Male partner displaced in t 728∗∗∗ 671 −242
(216) (852) (685)
Male partner displaced in t+1 937∗∗∗ 822 −177
(216) (852) (685)
Male partner displaced in t+2 1,093∗∗∗ 1,190 −623
(216) (852) (685)
Male partner displaced in t+3 839∗∗∗ 2,407∗∗∗ −311
(216) (852) (686)
Observations 629,288 53,856 40,368
Number of individuals 78,662 6,733 5,046
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1%
level. Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years
of age in the year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in
which the husband has an annual income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the
4 years before the treatment and with the husband not receiving income from UI,
social assistance or other benefits in the pre-treatment period. All specifications
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Table A.3.20: Effect male partner displaced in 2004 on income
female partner (wage + profit) - different income
groups male partner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2004 2004 2004 2004
Income husband <30.000 30-40.000 40-50.000 50.000+
Male partner displaced in t-2 −108 435 −305 307
(278) (298) (589) (762)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −143 86 524 1,451∗
(278) (298) (589) (762)
Male partner displaced in t 367 516∗ 537 2,453∗∗∗
(278) (298) (589) (762)
Male partner displaced in t+1 539∗ 1,088∗∗∗ 646 3,338∗∗∗
(278) (298) (589) (762)
Male partner displaced in t+2 464∗ 612∗∗ 2,001∗∗∗ 4,391∗∗∗
(278) (298) (589) (762)
Male partner displaced in t+3 351 827∗∗∗ 2,473∗∗∗ 6,32∗∗∗
(278) (298) (589) (763)
Observations 503,840 317,096 128,344 122,600
Number of individuals 62,980 39,637 16,043 15,325
(5) (6) (7) (8)
2008 2008 2008 2008
Income husband <30.000 30-40.000 40-50.000 50.000+
Male partner displaced in t-2 −540 560 −592 451
(671) (403) (768) (1,115)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −362 504 −818 −381
(671) (403) (768) (1,115)
Male partner displaced in t 209 517 −802 2,182∗
(671) (403) (768) (1,115)
Male partner displaced in t+1 627 766∗ −931 2,803∗∗
(671) (403) (768) (1,115)
Male partner displaced in t+2 23 1,063∗∗∗ −794 2,332∗∗
(671) (403) (768) (1,115)
Male partner displaced in t+3 −17 1,505∗∗∗ −140 866
(671) (403) (768) (1,115)
Observations 291,728 324,352 167,224 186,816
Number of individuals 36,466 40,544 20,903 23,352
(9) (10) (11) (12)
2012 2012 2012 2012
Income husband <30.000 30-40.000 40-50.000 50.000+
Male partner displaced in t-2 −184 485∗ 127 −443
(544) (267) (388) (482)
Male partner displaced in t-1 −510 311 13 −334
(544) (267) (388) (482)
Male partner displaced in t 424 831∗∗∗ 831∗∗ 675
(544) (267) (388) (482)
Male partner displaced in t+1 178 819∗∗∗ 793∗∗ 1,245∗∗∗
(544) (267) (388) (482)
Male partner displaced in t+2 345 629∗∗ 853∗∗ 1,67∗∗∗
(544) (267) (388) (482)
Male partner displaced in t+3 602 711∗∗∗ 468 1,589∗∗∗
(544) (267) (388) (482)
Observations 164,040 214,920 162,616 266,392
Number of individuals 20,505 26,865 20,327 33,300
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Standard errors in parentheses. Our sample consists of couples 25–55 years of age in the
year before the unemployment shock. Further, we select couples in which the husband has
an annual income from work of at least 5,000 euro in the 4 years before the treatment and
with the husband not receiving income from UI, social assistance or other benefits in the
pre-treatment period. All specifications include year dummies, time-varying demographic





4 The Effect of Constitutional
Commitment to Social Security
on Social Expenditure Schemes
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of constitutional commitment to social security
(CCSS) on different categories of social expenditure. For this purpose, we
use a pooled cross sectional database for 17 EU-countries from 1990 till
2012. We run OLS models, 2SLS regression models and the Heckman two
step model, using the rigidity of the constitution as instrumental variable
to correct for possible endogeneity. A positive effect of constitutional
commitment to social security is found on total social expenditure and
on all four categories of social security spending: old age and survivor,
incapacity, unemployment and active labor market policies (ALMPs). The
largest effect sizes, expressed as a percentage of average spending, are
found for expenditure on unemployment and ALMPs. This shows that
constitutional commitment to social security has the largest effect on
social expenditure schemes targeted at people who are perceived as less
deserving by the public opinion.
A working paper version of this chapter is published as Cammeraat (2017) and
is currently under review. This working paper received the Meijers Prize for best
published article written by PhD students of the research programme Reform of Social
Legislation, Leiden University. I am grateful to Sudha Narayanan, Pierre Koning, Kees
Goudswaard, Wim Voermans, Olaf van Vliet, Ben Velthoven, Stephan Michel, Stefan
Voigt, Jerg Gutmann, Willem van der Deijl, Clare Fenwick and seminar and conference
participants at Leiden University and the European Association of Law and Economics
conference in London. Remaining errors are my own.
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4.1 Introduction
In recent decades, politicians and academics have emphasized the role of
social rights for providing social and economic development (Townsend
2007; ILO 2014). The main argument for a rights-based approach to
development is that it gives an entitlement that can be enforced in court.
Without such a right, people are fully dependent on the ‘good-will’ of
the government of that time for proper education, health care and social
security. In theory, the constitution can play an important role for social
rights, as constitutions provide universal rights for everyone and protect
minorities against the majority. However, the number of empirical studies
on the effect of social rights in the constitution is still very limited.
In this paper, we study the effect of constitutional commitment to social
security (CCSS) on different kinds of social expenditure.1 We define CCSS
as a dichotomous variable, being 1 if there is at least a general statement
in the constitution on a social right to income, unemployment, sickness,
work injury, old age, survivor or disability and 0 if there is no statement
on any of these categories. First, we are interested in the effect of CCSS
on total social expenditure, which shows whether CCSS has an effect
at all. Second, we study if the effect of CCSS is most sizable on social
expenditure schemes for beneficiaries who are seen as less deserving by
the public opinion. We expect this if the median voter cares less about
these social expenditure schemes, leaving a larger role for the constitution.
We run OLS models, 2SLS regression models and the Heckman two
step model with the rigidity of the constitution as an instrument to correct
for possible endogeneity. In line with our expectations, we find a positive
effect of the rigidity of the constitution on CCSS. First, this is in accordance
with Landes and Posner (1975), who argue that the discounted value of
the constitution is larger when the constitution is more durable. Second,
uncertainty increases over time and thereby the risk that politicians them-
selves, but also the median voter, or their offspring become dependent on
social security is larger for the distant future rather than the near. These
1The use of the acronym CCSS for constitutional commitment to social security is in
line with Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016).
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two reasons show an added value of the constitution that supplements
laws and policies.
We use a panel data set for 17 EU-countries from 1990 until 2012.
The data on social expenditures as a % of GDP are taken from the Social
Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the OECD. For CCSS, we use the indicator
created by Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008), which we defined as one or zero,
depending on the presence of a legal provision on assistance to old age,
survivors, disability, unemployment, sickness, work injury or the poor in
the constitution.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find a positive significant
effect of CCSS on total social expenditure. This includes a positive effect on
spending on old age and survivor, incapacity, unemployment and active
labour market policies. Second, the most sizable effects, expressed as a
percentage of average spending, are found for spending on unemployment
and active labor market policies. These are the expenditure schemes
targeted at people who are perceived as less deserving by the public
opinion. Thirdly, no positive effect is found on expenditure on health and
family, which are not covered in CCSS. This suggests that the positive
effect we observe for social security types of social expenditure is due to
CCSS and not caused by a positive attitude towards redistribution.
Our paper relates to two important studies that consider the effect of
commitment to social rights in the constitution. Ben-Bassat and Dahan
(2008) were the first to investigate the effects of the rights to social security,
education, health, housing and workers’ rights. They find no relation
between these rights and expenditure on these different categories, except
for the positive relation between the degree of constitutional commitment
to social security and transfer payments and between constitutional com-
mitment to health and health policy performance. In a more recent paper,
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) find a positive relationship between CCSS
and the extent and coverage of actual measures of social security laws. The
studies of Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016) are the only two studies on
the relation between CCSS and spending on social security, which makes
more research on this topic a valuable contribution.
We make the following contributions to the literature. First, knowing if
there is an effect of CCSS on total social expenditure contributes to research
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on the popular rights-based approach, as it tells us if social rights in the
constitution contribute to social security. Second, studying the effects on
different kinds of social expenditure allows us to explain if CCSS has the
strongest effect on social expenditure targeted at people who are perceived
as less deserving by the public opinion. Third, an important contribution
is how we correct for possible endogeneity in our empirical methodology.
We select similar EU-countries and correct for the endogeneity problem
by using both 2SLS models and the Heckman two step model. We use the
rigidity of the constitution as an instrument in order to derive the effect
of CCSS on social expenditure. This contributes to the current literature,
which does not go beyond correlations inferred from OLS models for a
sample with a wide variety of countries, which we deem as insufficient
to deal with the endogeneity issue as well as to draw conclusions for the
more homogeneous group of EU-countries.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 gives a literature
review, in which we start with a theoretical framework on the effects of
CCSS in Section 4.2.1 and proceed with the related empirical literature
in Section 4.2.2. We continue with describing the methodology with an
elaborate discussion on the causes of endogeneity and the methodological
solutions to deal with this in Section 4.3.1. We give the empirical specifi-
cation in Section 4.3.2. We discuss the data in Section 4.4 and the results
in Section 4.5. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of the
results in Section 4.6.
4.2 Constitutional rights and social security
4.2.1 Theories on the effects of CCSS
In this section we discuss the mechanisms how CCSS is expected to
have an effect on top of normal laws and policies by the rigidity of the
constitution, the interdependence cost calculus and the expressive function
of law. We end this section with explaining the role of the median voter for
social expenditure and how we expect the effects of CCSS for the different
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expenditure schemes to be dependent on the preferences of the median
voter.
The difference between constitutional law and normal laws and policies
lies mainly in the more durable character of the constitution. Landes and
Posner (1975) argue that benefits for interest groups are larger if policies
or laws are more durable. This gives value to constitutional rights on
top of normal laws.2 This means that more rigid constitutions, which are
more durable constitutions, are more valuable. This greater value makes it
more likely that politicians will implement CCSS when the constitution is
more rigid, as it is more worthwhile to put a statement on social security
in the constitution when it is more durable. A second reason why we
expect CCSS to be more valuable when constitutions are more durable is
that uncertainty increases over time. The risk that politicians themselves,
but also the current median voter, or their offspring become dependent
on social security is larger for the distant future than the near future,
making the willingness to pay for social security in the future larger than
for social security in the present.3 Hence, there is enough theoretical
support for our empirical finding of a positive effect of the rigidity of the
constitution on CCSS. Therefore, we can use the rigidity of the constitution
as an instrument to derive the effect of CCSS on social expenditure in our
empirical part, as we will explain in the methodology section.
Another economic rationale for CCSS is given by the interdependence
cost calculus, which is about the trade-off between external costs and deci-
sion making costs (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Rights in the constitution
can protect minorities and thereby reduce external costs of political deci-
sions. Therefore, the number of people involved in the decision making
2Politicians know that the durable character of the constitution will be questioned
when they abolish or dramatically change the constitution. They also know that this
would decrease the value of the constitution. For this reason, politicians are in favor of
constitutions even when it limits their power, as they can use the constitution as a tool to
extract rents related to a longer period than the time being an elected politician. Hence,
we could explain the existence of constitutions in a multiparty system where different
political parties alternate power. We can show in a game theoretical framework in which
a tit for tat strategy is applied, like in Ordeshook (1992), that the Nash equilibrium is to
respect the constitution.
3The risk-averse nature of humans may even increase this difference in willingness to
pay for the uncertain future compared to the present in which the politician or median
voter is unlikely to rely on social security.
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can go down, reducing decision making cost. Hence, CCSS can reduce the
sum of external costs and decision making costs. Also, more potential effi-
ciency gains will be realized, as decision making costs can be an obstacle
to implement efficient policies when these decision making costs outweigh
the efficiency gains. We can compare this with an efficient contract that is
not concluded when transaction costs are too high (Coase 1960). Besides, a
reduction of the external costs affects policies through political stability. A
right to social security protects the lower and middle class, making them
less willing to resist against the government.
A third way in which CCSS can have an effect on social expenditure
can be explained by the expressive function of law, in which CCSS gives
information and thereby influences behavior. A provision in the constitu-
tion indicates that it is more fundamental and thereby provides a reference
point, allowing lower decision making costs. Funk (2007) finds in her
research on voting turnout that a law without penalties, targeted at the
civic duty, might have a bigger impact on behavior than actions which
affect the costs of provision for the public good. We expect this mechanism
to be important as CCSS may have an effect on the political duty to care
about social security.
We also study if CCSS has the largest effect on expenditure schemes
that are preferred by the median voter or on expenditure schemes tar-
geted at groups who are perceived as less deserving.4 Blekesaune and
Quadagno (2003) and Van Oorschot (2006) show that elderly people are
seen as most deserving, closely followed by sick and disabled, whereas
the unemployed are seen as less deserving. Knowing the preferences of
the median voter allows us to test empirically if CCSS has the largest
effects on the expenditure schemes preferred by the median voter or on
4In a democracy, we expect the preferences of the median voter to be the most
important determinant for the level of social expenditure (Hotelling 1929; Black 1948;
Downs 1957). Firstly, the median voter attaches more value to universal kinds of social
expenditure, compared to targeted forms of social expenditure, as not only the poor
but also the middle class benefits from these types of expenditure. This is supported
by Korpi and Palme (1998), Rothstein (2001) and Larsen (2008) who show that a more
universal character of entitlements causes higher levels of redistribution. Secondly, the
median voter is expected to be more in favor of supporting social expenditure targeted at
groups who are perceived as more deserving by the public opinion.
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the expenditure schemes targeted at groups that are perceived as less
deserving.
Empirical literature 4.2.2
In this section, we discuss the empirical literature on the effects of social
rights in the constitution. Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) studied the effects
of the rights to social security, education, health, housing and worker
rights in the constitution. They constructed quantitative indicators for con-
stitutional commitment for these five categories for 68 different countries.
For social security, they studied the relationship between CCSS and the
size of government and between CCSS and redistribution policy. They
find no robust relation between constitutional commitment and public
policy, except for the statistically significant association between CCSS and
government transfers and between constitutional commitment to health
and health policy performance. They find that an increase of one stan-
dard deviation in their CCSS index is associated with an increase of 1.7
percentage points in the share of transfers in GDP.
In a more recent study, Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) find a positive
relation between their indicator of CCSS and the extent and coverage of
actual measures of social security laws. The constitution seems to explain
part of the cross country variation in welfare coverage around the world.
They also tested for interaction effects between CCSS and the degree of
constitutional review, the ease of amending the constitution, the power
of NGOs and international organizations and ethnic fractionalization. In
contrast with theoretical predictions, they find that these institutional
factors do not have a significant influence on the effect of CCSS on social
security policy.
Two other related studies look at a right to social security in the
constitution on poverty and inequality. Bjørnskov and Mchangama (2019)
find no evidence for an effect of the introduction of a right to social
security in the constitution on inequality. Minkler and Prakash (2017)
find no association between constitutional rights generally framed and
poverty. These findings are in contrast with what we would expect based
on the positive association between CCSS and social expenditure found
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by Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016). Both Bjørnskov and Mchangama
(2019) and Minkler and Prakash (2017) use large panels covering 160
and 195 countries, whereas we are interested in the effect for the more
homogeneous EU-countries. The results of these two studies may be
driven by endogeneity as country characteristics are likely to play a role
in explaining both social rights and poverty and inequality in a sample
covering such a variety of countries. Furthermore, we look at the effect
on social expenditure on which we expect a more direct effect than on
inequality or poverty which can only indirectly be affected by a social
right.
When taking a broader perspective, Espinosa (2016) finds that countries
that spend more tend to inscribe fewer rights in their constitution. In
line with this, social expenditure may have a negative effect on CCSS.
Hence, the positive estimate of the effect of CCSS on social expenditure
is a conservative estimate if the effect of social expenditure on CCSS is
negative. Further, Espinosa (2016) finds fragile evidence that constitutional
rights are more likely to induce larger governments only for a sample of
democratic countries. Our sample exists of merely democratic countries
and we use social expenditure rather than government expenditure and
CCSS instead of their more general constitutional rights indicator, which
makes it more likely that we find a positive significant effect. Another way
by which constitutions affect government spending is by constitutional
entrenched spending limits (Blume and Voigt 2013).
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Endogeneity issues
One way by which endogeneity may be a problem is by reverse causality,
as the political conditions and the state of public opinions may cause
constitutional structure, rather than the other way around (Riker 1976).
Another endogeneity issue may be that societies with a culture that cares
more about social security are expected to have both higher CCSS and
higher total social expenditure. The latter indicates that third variables
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as history, culture and religion my explain correlation between CCSS and
social expenditure, rather than an effect of CCSS on social expenditure. In
this section, we explain to what extent endogeneity may cause problems
to find the effect of CCSS on social expenditure and how we address this
endogeneity issues to find an effect that goes beyond mere correlations.
Constitutions can be considered as a representation or expression of
social and political preferences, which have a deeper root in history, culture
and religion. Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016) show that cultural values
and history, like religion and legal origin, indeed have an effect on both
constitutional commitment and social benefits. They find that CCSS is
on average higher in countries that share the tradition of French civil law.
They also find that common law countries exhibit on average a lower
CCSS. Constitutional commitments for socialist countries are closer to
French civil law whereas German and Scandinavian traditions resemble
the English common law more closely (Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2008). Part
of the endogenous variation in CCSS can be explained by legal origin,
which is related to geographical location and religion. Therefore, we
control for legal origin to determine the partial effect of CCSS.
However, Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) argue that the endogeneity
issue is less of a problem than we would expect, as it is hard to find
common economic, cultural or other characteristics among countries that
share a similar degree of constitutional commitment to social security.
For example Scandinavian countries, which are known for their broad
welfare state, have very different levels of CCSS. Finland has very high
CCSS whereas Norway has a CCSS of zero. The same large differences
for similar countries exist all over the sample with Greece having zero
commitment whereas Italy has a very high CCSS. Hungary has a high
CCSS while the Czech Republic has zero CCSS.
Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2016) also argue that endogeneity problems are
absent if the effect of CCSS is interpreted as a proxy for stated preferences
of the past, embedded in the culture. This is in line with Acemoglu
et al. (2005), who argue that economic outcomes and the distribution
of resources determine de facto political power, which has an effect on
political institutions such as the constitution. In turn, these institutions
have an effect on future redistribution of resources and future political
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power. In this chain of causation, we measure the effect of the latest step,
that is the effect of the ‘stated public preferences in the constitution’ on
‘future political power’, namely redistribution of resources and future
public preferences. In this interpretation, we recognize that CCSS is
affected by political preferences at the time when the constitution came into
force. Finding an effect of CCSS indicates that former political preferences
have a stronger effect on preferences of current politicians when these are
stated in the constitution. Hence, culture is not a third variable that makes
CCSS endogenous, but CCSS is a proxy of stated public preferences of the
past. Finding a positive effect makes us conclude that political or public
preferences are more durable if they are stated in the constitution.
To avoid biases in estimating the effect of CCSS, we use the rigidity of
the constitution as an instrumental variable to derive the effect of CCSS on
social expenditure in a 2SLS model and in the Heckman two step model.
In these models, we assume that the rigidity of the constitution has an
effect on CCSS, but no independent effect on social expenditure schemes.
It is easy to imagine that CCSS is positively affected by the rigidity of the
constitution, as explained in the theory part. First of all, because a higher
level of rigidity implies a more durable character of the constitution and
this would, according to Landes and Posner (1975), lead to a higher value
for interest groups. After all, the added value of CCSS on top of normal
policies and laws is expected to be very limited when constitutions are
very adaptable. Second, preferences for CCSS are expected to be larger
for more durable constitutions because uncertainty increases when time
elapses and thereby the risk that the politician, the median voter, or their
offspring become dependent on social security is larger in the far than
the near future. For these two reasons, we expect a positive effect of the
rigidity of the constitution on CCSS.
Regarding the exclusivity condition of our instrumental variable, there
is no theoretical basis for an independent effect of the rigidity of the con-
stitution on social expenditure. A potential risk is that another variable
closely correlated with rigidity might have an effect on both CCSS and so-
cial expenditure directly. Trust might be such a variable that explains both
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the rigidity of the constitution, CCSS and social expenditure.5 However,
Bjørnskov and Voigt (2014) argue that high trust levels reduce the need
for statements in the constitution. In line with this it would also reduce
the need for a more rigid constitution, suggesting a negative relation
between trust and the rigidity of the constitution. But we find that trust
and rigidity are only weakly (and positively) correlated, indicating that
trust does not cause problems for the validity of our instrument. When we
have a closer look at the data on the rigidity of the constitution, again no
clear pattern appears between similar groups of countries and the rigidity
of the constitution. All in all, we expect exclusivity of our instrument to
be a justified assumption.
In the Heckman correction model, we correct for unobserved corre-
lation between the selection model and the second stage. We expect a
positive correlation, when CCSS is a complement to political decision
making. This is the case when endogeneity is mainly driven by a welfare
state culture explaining both CCSS and social expenditure. But we expect
a negative correlation when CCSS is a substitute to political decision mak-
ing. This implies that unobserved characteristics have a negative effect
on the probability of CCSS and a positive effect on social expenditure.
For instance, if the added value of a statement in the constitution would
be smaller when policies or other laws are already inducing high social
expenditure.
We also study the effect of CCSS on social expenditures on health
and family. We expect no significant positive effects on these expenditure
schemes as these are not taken into account in the CCSS indicator. How-
ever, we would still expect to find a positive significant effect of CCSS on
social expenditure on family and health if part of the effect we measure is
due to larger welfare regimes. Not finding such a positive effect can be
interpreted as indication that the effect we find on social security expendi-
ture is due to CCSS and not due to cultural factors that are both related
with CCSS and social expenditure.
5Bjørnskov and Voigt (2014) show that social trust is negatively associated with the
length of countries’ constitutions. Although they are not studying constitutional rigidity,
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4.3.2 Empirical specification
We use various model specifications to estimate the effect of CCSS on
different kinds of social expenditure. Regression equation (1) is used as a
framework for the first three empirical model specifications:
yit = αt + γCCSSi + X′itβx + �it. (4.1)
The dependent variables of interest are public and mandatory private gross
total social expenditure and spending on old age and survivors, incapacity,
unemployment, ALMPs, health and family, denoted by yit. This outcome
variables vary by country (i = 1, ..., N) and years (t = 1, ..., T). We regress
the outcome variables on a set of year fixed effects (αt), the control variables
old age dependency ratio and GDP per capita X′it with coefficients βx and
the explanatory variable of interest CCSSi with coefficient γ. The choice
of these two control variables in the baseline model are in line with the
literature (Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2016; Rodrik 1998; Mulligan et al. 2010).
Note that CCSS is constant over time. Therefore the first specification is
cross sectional, as we only use the data for 2008, which is the year in which
CCSS is measured. From specification 2 onward we use the time period
1990-2012 and include year dummies to obtain more accurate estimates
for our control variables and for CCSS. In specifications 2 and 3, we also
include a first order serial correlation component in the error term and
replace robust standard errors by panel corrected standard errors. Control
variables for legal origin and unemployment are added in specification 3.
In specification 4, we control for endogeneity by using a 2SLS model
using the rigidity of the constitution as instrument. Our first stage equation
is given by regression equation (2):
CCSSi = αt + δZi + X′itβx + μit (4.2)
In which Zi denotes the rigidity of the constitution, our instrumental
variable, with coefficient δ. As constitutions are constant, the rigidity of
the constitution is constant over time as well. The second stage is still
equal to equation (1). The rigidity of the constitution is expected to have
an effect on CCSS but no direct effect on social expenditure. As explained
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earlier, we can use this instrument to control for possible endogeneity to
find a more accurate effect of CCSS on the different kinds of benefits. The
rigidity of the constitution is expected to have a positive effect on CCSS,
as the added value of CCSS on top of laws and policies is larger when the
constitution is more rigid.6
Finally, specification 5 is our preferred model. Here we use the rigid-
ity of the constitution to estimate the effect by using the Heckman two
step model in which a correction for the correlation between unobserved
characteristics in the selection model and unobserved characteristics in the
second stage is applied (Heckman 1979). This yields:
Prob(CCSSi = 1|Zi, X�it) = Prob(−μit < θZi + νxX�it) (4.3)
= Φ(θZi + νxX�it)











�it ∼ N(0, σ�)





The first stage, follows from a probit regression model for the probabil-
ity of CCSS, see equation (3). Zit denotes the rigidity of the constitution,
6In our robustness analysis, we find that the rigidity of the constitution is a weak
instrument for the OECD sample, which is denoted by a low F-statistic. Therefore, for
the OECD sample, we can only use our first three (OLS) specifications.
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which is our exclusion restriction, with parameter θ and X′it give the ex-
planatory variables GDP per capita and the old age dependency ratio
with parameters νx. Estimation of this first stage model yields results that
can be used to predict the probability that a country has CCSS. Equation
(4) is our second stage equation, where γ gives the effect of CCSS when
we control for selectivity. We assume that the error terms are jointly nor-
mal and are independent and identically distributed. ρ is the correlation
between unobserved determinants of CCSSit and unobserved determi-
nants of social expenditure. σ� is the standard deviation of �it. We use
the inverse mills ratio to correct for selectivity, in which φ denotes the
standard normal density function and Φ the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. We use robust standard errors to correct for possible
heteroscedasticity.
4.4 Data
We use a pooled cross sectional data set for 17 EU-countries covering 23
years from 1990 to 2012.7 We choose to focus on EU-countries that are
represented in the OECD for the reason of data availability and because
there is less heterogeneity between these developed countries, making
cross-country comparison more reliable. The countries Estonia, Latvia,
Luxembourg and Slovenia were removed from the database, because both
the index for CCSS and the index for the rigidity of the constitution are
not available for these countries (Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2008; Lorenz 2005).
This makes our selected countries even more comparable with regard to
GDP per capita, geographical location and being consolidated democracies,
reducing the risk that third factors obscure our results. We focus on the
period from 1990 onwards, making the data set highly balanced, as this
enables us to take the post-Soviet countries into account; a substantial
share of the data is missing for these countries for the period before 1990.
We choose to use the CCSS indicator created by Ben-Bassat and Dahan
(2008, 2016) as we consider this data of higher quality than the data sets
7Countries in EU sample: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
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from the Toronto Initiative for Economic and Social Rights (TIESR) (Jung
and Rosevear 2011) and the data set from the Comparative Constitutions
Project (CCP) (Elkins et al. 2014). First, because Ben Bassat and Dahan
studied the various constitutions thoroughly to code both different types
of commitment to social security and different degrees of commitment.
The other data sets only capture a dummy if there is a social right to social
security in the constitutions.8 Looking more carefully in the constitutions
reduces the risk of making mistakes. Second, we consider the indicator
of Ben Bassat and Dahan most accurate as The Netherlands and Sweden
do commit to social security in the constitution, which is not given for the
Netherlands in the CCP data set and not for Sweden in both the TIESR and
the CCP data sets.9 Third, a lot of data on commitment to social security
is missing for different OECD countries and years in the CCP dataset. We
could have exploited the panel nature of this dataset if this dataset was
more complete regarding social rights to social security. However, the
added value of using this panel nature is limited as constitutions hardly
change over time. Looking at the CCP dataset, I only found 4 changes in
CCSS for our sample of 28 OECD countries during the period 1990-2012.10
Besides, constitutional changes are expected to be highly correlated with
other political or economic shocks, making it difficult to separate the effect
of social rights from the effects of these other shocks.
Another reason why we accept that we lose some countries when we
use these CCSS and rigidity indicators is that Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008,
8The CCP project is unique as it codes constitutions in hundreds of variables and
is therefore of great value for studying the empirical effects of constitutions, but its
limitation is that by looking at so many different aspects, less accuracy is expected for
individual indicators.
9Article 20 of the Dutch constitution: 1. It shall be the concern of the authorities to
secure the means of subsistence of the population and to achieve the distribution of
wealth. 2. Rules concerning entitlement to social security shall be laid down by Act of
Parliament. 3. Dutch nationals resident in the Netherlands who are unable to provide
for themselves shall have a right, to be regulated by Act of Parliament, to aid from the
authorities.
Article 2(2) of Chapter 1 of the Swedish constitution (headed ‘Basic Principles’): “The
personal, economic and cultural welfare of the individual shall be fundamental aims of
public activity. In particular, the public institutions shall secure the right to employment,
housing and education, and shall promote social care and social security, as well as
favourable conditions for good health".
10Changes in CCSS are found for Belgium (1994), Finland (1998), France (2000), Poland
(1997) in the CCP dataset.
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2016) already studied the association between CCSS and social expenditure
for a large variety of countries from all over the world. Our contribution
is in finding effects rather than associations, using an IV approach, and
looking at different social expenditure schemes. For these purposes, it is
important that countries are not too different in unobserved characteristics
that might drive our results. Therefore, we value quality of the data over
quantity.
We transform the CCSS indicator of Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016)
in a dichotomous variable, being 1 if there is at least a general statement
in the constitution on a social right to income, unemployment, sickness,
work injury, old age, survivor or disability and 0 if there is no statement
on any of these categories. The choice of taking the sum of these five
categories corresponds to Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016). A high
overlap and substitutability between the different types of commitment to
social security, caused by the abstract formulation of the legal provisions,
makes us believe that the sum has more explanatory power than the indi-
vidual commitment to social security variables.11 We use a dichotomous
variable in our baseline models, because we expect the existence of a legal
provision in the constitution to be more important than the concreteness
of this legal provision.
The outcome variables we consider are social expenditure variables for
which we use the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the OECD. Our
main variable for social security is public and mandatory private gross
total social expenditure as a % of GDP, which we define as total social
expenditure.12 This total social expenditure consists of spending on old
age and survivor, incapacity, unemployment, ALMPs, health and family,
which are our next dependent variables.13 A description of the different
social expenditure variables is given in the appendix in Table A.5.1.
11For example, Article 2 of the Swedish constitution and article 20 of the Dutch
constitution may explain an effect on spending in multiple categories, see footnote 9.
12Data on net total social expenditure is not available for the different expenditure
types, and very limited for total social expenditure, therefore we use data on gross social
expenditure.
13A very small part of total social expenditure consists of expenditure on housing and
others. we choose not to analyze these kinds of social expenditure separately because of
the low significance, on average 0.33% and 0.46% of GDP in the period 1990-2012.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics: differences in means between
countries with and without constitutional commit-
ment to social security (CCSS) for the different social
expenditure variables shown as % of GDP
Countries Countries Differences Differences (in %)
with without in relative to Countries
CCSS CCSS Means without CCSS
Total social expenditure 23.5 22.0 1.5 6.9
Old age and Survivor 9.3 9.5 0.2 −2.0
Incapacity 3.1 2.4 0.7 29.1
Unemployment 1.5 0.8 0.6 76.3
ALMPs 0.9 0.5 0.4 88.4
Health 5.6 5.8 -0.2 −3.5
Family 2.2 2.1 0.1 4.2
Observations 12 5
Sample: 17 EU countries in the years 1990-2012.
Table 4.1 gives the descriptive statistics on the different social expendi-
ture schemes for countries with and without CCSS, for EU countries over
the period 1990-2012. We find that total social expenditure is on average
23.5 percent of GDP in the countries with CCSS and 22.0 in the countries
without CCSS. This difference is 7 percent relative to the mean of total
social expenditure for countries without CCSS. The relative differences are
the largest for spending on unemployment and ALMPs (respectively 76
percent and 88 percent relative to the means in countries without CCSS).
Further, in countries with CCSS, we observe less spending on old age and
survivor (−2 percent) and more spending on incapacity (+29 percent).
Regarding social expenditure which is not taken into account in CCSS,
we find slightly larger spending in countries with CCSS on family (+4
percent), whereas we find less spending on health (−3 percent).
Our instrumental variable, the the rigidity of the constitution, is the
average of the standardized indices for rigidity in Lorenz (2005). This
index considers the factors: kinds of majority, success rate, times of
voting, unicameral/bicameral legislature, initiative actors, special body
or regulator legislature, need of elections between two votes, electoral
system, approval by referendum, approval by states’ legislatures. The
rigidity of the constitution, CCSS and total social expenditure are given
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for the different countries in the year 2008 in Table A.4.2. We consider the
rigidity of the constitution of Lorenz (2005) a better instrument than the
amendment rate because it contains more dimensions and has the highest
correlation with most other variables for the rigidity of the constitution
(Ginsburg and Melton 2015).
Further, we create an interaction variable between CCSS and political
party in office to study how constitutional commitment and political party
in office have a combined effect on social security benefits. For politics,
we use left-wing/center/right-wing cabinet posts in percentage of total
cabinet posts from the comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al.
2013).
The control variables we use are GDP per head of population (USD
in thousands, constant prices, 2010 PPPs), the old age dependency ratio
(percentage of 65+ relative to 15-64 years old), dummies for legal origin,
unemployment rate (standardized unemployment rate, all persons) and
year dummies, see the appendix Table A.4.3 for the descriptive statistics.
These control variables are chosen as they have the largest effects on the
social expenditure schemes and are expected to influence the effect of
CCSS on social expenditure. These control variables are in line with the
literature (Kittel et al. 2003; Mulligan et al. 2010; Ben-Bassat and Dahan
2008; Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2016). For legal origin we use dummies for
French, English, German and Scandinavian legal origin, where we use
socialist legal origin as the reference category.
In our robustness analysis, we also investigate the effect for the sample
of EU-countries together with Iceland, Switzerland and Norway, as well
as for a sample of OECD countries without Japan and Korea.14 Japan
and Korea are outliers as they have a different Asian system with very
low levels of social spending.15 Hence, Japan and Korea are outliers for
14Countries in OECD sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States
15Reasons for low spending in Japan and Korea can be found in social policies as
means rather than as goals, larger involvement of family and private sector in the welfare
mix, late start of welfare system, top-down development of social policies, colonial past
and the neglect for social services targeting woman (Hong, 2014).
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reasons independent of CCSS and therefore we decided to drop these two
countries from our database.
Results 4.5
Table 4.2 presents the regression results of CCSS on total social expenditure.
Column (1) shows the results for the year 2008 where we only control
for GDP per capita and the old age dependency ratio. This specification
suggests a positive effect, significant at a 10 percent level, indicating
that countries with CCSS spend on average 2.0 percentage points of
GDP more on total social expenditure. This implies that the mean total
social expenditure rate for countries with CCSS is 9% higher than for
countries without CCSS. In Column (2), we use the years 1990-2012 and
add year dummies to our empirical specification. The robust standard
errors are replaced by panel corrected standard errors and we include a
first order serial correlation component. The effect of CCSS on total social
expenditures slightly increases and is highly significant now.
Adding control variables for the unemployment rate and legal origin, in
column (3), does not change much. German legal origin and Scandinavian
legal origin have the largest positive effect on total social expenditure,
socialist and English legal origin the lowest. The unemployment rate
increases total social expenditure, which we expected as it controls for
business cycle differences.
The effect of CCSS on total social expenditure increases to 3.1 per-
centage points in our 2SLS model, in which we use the rigidity of the
constitution as instrument. An increase in the coefficient suggests an
underestimation of the effect size when we do not control for endogene-
ity. This could be explained by the constitution being a substitute for
political decision making. In the first stage regression, we find a large
positive effect of the rigidity of the constitution on CCSS. The F-test of
excluded instruments is easily rejected with an F-value of 73.6, see Table
4.3, suggesting sufficient relevance of our instrument.
In column (5), the effect size increases to 3.8 percentage points when
we control for unobserved correlation between our selection model and
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Table 4.2: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) on
total social expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CCSS 1.990∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 2.261∗∗∗ 3.053∗∗∗ 3.763∗∗∗
(1.099) (0.664) (0.862) (0.939) (1.015)
Old age dependency ratio 0.574∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.087) (0.083) (0.059) (0.061)
GDP per capita 1.081 −0.858∗∗ −1.534∗∗∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗
(0.671) (0.402) (0.518) (0.243) (0.249)
Unemployment rate 0.185∗∗∗
(0.034)
French legal origin 4.325∗∗∗
(1.277)
English legal origin 1.577
(1.268)
German legal origin 10.170∗∗∗
(1.451)
Scandinavian legal origin 8.432∗∗∗
(1.450)
Constant 3.957 8.243∗∗∗ 12.230∗∗∗ 0.111 −0.614
(2.602) (1.853) (2.068) (1.651) (1.720)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Observations 17 382 359 382 382
R-squared 0.601 0.748 0.843 0.459
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level
and *** at the 1% level.
Table 4.3: First stage results: the rigidity of the constitution on





Old age dependency ratio −0.016∗∗
(0.007)





* denotes significant at the 10% level, **
at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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second stage regressions by using the Heckman two step model. The effect
size in our preferred specification, column 5, is a substantial 17% relative to
the mean of total social expenditure for countries without CCSS. Also the
extent to which the Heckman two step model is correcting for unobserved
correlation, denoted by rho, is with a value of −0.4 within acceptable
proportions. The negative rho means that there is a lower probability
of CCSS when other factors already take care of social expenditure (e.g.
politicians or labor unions).
Table 4.4 presents the effect of CCSS on the different social spending
categories when we split up total social expenditure. The largest effect
sizes, expressed as a percentage of average spending, are found for ex-
penditure on unemployment and ALMPs. In our preferred specification,
column 5, a positive effect of 2.1 percentage points is found for expenditure
on unemployment, which is an increase of 248% relative to the mean of ex-
penditure on unemployment in countries without CCSS. For expenditure
on ALMPs we find a coefficient of 0.5, which is an increase of 99% relative
to the mean. Although smaller in relative size, we still find large positive
significant effects of CCSS on expenditure on old age and survivor and on
incapacity. A positive coefficient of 2.46 is found for old age and survivor,
which is about 26% relative to the mean in countries without CCSS and we
find a positive effect of 0.7 percentage points for incapacity which is about
28% relative to the mean. However, for the effect on old age and survivor
we find no significant effect in specifications (2) and (3), suggesting that
we have to be more careful in drawing conclusions. We find a negative
rho for all kinds of social expenditure except for expenditure on family
benefits. Meaning that for all these other social expenditure schemes, there
is a lower probability of CCSS when other factors (e.g. politicians or labor
unions) already take care of social expenditure.
No significant positive effect is found on health and family spending,
which are not taken into account in the CCSS variable. This provides extra
evidence that the effects we find on social security expenditure are due to
CCSS and not caused by a third factor, such as a large welfare state. We
even observe a negative significant effect on family, suggesting that this
social expenditure type is substituted by expenditure on social security.
This may be explained by government budget constraints or because the
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Table 4.4: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) on
different kinds of social expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) %Δ
Total social expenditure 1.990∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 2.261∗∗∗ 3.053∗∗∗ 3.763∗∗∗ 17%
(1.099) (0.664) (0.862) (0.939) (1.015)
Correlation (rho) −0.363
Old age and Survivor 0.698 −0.005 0.063 3.233∗∗∗ 2.464∗∗∗ 26%
(1.154) (0.525) (0.620) (0.688) (0.522)
Correlation (rho) −0.609
Incapacity 0.684 0.681∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 28%
(0.433) (0.243) (0.219) (0.329) (0.343)
Correlation (rho) −0.020
Unemployment 0.475 0.757∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗ 248%
(0.290) (0.195) (0.187) (0.351) (0.098)
Correlation (rho) −0.924
ALMPs 0.282∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 99%
(0.100) (0.074) (0.073) (0.110) (0.067)
Correlation (rho) −0.108
Health −0.066 0.055 0.004 −0.030 0.056 1%
(0.375) (0.223) (0.335) (0.237) (0.145)
Correlation (rho) −0.142
Family −0.063 0.119 0.218 −2.303∗∗∗ −1.684∗∗∗ −79%
(0.404) (0.160) (0.203) (0.409) (0.0742)
Correlation (rho) 0.983
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls legal origin No No Yes No No
controls unemployment No No Yes No No
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at
the 1% level.
government takes into account the total budget of the needy, which is
already higher when they can rely on generous social security benefits.
The results remain the same in the robust analysis. Table A.4.4 in the
appendix shows that the results are robust when we add the European
non-EU countries: Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Table A.5.10 shows
robust results in our sample of 28 OECD countries, when we exclude Japan
and Korea as they have a different Asian system. Further, we find the
same positive effects when we only consider the period before the Great
Recession (1990-2009), in Table A.4.6. Finally, the results remain robust
when we standardize the 3 values with the lowest and highest rigidity of
the constitution and when we transform the variable for the rigidity of the
constitution in a dichotomous variable, to correct for possible outliers, see
Table A.4.7 and Table A.4.8.
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We study non-linear effects in Tables A.4.9 and interaction effects with
politics in Table A.4.10, see the appendix. In Table A.4.9 we observe
significant negative effects of the square of CCSS on total social expendi-
ture, suggesting that the concreteness of CCSS is less important than the
statement itself. Regarding interaction effects with politics, no effect is
found of left-wing cabinet seats on social expenditure, nor of left-wing
cabinet seats interacted with CCSS, see Table A.4.10 appendix. We find
some evidence that more right-wing cabinet seats translate in lower total
social expenditure but that the interaction between right-wing cabinet
seats and CCSS has a positive effect on total social expenditure. This
suggests that right-wing politicians reduce total social spending less when
there is CCSS. However, more research is required on this result as the
effect is not significant in specifications (2) to (4).
Discussion and conclusion 4.6
In this paper, we studied the effect of constitutional commitment to social
security (CCSS) on different kinds of social expenditure. We used a pooled
cross sectional database for 17 EU-countries from 1990 till 2012.
The main challenge of research on institutions like CCSS is that they are
related to many other things like culture, religion, legal origin, geography,
political institutions, etc. We deal with this potential endogeneity problem
extensively by limiting the sample to more similar EU-countries, control
for legal origin and use 2SLS models and the Heckman two step model
with the rigidity of the constitution as instrumental variable.
First, we find a positive significant effect of CCSS on total social security
expenditure, which increases when we control for endogeneity. This
includes positive effects on the categories of social expenditure on old age
and survivor, incapacity, unemployment and active labor market policies.
This is in accordance with the rights-based approach to development,
which supplements the focus on market institutions and property rights
with human rights and social policies (Townsend 2007: ILO 2014). This
result corresponds with the findings of Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008, 2016)
who find a positive relation between CCSS and transfer payments and
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between CCSS and the extent and coverage of measures of social security
laws.
Second, the results show that the added value of CCSS is mostly
found for expenditure on unemployment and ALMPs. Blekesaune and
Quadagno (2003) and Van Oorschot (2006) show that the general public
perceives the unemployed as less deserving than the old and disabled,
suggesting lower support for spending on the unemployed by the median
voter. This could explain why CCSS, rather than the median voter theory
alone, can explain the scope of expenditure on unemployment and ALMPs.
Hence, the importance of CCSS is mainly to protect people who are
perceived as less deserving, which makes CCSS a substitute for political
decision making. This is in line with the theory of the interdependence
cost calculus, in which Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that the role of
the constitution is mainly to protect minorities. These is also supported
by finding more sizable effects when we control for endogeneity and by
a negative rho in the Heckman model. This suggests that there are third
factors (e.g. political decision making) that have a positive effect on social
expenditure and a negative effect on CCSS.
Thirdly, No positive significant effect is found for expenditure on
families and health which are the two social expenditure categories that
are not included in CCSS. This indicates that the positive relationship
between CCSS and the social security types of social expenditure is really
due to CCSS and not due to different social preferences that affect both
CCSS and social expenditure.
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Table A.4.1: The OECD social expenditure categories
Category Description
Old-age Pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help and
residential services for the elderly.
Survivors Pensions and funeral payments.
Incapacity Care services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from occupational injury
and accident legislation, employee sickness payments.
Health Spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention.
Family Child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support during leave
and sole parent payments.
ALMPs Active Labour Market Policies: employment services, training youth measures
subsidized employment, employment measures for the disabled.
Unemployment Unemployment compensation, severance pay and
early retirement for labour market reasons.
Housing Housing allowances and rent subsidies.
Other Social policy areas, non-categorical cash benefits to low-income households,
other social services; i.e. support programs such as food subsidies.
Description of the different categories is taken from OECD (2007)
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Table A.4.2: Descriptive statistics: values of constitutional com-
mitment to social scurity (CCSS) and the rigidity
of the constitution for the different countries
Country Year Total CCSS Rigidity const.
EU countries
Austria 2008 26.40 0 −0.47
Belgium 2008 26.31 1 0.64
Czech Republic 2008 18.21 0 −0.18
Denmark 2008 27.44 1 0.37
Finland 2008 23.34 1 −0.08
France 2008 28.54 1 −0.64
Germany 2008 25.30 0 0.16
Greece 2008 21.41 0 −0.34
Hungary 2008 22.65 1 −0.41
Ireland 2008 18.49 1 −0.43
Italy 2008 26.19 1 −0.16
Netherlands 2008 20.16 1 0.65
Poland 2008 20.23 1 −0.02
Portugal 2008 22.57 1 −0.47
Spain 2008 22.19 1 0.58
Sweden 2008 25.95 1 −1.12
United Kingdom 2008 21.72 0 −2.03
Other European countries
Iceland 2008 20.24 1
Norway 2008 20.35 0 0.05
Switzerland 2008 22.48 1 0.36
Other non-European OECD countries
Anglo-Saxon:
Australia 2008 18.87 0 0.88
Canada 2008 16.31 0 0.55
New Zealand 2008 19.35 0 −1.91
United States 2008 16.84 0 2.07
Non-Anglo-Saxon:
Chile 2008 12.18 1 0.44
Israel 2008 15.96 0
Mexico 2008 6.84 1
Turkey 2008 11.58 1
Asian countries
Japan 2008 20.18 1 1
Korea 2008 8.26 1 0.44
The rigidity of the constitution is not available for Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Turkey
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Table A.4.3: Descriptive statistics of all used variables: exten-
tion of Table 1.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total social expenditure 382 23.0 4.3 12.4 34.6
Old age and survivor 382 9.3 2.8 3.1 17.5
Incapacity 382 2.9 1.238 0.8 6.4
Unemployment 388 1.3 1.0 0.0 4.6
ALMPs 388 0.8 0.5 0.1 2.7
Health 390 5.7 1.1 3.2 8.5
Family 382 2.2 1.0 0.3 4.5
CCSS (dummy) 391 0.71 0.46 0 1
CCSS (non-dichotomous) 391 0.64 0.72 0 2.14
Rigidity constitution 391 -0.23 0.65 -2.03 0.65
GDP per capita (in thousands) 390 3.1 0.8 0.9 4.8
Old age dependency ratio 391 23.3 3.4 15.5 32.2
Unemployment rate 362 8.6 3.8 1.7 24.8
French civil law 391 0.41 0.49 0 1
English common law 391 0.12 0.32 0 1
German law 391 0.12 0.32 0 1
Socialist law 391 0.18 0.38 0 1
Scandinavian law 391 0.18 0.38 0 1
Sample: EU-countries.
Table A.4.4: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social
security (CCSS) on different kinds of social expenditure:
sample of EU-countries plus Norway, Switzerland and Ice-
land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total social expenditure 2.134∗ 1.655∗∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 2.385∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗
(1.058) (0.501) (0.491) (0.903) (0.837)
Old age and Survivor 0.776 0.067 0.190 3.380∗∗∗ 3.040∗∗∗
(0.921) (0.418) (0.557) (0.683) (0.785)
Incapacity 0.421 0.252 0.165 0.617∗ 0.328
(0.409) (0.180) (0.107) (0.318) (0.329)
Unemployment 0.499∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ 1.984∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.193) (0.206) (0.304) (0.246)
ALMPs 0.266∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.087) (0.095) (0.113) (0.115)
Health 0.175 0.207 0.061 −0.231 −0.063
(0.417) (0.215) (0.276) (0.235) (0.152)
Family −0.058 −0.046 0.052 −2.387∗∗∗ −1.869∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.165) (0.141) (0.399) (0.089)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 20 20 20 19 19
Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. The rigidity of the constitution is not available for Iceland,
leaving 19 countries in specification (4) and (5). * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level
and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.4.5: Estimation results of constitutional
commitment to social security (CCSS)
on different kinds of social expendi-
ture: sample of OECD countries mi-
nus Japan and Korea
(1) (2) (3)
Total social expenditure 1.989∗∗ 1.299∗∗ 1.694∗∗∗
(0.847) (0.576) (0.616)
Old age and Survivor 1.185∗ 0.641∗ 0.103
(0.675) (0.369) (0.546)
Incapacity 0.559 0.442∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗
(0.410) (0.145) (0.157)
Unemployment 0.379 0.378∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.156) (0.167)
ALMPs 0.265∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.066) (0.084)
Health −0.379 −0.412∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.366) (0.114) (0.340)
Family 0.044 −0.026 0.286∗∗
(0.402) (0.170) (0.119)
Year dummies No Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE
AR(1) component NO YES YES
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 28 28 28
Only OLS models lead to reliable results when considering the OECD,
because the rigidity of the constitution has lower explanatory power
for CCSS (lower F-statistic) and it is harder to argue that the exclusion
restriction still holds as the rigidity of the constitution may be endoge-
neous due to larger cultural differences when considering the OECD
rather than merely the EU countries represented in the OECD. Japan
and Korea are excluded from the sample as they have a different Asian
system of social security, in which social expenditure is typically much
lower. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and ***
at the 1% level.
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Table A.4.6: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social
security (CCSS) on different kinds of social expenditure:
period before Great Recession (1990-2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total social expenditure 1.990∗ 2.226∗∗∗ 2.565∗∗∗ 3.544∗∗∗ 3.949 ∗∗∗
(1.099) (0.696) (0.603) (1.086) (0.992)
Old age and Survivor 0.698 0.202 0.475 3.598∗∗∗ 2.766 ∗∗∗
(1.154) (0.295) (0.502) (0.782) (0.853)
Incapacity 0.684 0.701∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.705∗ 0.560
(0.433) (0.275) (0.200) (0.386) (0.400)
Unemployment 0.475 0.672∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ 2.049 ∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.160) (0.147) (0.368) (0.112)
ALMPs 0.282∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.463 ∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.0823) (0.0862) (0.128) (0.0713)
Health −0.0662 0.0778 0.133 0.0280 0.118
(0.375) (0.200) (0.237) (0.242) (0.129)
Family −0.0633 0.141 0.242 −2.043∗∗∗ −1.772 ∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.159) (0.204) (0.423) (0.104)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.4.7: Estimation results of consti-
tutional commitment to so-
cial security (CCSS) on dif-
ferent kinds of social expen-
diture: highest and lowest
values of rigidity standard-
ized
(1) (2)
Total social expenditure 2.562∗ 3.362∗∗
(1.545) (1.341)












Year dummies Yes Yes
Method 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO NO
Years 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the
constitution. Highest values of rigidity, for The Nether-
lands, Belgium and Spain, are standardized to 0.37 and
the lowest values of rigidity, for United Kingdom, Swe-
den and France, are standardized to −0.47. By this stan-
dardization we try to be as objective as possible as we
choose 3 outliers of both sides of the distribution. The
values 0.37 and −0.47 are equal to the values of the fourth
observation from both sides of the distribution. This
choice is also based on the consideration that the mean
of the rigidity of the constitution is slightly negative. For
the Heckman model on family expenditure we did not
control for the old age dependency ratio as there was a
discontinuous region encountered. * denotes significant
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
150 Constitutional Commitment to Social Security Chapter 4
Table A.4.8: Estimation results of consti-
tutional commitment to so-
cial security (CCSS) on dif-
ferent kinds of social expen-
diture: rigidity as a dichoto-
mous variable
(1) (2)
Total social expenditure 4.357∗∗∗ 3.894∗∗∗
(1.074) (0.870)












Year dummies Yes Yes
Method 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO NO
Years 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the
constitution. The dichotomous variable for the rigidity of
the constitution = 1 if the the rigidity of the constitution
> −0.17 and 0 otherwise. Countries with a rigid constitu-
tion are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Poland and Spain. Countries with no rigid
constitution are Austria, Czech Republic, France, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the United King-
dom. For the Heckman model on family expenditure we
did not control for the old age dependency ratio as there
was a discontinuous region encountered. * denotes sig-
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Table A.4.9: Estimation results of constitutional commitment
to social security (CCSS) on different kinds of
social expenditure: CCSS as non-dichotomous
variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total social expenditure
CCSS 5.629∗ 1.621 4.219∗∗ 4.542∗∗∗
(2.641) (1.655) (1.743) (1.523)
CCSS squared −2.794∗∗ −1.008 −2.698∗∗∗
(1.230) (0.763) (0.763)
old age and Survivor
CCSS 1.783 −0.681 1.213 4.810∗∗∗
(2.407) (1.067) (1.017) (0.878)
CCSS squared −0.872 0.382 −0.582
(1.069) (0.452) (0.448)
Incapacity
CCSS 0.749 −0.454 0.659 1.167∗∗
(1.307) (0.660) (0.423) (0.578)
CCSS squared −0.275 0.212 −0.447∗∗
(0.619) (0.337) (0.202)
Unemployment
CCSS 1.836 1.707∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗ 3.175∗∗∗
(1.038) (0.535) (0.356) (0.773)
CCSS squared −0.779 −0.790∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗∗
(0.527) (0.247) (0.156)
ALMPs
CCSS 0.48∗ 0.506∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.230) (0.198) (0.217)
CCSS squared −0.216∗ −0.258∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.121) (0.103)
Health
CCSS 0.793 0.580 0.196 −0.0446
(0.949) (0.466) (0.537) (0.355)
CCSS squared −0.573 −0.387∗ −0.255
(0.539) (0.215) (0.232)
Family
CCSS 0.166 −0.408 0.503 −3.426∗∗∗
(1.210) (0.306) (0.403) (0.754)
CCSS squared −0.099 0.103 −0.359∗∗
(0.552) (0.134) (0.167)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.4.10: Estimation results of constitutional commitment to social security
(CCSS) on total social expenditure: interaction with politics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CCSS 4.394∗∗ 2.399∗∗∗ 2.229∗∗∗ 4.715 3.201∗∗∗
(1.655) (0.595) (0.819) (2.982) (1.081)
Government left 0.030 0.002 −0.000 0.027 0.002
(0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.007)
Government left*CCSS −0.062∗ −0.004 −0.000 −0.029 0.012
(0.029) (0.004) (0.003) (0.040) (0.010)
CCSS −1.105 2.117∗∗∗ 2.370∗∗∗ 1.272 1.997∗∗
(1.251) (0.608) (0.834) (1.558) (0.942)
Government right −0.040∗∗ −0.005 0.002 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0148) (0.007)
Government right*CCSS 0.084∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.003 0.031 0.035∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.010)
CCSS 3.564∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗ 2.145∗∗∗ 3.006∗∗∗ 3.507∗∗∗
(1.159) (0.668) (0.825) (0.926) (0.782)
Government center 0.034 0.002 −0.007 0.064∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.011)
Government center*CCSS −0.086 0.006 0.012∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.012)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS Heckman
Standard errors Robust PCSE PCSE Robust Robust
AR(1) component NO YES YES NO NO
Years 2008 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012
Countries 17 17 17 17 17
Observations 17 381 359 381 381
Sample: EU-countries. Instrument: the rigidity of the constitution. * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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5 The Relationship between
Different Social Expenditure
Schemes and Poverty, Inequality
and Economic Growth
Abstract
In this paper, we study how different social expenditure types are related
to poverty, income inequality and GDP growth. We contribute to the
literature on the potential trade-off between redistribution and economic
growth as well as to the literature on the targeted versus universal ap-
proach to the welfare state. For this purposes, we use a panel data set for
22 EU-countries from 1990 till 2015. We employ OLS and 2SLS regression
models in which we deal with endogeneity problems extensively. We
find total public social expenditure to be negatively related to poverty
and inequality, but not related to GDP growth. The results vary substan-
tially between the different social expenditure schemes on 1) old age and
survivor, 2) incapacity, 3) health, 4) family, 5) unemployment and active
labour market policies and 6) housing and others.
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FISS 2017 conference in Sigtuna, the Science Day 2017 at the Dutch Ministry of Social
Affairs in The Hague and the Dutch Economist Day in Amsterdam. Remaining errors are
my own. In addition, I would like to thank the OECD Social Policy Division for allowing
me to come over from May-August 2018 to strengthen the paper at the OECD in Paris. At
last, I would like to thank the Leids Universiteits Fonds/ Dr. H.A. van Beuningen Fonds
and the Victor Halberstadt Reisfonds for financial support for my stay at the OECD.
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5.1 Introduction
Since Piketty (2014), strengthened by the rise of populist movements, there
is a resurgence of the public and academic debate on income and wealth
inequality. For a long time, policy makers and academics assumed a
trade-off between reducing income inequality and increasing GDP growth
(Okun 1975; Benabou 2000; Arjona et al. 2003). More recent studies find
no evidence for such a trade-off and even find a negative association
between income inequality and economic growth (Persson and Tabellini
1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Perotti 1996; Easterly 2007). However, this
negative association between inequality and growth does not yet imply
that higher levels of redistribution are related to higher economic growth.
At least, the latest empirical evidence does not support that redistribution
is negatively related to economic growth (Thewissen 2013; Ostry et al.
2014). Nevertheless, redistribution is a broad concept and different kinds
of redistribution, translated into different social expenditure types, have
different effects on poverty, inequality and economic growth.
In this paper, we study how different social expenditure types are
related to poverty, inequality and GDP growth. First, we investigate how
social expenditure at the aggregated level is related to poverty, inequality
and GDP growth. This analysis gives insights into the potential trade-off
between poverty and inequality on the one hand and GDP growth on
the other hand. Second, we study how these relationships between social
expenditure and poverty, inequality and GDP growth differ for social
expenditure on 1) old age and survivor, 2) incapacity, 3) health, 4) family, 5)
unemployment and active labour market policies (ALMPs) and 6) housing and
others. This analysis shows the importance of the different expenditure
types for reducing poverty and inequality and stimulating GDP growth.
Our first contribution to the literature is studying whether the expen-
diture types that reduce poverty and inequality the most are also related
to economic growth. This gives new evidence for the presence or absence
of a trade-off between redistribution and growth. As a result, we identify
the expenditure types which are most effective in reducing poverty and
inequality while also being positively related to economic growth. Our
second contribution is to study how targeted as well as universal expen-
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diture types affect poverty, inequality and growth. This contributes to
the literature on the targeted versus the universal approach to the welfare
state (Korpi and Palme 1998; Jacques and Noël 2018).
We employ OLS and 2SLS regression models in which the lagged values
of the different expenditure variables are used as explanatory variables.
We use social expenditure in period (t-1) because social expenditure itself
is also depending on growth and potentially also on poverty and inequality.
In our 2SLS model, we use the social expenditure variables in period (t-2)
as instrument. Our preferred model is an OLS model with panel corrected
standard errors in which we correct for first order serial correlation and
control for country and year fixed effects. We use a panel data set of 22
EU-countries for the years 1990-2015 for our base results and a panel data
set of 32 OECD countries in our robustness analysis. The data are taken
from several OECD databases.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find total public social
expenditure to be negatively related to poverty and inequality and not
significantly related to GDP growth. Hence, there seems to be no trade-off
between reducing poverty and inequality on the one hand and higher eco-
nomic growth on the other hand. Second, the different social expenditure
schemes are differently related to poverty, inequality and economic growth,
which makes more accurate targeting possible. For poverty, we find nega-
tive relations with expenditure on family, unemployment and ALMPs and
housing and other.1 For inequality, we find a strong negative connection
with social expenditure on old age and survivor and family. Finally, a strong
positive relation with GDP growth is found for expenditure on housing
and others.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We start with describing the
literature on the effects (and mechanisms) of social expenditure on poverty,
inequality and GDP growth in Section 5.2. The data is described in Section
5.3, the methodology in Section 5.4 and the results in Section 5.5. We
conclude with a discussion of the results in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Literature
5.2.1 The effects of social expenditure on poverty and inequality
We expect social expenditure to reduce poverty and inequality (Caminada
and Goudswaard 2009; Adema et al. 2014; ILO 2014). Wang et al. (2012)
and Caminada et al. (2019) find that public pensions account for the
largest reduction in income inequality but also social assistance, disability
benefits, family benefits and unemployment benefits have a negative effect
on income inequality. Wang et al. (2014) observe that the tax-benefit
systems have offset two-thirds of the average increase in primary income
inequality, old age benefits accounted for 60% and social assistance for
20% of the increase in redistribution.
We expect social expenditure types that are best targeted at the poor
to have the largest negative effects on poverty. In contrast, the largest
effects on income inequality, measured by the Gini index, are expected
for social expenditure types with a more universal character. We expect
universal expenditure types to have a stronger negative effect on the
Gini (for income inequality) for the following two reasons. First of all,
because universal social expenditure types can count on more public
support as a larger share of the population is benefiting, translating in
higher levels of social expenditure (Korpi and Palme 1998). Indeed, not
only the targeting efficiency but also the budget size is important for
reducing income inequality (Caminada et al. 2017). Second, because the
Gini coefficient is much more sensitive to the income groups in the middle
of the income distribution than to the bottom or the top of the income
distribution.
In table 5.1 we present the share of social cash benefits received by the
five quintiles of the income distribution, based on 21 EU-SILC countries in
2015. This table gives an indication which social expenditure categories are
best targeted at the poor. We find that housing and social exclusion benefits
are best targeted at the poor with 52% and 62% of cash benefits being
received by the bottom 20% of the income distribution. Afterwards family
benefits are best targeted with 48% going to the bottom 40%. Disability
benefits and unemployment benefits are about equally distributed over
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the five income quintiles. Social expenditure on old age is not targeted
at the poor at all, only 28% of old age cash benefits are received by the
bottom 40% of the income distribution.
Table 5.1: Share of social benefits received by quintiles of in-
come distribution
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Old age benefits 11 17 19 22 30
Survivor benefits 19 21 21 18 20
Disability benefits 20 23 22 19 17
Family benefits 23 25 21 17 14
Unemployment benefits 24 20 17 18 22
Housing benefits 52 23 9 9 7
Social Exclusion benefits 62 17 10 7 5
Notes: Source: Own calculations based on EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions for European countries
(EU-SILC). The calculations are based on equialized household income in 2015 for 21 of the 22 EU-countries in our
sample, excluding Germany which is not available in EU SILC.
Another expenditure type which we expect to be effective in reducing
poverty and inequality is family expenditure. First of all, because families
are more often poor because income must be shared with more household
members, including children and non-working adult members. In line
with this, higher poverty rates are observed among children than among
adults. Second, due to economies of scale for larger households, it is
relatively cheap to reduce the poverty rate by targeting on families. Also
for the Gini, we expect a large negative effect of family spending, because
a large share of family spending is received by the second and third
quintiles of the income distribution (25% and 21% of family spending).
Increasing income for the second and third quintiles is expected to be
relatively effective in reducing the Gini for income inequality because
the Gini is relatively sensitive to the income groups in the middle of the
income distribution.
The effects of social expenditure on economic growth 5.2.2
The literature is divided on the effect of social spending on growth. On the
one hand, Barro (1996) shows that government expenditure has a negative
effect on economic growth and Arjona et al. (2003) find some evidence
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that social expenditure reduces growth. On the other hand, most studies
reject the hypothesis that social expenditure has a negative impact on
growth (e.g. Atkinson 1995; Singh 1996; Baldacci et al. 2008; Thewissen
2013; Ostry et al. 2014; Bakija et al. 2016). In line with this, Cingano (2014),
OECD (2015) and Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) show that inequality reduces
economic growth, suggesting that redistribution may increase growth.
Capital accumulation is one of the main mechanisms that can explain
GDP growth rates (Solow 1956). The effect on capital accumulation highly
depends on the social insurance system in place. In a pay-as-you-go
pension system, the expected effect of old age expenditure on savings is
negative as fewer savings are needed when retirees receive a pension paid
by the working age population (Feldstein 1974). In a capital-based system,
premiums for social insurance can be higher than the amount people
would have saved otherwise. Hence, a capital-based pension system can
increase total savings and investments and thereby economic growth.
Another main determinant of growth is labor supply. The welfare
state typically decreases labor supply as the benefit of supplying labor
decreases when the outside option becomes more attractive (Krueger and
Meyer 2002; French and Song 2014). There are also some studies which
find no effect, or even a positive effect, of social protection schemes on
labor supply (Krueger and Pischke 1992; Rust and Phelan 1997). All these
studies show that the effects of welfare state programs (e.g. retirement
schemes) on labor supply can be explained for a large part by the specific
features of the social security system. The largest negative effects on labor
supply are expected for the expenditure type unemployment and ALMPs, as
these target the working age population and not children, the old or the
disabled. Besides, only unemployed people are eligible for unemployment
benefits, which may create a disincentive to work.
In addition to labor supply, the level of productivity is also important.
Social expenditure affects the level of productivity by two main mecha-
nisms: it increases risk-taking behavior and it reduces poverty. First, social
protection decreases income risks and this may increase risk-taking, in-
vestments, productivity and thereby growth.We expect an increase in risk
taking, not only for the poor, but also for the middle class who know they
can rely on the social safety net when needed. For example, social security
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increases investments by employees in their firm and industry-specific
skills (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). As social protection provides security, the
willingness to build up dependence on particular employers and hence
being more vulnerable to market fluctuations increases. Second, poverty
has a negative effect on productivity. Children’s health, capabilities and
achievements are negatively affected by poverty (Aber et al. 1997; Brooks-
Gunn and Duncan 1997). Furthermore, poverty reduces the cognitive
capacity of the brain (Banerjee et al. 2006; Mani et al. 2013). Hence, re-
ducing poverty may increase the capacities of poor people which may
translate into increases in productivity and GDP growth. Not only poverty,
but also inequality can be detrimental to economic growth. Increased
income inequality depresses the development of skills among individuals
whose parents have a lower education background (Cingano 2014; OECD
2014). The driver of this negative impact of inequality on growth is the
gap between low-income households and the rest of the population.
Finally, social expenditure is expected to have a positive effect on
aggregate demand, as the lower and middle-income groups consume a
larger part of their income (Keynes 1937). For this reason, we expect the
largest positive effects on aggregate demend, for the best targeted schemes.
The positive effect of an increase in aggregate demand on economic growth
is expected to be larger when aggregate demand is low. Blanchard and
Leigh (2013) find large fiscal multiplier during the Great Recession. Darby
and Melitz (2008) show in an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries that
spending on unemployment, old age and health-related social expenditure,
as well as incapacity and sickness benefits, react to the cycle in a stabilizing
manner.
All in all, for GDP growth, we expect the largest positive effects of the
targeted schemes when the most important mechanisms are: an increase
in risk-taking, releasing the potential of the poor and increasing aggregate
demand. Furthermore, we expect the potential negative effects caused
by lower capital accumulation to be limited for poor people, because of
their low levels of physical capital. Potential negative effects of targeted
schemes on labor supply may be compensated by higher levels of produc-
tivity when more of the potential of poor people is released. Hence, we
expect the largest positive effects on GDP growth of spending on housing
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and others, as these are best targeted at the poor, see Table 5.1. If labor
supply is important for economic growth, spending on unemployment and
ALMPs is expected to reduce GDP growth, as unemployment benefits may
disincentivize work. When we consider the size of the different social ex-
penditure types, we expect large effects of spending on old age and survivor
as this spending category is most sizable. However, the direction of the
effect of old age spending on GDP growth is harder to predict, because a
lot depends on the institutional settings of countries.
5.3 Data
We use a panel data set for 22 EU-countries that are a member of the
OECD covering 26 years from 1990-2015. The countries in our EU sample
are: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. The data set is limited to EU countries that are a
member of the OECD for reasons of data availability, but also because
these countries are more similar in their characteristics, making the results
more reliable. We employ the same analysis for a sample of 32 OECD
countries in our robustness analysis. Selecting the period 1990-2015 allows
us to take the post-Soviet states into account and provides us with a more
balanced sample as much less data is available for the years before 1990.
Our dependent variables are the poverty rate (poverty after taxes and
transfers for a poverty line of 50%), the Gini coefficient for income in-
equality (Gini for disposable income post taxes and transfers) and average
GDP growth rate over 3 years [(growth(t) + growth(t+1) + growth(t+2))/3]
(annual growth of GDP per capita, constant prices, in percentage). We use
the average annual GDP growth rate over the next three years to reduce
the endogeneity problem (Thewissen 2013). The Poverty rates and the
Gini coefficients are taken from the Income Distribution Database of the
OECD and the GDP growth rates are taken from the Annual National
Accounts data of the OECD.
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The explanatory variables of interest are social expenditure variables for
which we use the Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) of the OECD. We
are aware that social expenditure variables have limitations in explaining
the degree of social protection and generosity (De Deken 2014; Van Vliet
and Wang 2015). First, differences in spending may reflect variation in
demographic and socio-economic trends across countries. Second, expen-
ditures neglect some important institutional characteristics of welfare state
programmes, such as the extent to which welfare state programmes are
means-tested. Third, gross social expenditure does not take the taxation of
benefits into account. We deal with these problems by including year and
country fixed effects and a large number of economic and demographic
controls to control for different demographic and socio-economic trends
and different institutional characteristics. We use gross social expenditure
variables for our base results because not much data is available on net
social expenditure and no data is available on net social expenditure for
the different expenditure categories. But we perform the same analysis
with the limited available data for net social expenditure in our robustness
analysis. All in all, social expenditure variables are the most objective and
most used variables for studying the effects of the welfare state.
Another point is if we should include old age expenditure in total
public social expenditure when we are interested in the redistributive
effects of social expenditure. Most studies (e.g. the OECD studies) are
looking at expenditure schemes targeted at the working-age population
on poverty and inequality among the working-age. The main question is if
pensions are about redistribution over the life cycle or about redistribution
between individuals. Also cohort effects may blur the effects of social
expenditure. We choose to look at different social expenditure types,
among which old age expenditure, separately. Further, we look at the
effects on poverty and inequality for the total population as well as for the
working-age population. Furthermore, we control for demographics to
ensure that the coefficients are not biased by cohort effects.
Our main explanatory variable is total public social expenditure (as
% of GDP), as the quality of public social expenditure data is the high-
est when we consider the different expenditure types, especially for the
comparison over time. We also look at the effects of total public and
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mandatory private social expenditure and total social expenditure (includ-
ing public, mandatory private and voluntary private) in the robustness
analysis. The reason for this that public and private social expenditure
are close substitutes (Goudswaard and Caminada 2010). Our total public
social expenditure variable is separated in spending on 1) old age and
survivor, 2) incapacity, 3) health, 4) family, 5) unemployment and active
labour market policies and 6) housing and others, which are our next
explanatory variables. See Table A.5.1 for a more detailed description of
these different categories of social expenditure.
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for poverty, inequality, and
GDP growth and the various social expenditure variables for our sample
of EU countries during the period 1990-2015. On average 9.2 percent of
the population has an income below the poverty line of 50% of the median
income. Our indicator for inequality, the Gini coefficient, is on average 0.29
in this period. GDP growth is on average 2.4 percent between 1990 and
2015. Table 5.2 also denotes the mean values and standard deviations for
the different social expenditure variables. Total public social expenditure
is on average 22.1% of GDP, the largest part is going to old age and survivor
(9.1% of GDP) and health spending (5.7% of GDP). Lower amounts are
spent on incapacity (2.6% of GDP), families (2.2% of GDP), unemployment
and ALMPs (1.8%) and housing and others (0.7%).
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistis: dependent and explanatory vari-
ables 1990-2015 for EU-sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Poverty 9.2 3.1 3.6 18.6 317
Gini 0.29 0.04 0.21 0.39 317
GDP growth 2.4 2.6 -7.3 13.0 555
Total public SE 22.1 4.5 11.1 34.7 534
Old age and Survivor SE 9.1 2.7 3.1 17.1 535
Incapacity SE 2.6 1.1 0.8 5.9 535
Health SE 5.7 1.3 2.3 9.3 545
Family SE 2.2 0.9 0.3 4.5 535
Unemp. and ALMPS SE 1.8 1.2 0.1 6.1 533
Housing and Others SE 0.7 0.5 0.0 2.2 521
The control variables we use in our models for poverty and inequality
are GDP per capita (measured in thousands of USD, constant prices,
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2010 PPPs), unemployment rate (harmonized), population share 15-64
years of age, population share 65 plus and the trade union density, the
data are taken from the OECD databases except for the population data
which is taken from United Nations database. We control for business
cycle fluctuations and demographics as both have an effect on both social
expenditure and poverty and inequality. We consider trade union density
as a control for labor market institutions, as unions may increase pressure
to increase social expenditure and decrease poverty and inequality (Card
2001; Hooghe and Oser 2016).
In our models for GDP growth we use the control variables population
share 15-64 years of age, population share 65 plus of age, gross capital
formation (annual growth rate), education (share of population attained
tertiary education, 25-64 years), export (as % of GDP) and inflation (con-
sumer price all items, annual % change). We add these control variables to
our model as we expect them to have an effect on both social expenditure
and on GDP growth. These control variables are based on the papers
of (Solow 1956; Barro 1996; Bellettini and Ceroni 2000; Barro 2013). All
this data are taken from the OECD databases. See Table A.5.2 for the
descriptive statistics of the control variables.
Empirical methodology 5.4
Endogeneity issues 5.4.1
We start this section with elaborating on the reverse causality issue. Not
only social expenditure can have an effect on poverty, inequality and
economic growth, but also the other way around. We expect a positive
effect of poverty and inequality on social expenditure (Alesina and Rodrik
1994; Arjona et al. 2003; Milanovic 2000). This positive effect can be
explained by the median voter who cares more about redistribution if
the possibilities and benefits of redistribution are larger, which is the
case when poverty and inequality are more severe. This positive effect of
poverty and inequality on social expenditure may cause a positive relation
between social expenditure and poverty and inequality, leading to an
532860-L-bw-Cammeraat
Processed on: 25-7-2019
164 Social Expenditure and Poverty, Inequality and Economic Growth Chapter 5
underestimation of a negative effect of social expenditure on poverty and
inequality. For economic growth, we expect a negative effect on social
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, at least in the short term which we are
studying. First of all, because the denominator of social expenditure as a
percentage of GDP per capita increases, second because social expenditure
is negatively related to the business cycle. This negative effect of GDP
growth on social expenditure (as % of GDP) could translate in a negative
relationship between social expenditure and GDP growth, leading to an
underestimation of a potential positive effect of social expenditure on GDP
growth. In short, the coefficients we will find are conservative estimates
for the potential negative effects on poverty and inequality and potential
positive effect on GDP growth.
We reduce the problem of reverse causality by using the social expendi-
ture variables in period (t-1), as we expect that the dependent variables in
period t can not have an effect on the explanatory variables in period (t-1).
We also check if the results are robust when we consider different time
lags, up to a 5-year period lag, as reverse causality becomes less likely with
a longer time lag. In line with the literature, we use the average annual
GDP growth rate over the next three years [(growth(t) + growth(t+1) +
growth(t+2))/3] as dependent variable in the growth models to reduce
endogeneity problems even further (Thewissen 2013).
Besides, we use 2SLS regression models to correct for possible endo-
geneity. In the 2SLS model, we use the social expenditure variables in
period (t-2) as instruments because we argue that social expenditure in
period (t-2) has an effect on social expenditure in period (t-1) but no direct
effect on poverty, inequality and growth two periods later. We indeed find
high F-statistics in the first stage indicating that the instrument is relevant.
The exclusion restriction is harder to prove statistically, but it is plausible
that the dependent variables poverty, inequality and growth are in the
first place affected by a change in social expenditure in the same period or
the next period and less, or not at all, two periods later. Nevertheless, we
prefer to be cautious by considering the 2SLS results jointly with the OLS
estimates, as it is impossible to prove that social expenditure in period
(t-2) has no direct effect on our outcome variables. The 2SLS estimates
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generally give very similar results to the OLS estimates, indicating that
the effects are really due to social expenditure.
Our preferred model is an OLS regression model which contains panel
corrected standard errors and in which we control for first order serial
correlation. In addition, we include year and country fixed effects to
control for different demographic and socio-economic trends and different
institutions. This model deals most extensively with possible simultaneity
problems in which social expenditure and the dependent variables move
simultaneously and affect each other over time.
Empirical specification 5.4.2
The model is built step by step to show how the different parts of the
model change the results. The first specification shows a correlation co-
efficient when we do not include controls. In specification 2, we include
the economic, demographic and institutional control variables. We add
year fixed effects to control for the business cycle and other time effects
in specification 3. We include country fixed effects to control for unob-
served characteristics (e.g. institutional differences between countries) in
specification 4. Afterwards, in specification 5, we run a 2SLS regression
model, in which we use the social expenditure variables in period (t-2) as
instruments. The regression equation of our 2SLS model is as follows:
yit = αt + βi + X�itνx + γSEit−1 + �it. (5.1)
SEit−1 = αt + βi + δSEit−2 + X�itνx + μit (5.2)
The dependent variables in which we are interested are denoted by yit,
standing for poverty, inequality and GDP growth, which vary by country
(i = 1, ..., N) and years (t = 1, ..., T). We regress the outcome variables on
year fixed effects (αt) country fixed effects (βi), economic and demographic
controls (X�it) with coefficients νx and the explanatory variables of interest
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for social expenditure (SEit−1) with coefficient γ. The second lags of
the social expenditure variables, our instruments in the first stage, are
captured by SEit−2 with coefficient δ.
Finally, specification 5 gives our most preferred model, given by regres-
sion equations (3) and (4):
yit = αt + βi + X�itνx + γSEit−1 + μit (5.3)
μit = ρμit−1 + �it (5.4)
We prefer this OLS model over the 2SLS model as we can not prove that
the exclusion restriction holds, making OLS estimates with panel corrected
standard errors in which we control for first order autocorrelation most
reliable. This model is the same as the second stage of the 2SLS model,
but now we control for autocorrelation in the error term. We use robust
standard errors in the first four empirical specifications and panel corrected
standard errors in specification 5.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main results
Table 5.3 presents the results for the relationship between total public
social expenditure and poverty. The first column shows the correlation
coefficient in the model when we only control for economic, demographic
and institutional control variables. We find a negative significant coefficient
of −0.237. Adding year fixed effects in column 2 increases the negative
coefficient to −0.409. The coefficient decreases slightly when we include
country fixed effects in column 3, but increases again to 0.431 in our 2SLS
model in column 4. In our preferred specification, column 5, we run an
OLS model with panel corrected standard errors in which we control for
serial correlation. The coefficient of total public social expenditure on
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poverty has a statistically significant coefficient of −0.337. This coefficient
indicates that a one percentage point increase in total social expenditure is
associated with a 0.337 percentage point lower poverty level one year later.
Also increases in GDP per capita, the population share 15-64 years of age,
the population share 65 plus and the union density rate are associated
with lower poverty rates. However, these coefficients are smaller than the
coefficient for total public social expenditure.
Table 5.3: Estimation results of total public social ex-
penditure on poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Total pub. SE (t-1) −0.237∗∗∗ −0.409∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.431∗∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.080) (0.107) (0.077) (0.074)
GDP per. c. (t-1) 0.020 0.027 −0.162 −0.180∗∗ −0.147 ∗∗
(0.038) (0.027) (0.117) (0.086) (0.059)
Unemp. rate (t-1) 0.085 0.303∗∗∗ 0.032 0.030 0.037
(0.059) (0.083) (0.072) (0.049) (0.040)
Pop. 15-64 (t-1) −0.130 −0.369 −0.275 −0.371∗∗ −0.286∗
(0.246) (0.246) (0.272) (0.172) (0.170)
Pop. 65+ (t-1) 0.246 0.583∗∗ −0.209 −0.269∗∗ −0.223∗
(0.171) (0.249) (0.160) (0.126) (0.133)
U. density (t-1) −0.058∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.014) (0.038) (0.023) (0.016)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component No No No No Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust PCSE
Observations 275 275 275 270 275
R-squared 0.468 0.628 0.926 0.327 0.923
Countries 22 22 22 21 22
Notes * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the
1% level.
Table 5.4 shows the relation between total public social expenditure
(t-1) and poverty, Gini and GDP growth in our preferred model. Tables
A.5.3 and A.5.4 in the appendix show the six different regression models
for inequality and growth. In Table 5.4, we find a negative significant
coefficient of total public social expenditure on inequality of −0.0038,
which is 9% of the standard deviation of Gini. This coefficient seems small
but is large compared to the coefficients of GDP per capita (−0.0018),
unemployment rate (−0.0008) and the union density (−0.0006), which are
the controls that are significantly related to the Gini, see Table A.5.3. In
column 3, we find a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient for
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Table 5.4: Estimation results of total public so-
cial expenditure on poverty, inequal-
ity and GDP growth
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.337∗∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗ 0.142
(0.074) (0.0005) (0.102
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.147∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.0004)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.037 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.0002)
Union density (t-1) −0.097∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗
(0.016) (0.0002)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.286∗ −0.0019 −0.118
(0.170) (0.0019) (0.261)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.223∗ −0.0012 −0.222
(0.133) (0.0013) (0.293)








Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 275 275 406
R-squared 0.923 0.9634 0.610
Number of countries 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at
the 1% level.
total public social expenditure on GDP growth. Finding a statistically
insignificant coefficient may explain why the effect of social protection on
GDP growth is still disputed in the academic literature. In Table A.5.4 we
present the other models for growth and we find a negative significant
relation in specifications 1-3, but the coefficient becomes positive and
statistically insignificant when we include country fixed effects. This
suggests that countries with lower social spending have grown faster,
but that no effect remains when we merely consider the within countries
variation over time by controlling for (unobserved) differences between
countries. Adding fixed effects is needed to make sure that there are no
other differences between countries that explain both social expenditure
and GDP growth, for example different phases of development.
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Table 5.5: Estimation results of different kinds
of social expenditure on poverty, in-
equality and GDP growth
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Old age & Survivor SE (t-1) −0.197 −0.0058∗∗∗ 0.275
(0.152) (0.0009) (0.254)
Incapacity SE (t-1) −0.061 −0.0009 0.023
(0.324) (0.0027) (0.279)
Health SE (t-1) −0.021 −0.0015 −0.033
(0.154) (0.0009) (0.222)
Family SE (t-1) −1.156∗∗∗ −0.0108∗∗∗ 0.576
(0.215) (0.0035) (0.466)
Unempl. & ALMPS SE (t-1) −0.429∗∗∗ −0.0021 −0.332
(0.141) (0.0018) (0.291)
Housing & Others SE (t-1) −0.794∗∗ 0.0037 1.211∗
(0.367) (0.0028) (0.644)
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.146∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.0005)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.029 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.0002)
Union density (t-1) −0.078∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗
(0.016) (0.0003)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.183 −0.0004 −0.187
(0.186) (0.0018) (0.264)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.114 −0.0003 −0.341
(0.165) (0.0012) (0.322)








Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 275 275 400
R-squared 0.927 0.9676 0.619
Number of countries 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at
the 1% level.
We use the same preferred models to examine the relationships be-
tween the different social expenditure types and poverty, inequality and
GDP growth, see Table 5.5. Column 1 gives the relation between the
different social expenditure schemes and poverty. Social expenditure on
family, unemployment and ALMPs and housing and others are negatively
and significantly related to poverty. The largest coefficients are found for
family (−1.156) and housing and others (−0.794). This indicates that a one
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percentage point increase in social spending on families as a percentage
of GDP is associated with a 1.156 percentage point lower poverty rate
in the next year. Column 2 shows the connection between the different
kinds of social expenditure and the Gini coefficient for income inequal-
ity. We find that spending on old age and survivor (−0.0058) and family
(−0.0108) are negatively and significantly related to the Gini coefficient.
In column 3, we find that only expenditure on housing and others (1.211)
is significantly related to GDP growth. A one percentage point increase
in public social expenditure on housing and others is associated with a
1.211 percentage point increase in GDP growth over the next three years.
Although, countries spend on average only 0.7% of GDP on housing and
others indicating that this spending category still plays only a small role
as determinant of GDP growth. The results in Table 5.5 suggest large
differences in effects between the different social expenditure schemes,
providing policy makers with the possibility to target more accurately
when picking social expenditure schemes for the policy goals of reducing
poverty and inequality without detrimental effects on GDP growth.
The two largest categories of social expenditure, old age and survivor
and health, are particularly interesting to look at. Old age and survivor
expenditure is negatively and significantly related to inequality but there is
no statistically significant relation to poverty nor to GDP growth. Finding
a strong negative relation with the Gini but no statistically significant
effect on poverty indicates that the groups in the middle of the income
distribution benefit most from spending on old age and survivor. The large
positive coefficient for old age and survivor on GDP growth indicates that
there is at least no large negative association between spending on old
age and survivor and GDP growth. For health expenditure, we find no
significant relationship with any of the outcome variables.
In Table A.5.5, we run separate regression models for the different
social expenditure variables including only one social expenditure vari-
able in our model at a time. We do this because inclusion of all could
lead to multicollinearity issues. This additional analysis shows that the
only difference is that the negative coefficients of social expenditure on
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Sensitivity analysis 5.5.2
Finally, we run a large number of additional robustness checks. The results
are almost the same for the effects of ‘total public and private mandatory
social expenditure’ (Table A.5.6) and ‘total social expenditure’ (including
voluntary private social expenditure) (Table A.5.7). We also study the
relation with net total public social expenditure and net total public
and private social expenditure, see Table A.5.8 and Table A.5.9.2 These
indicators capture the amount of actually received social benefits much
better, but much less data is available for the net indicator. Furthermore,
the quality of the data is limited. Also for net social expenditure we find
results that are similar to our results for gross total social expenditure.
In table A.5.10 we look at the effects for a sample of 32 OECD countries
for our poverty and inequality models and 33 OECD countries for our
growth models.3 The coefficient size of total public social expenditure
on poverty slightly decreases to −0.239 and the coefficient size of total
public social expenditure on the Gini decreases substantially to −0.0017,
both coefficients remain highly significant. For GDP growth, our positive
coefficient of total public social expenditure is statistically significant when
we consider the sample of OECD countries, 1 percentage point increase
in public social expenditure is associated with a 0.134 percentage point
increase in GDP growth in the next three years.
For the different expenditure categories, presented in table A.5.11, we
find very similar results using the OECD sample compared to the EU sam-
ple. The only two differences are that for the OECD sample the negative
coefficient of unemployment and ALMPs on the Gini becomes statistically
significant and the positive coefficient of expenditure on housing and others
on GDP growth turns statistically insignificant. Table A.5.12 shows again
2Because of missing data, the sample for the analysis of net social expenditure is
excluding Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg and Portugal for the poverty and
inequality models and excludes Latvia in the growth model.
3Countries in OECD sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, United States. Excluding Israel, Mexico and Australia in our poverty
and inequality models and excluding New Zealand and Turkey in our GDP growth
models, for reasons of data availability.
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similar results when we include only one social expenditure category
in the model at a time. The negative coefficients of incapacity spending
on poverty as well as on the Gini turn significant now. When we sepa-
rate housing and other, in Table A.5.12, we still find a positive significant
coefficient for ‘other’ (mostly social assistance) on GDP growth.
In Table A.5.13, we show the results for the years 2008-2015. We
find a smaller negative coefficient for total public social expenditure on
poverty and inequality and a larger positive coefficient, but statistically
insignificant, for public social expenditure on GDP growth. Table A.5.14
shows the results for the years 1990-2007 and confirms that our results are
not driven by the Great Recession, as the differences between the results
in Table A.5.13 and A.5.14 are not statistically significant for poverty and
GDP growth.4 Although not statistically significant, the coefficient size
of total public social expenditure on GDP growth is more than two times
larger for the years 2008-2015 than for the years 1990-2007. Hence, if the
business cycle has any impact on the effect of total public expenditure on
GDP growth it would probably be positive. Also, it is possible that the
effect of social expenditure on GDP growth has become more positive over
time, independent of the business cycle.5
We also study if our results are robust for the working age population.
In Table A.5.15 we find that the coefficient of total public social expen-
diture on the working poor is small and insignificant. However, we do
find a negative association between total public social expenditure and
the poverty rate and Gini coefficient for the age group 18–65. We find that
spending on family, unemployment and ALMPs and housing and others do
4Table A.5.14 suggests a stronger negative relationship between total public social
expenditure and the Gini in the period 1990-2007 than in the period 2008-2015.
5A change in this relationship over time would be in line with our finding of a
positive coefficient of the interaction between social expenditure and a timetrend on
GDP growth (results are available on request). This would also be in line with finding
a negative relationship between social expenditure and growth in some older studies,
whereas most recent studies find a positive relationship. This change over time in the
relationship between social expenditure and GDP growth may partly be explained by
ageing populations as we also find a positive coefficient for the interaction between social
expenditure and the population share 65 plus on GDP growth (results are available on
request). However, this interaction term with population share 65 plus is much smaller
than the interaction with a timetrend and is not statistically significant. Therefore, ageing
is unlikely to be the only reason why the relationship between social expenditure and
GDP growth may have become more positive over time.
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also have the strongest negative relation with poverty for the working age
population. A counter-intuitive statistically significant positive association
is found between spending on incapacity and poverty among the working
age population. Spending on old age and survivor and family are again
negatively related to inequality when we consider the working age popu-
lation. For GDP growth, our findings are robust when we study the effect
of total public social expenditure on growth rates for GDP per member
of the working age population (results are available on request). This is
in line what we expected as we have already controlled for demographic
structure in our preferred models.
Table A.5.16 gives the results for a poverty rate of 60% instead of the
50% poverty rate. On average 16.1% of the people in the EU had an income
of less than 60% of the median income (Table A.5.2), whereas only 9.2% of
the people had an income of less than 50% of the median income (Table5.2).
Studying the relationship between total public social expenditure and the
60% poverty rate, in Table A.5.16 Column 1, gives a coefficient of 0.570. In
column 2, we study how the different social expenditure types are related
to the 60% poverty rate. We find again substantial negative significant
coefficients for social expenditure on family and unemployment and ALMPS,
but the large negative coefficient of Housing and Others turns statistically
insignificant. Most interesting is the negative relation between Old age
and Survivor which becomes stronger and statistically significant, with a
coefficient of −0.504. When we compare the differences in results between
the 50% and 60% poverty rates we can infer the following: Housing and
Others are most effective in reducing poverty among the poorest decentile,
whereas Old age and Survivor spending is reducing poverty among the
second decentile of the income distribution.
In a final robustness test we consider different time lags for our explana-
tory variables. Table A.5.17 shows that the negative relation between total
public social expenditure and poverty is almost exactly the same when
we use different time lags. Table A.5.18 presents that total public social
expenditure remains negatively and significant related to the Gini, but the
coefficient size decreases to −0.0019 when we consider a 5-year time lag.
For GDP growth, we find that our results are robust for different time lags,
except for a larger positive and statistically significant coefficient when
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we consider a 5-year time lag, see Table A.5.19. This result provides some
evidence that the relationship between social expenditure and growth is
not only a short run relation caused by an aggregated demand effect, but
that the positive effect can be considered to be a long-run effect.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied how different social expenditure schemes are
related to poverty, inequality and economic growth. First, we find that total
public social expenditure is negatively related to poverty and inequality,
but not related to GDP growth. Hence, the results do not support a
trade-off between reducing poverty and inequality on the one hand and
increasing GDP growth on the other. The negative effect on poverty and
inequality corresponds with the literature (Caminada and Goudswaard
2009; Wang et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2014). Finding no significant relation
with GDP growth is in line with Bellettini and Ceroni 2000; Thewissen
2013; Ostry et al. 2014, who find no negative effect of social expenditure
on economic growth.
Second, we find substantial differences in the effects of various types of
social expenditure. These differences allow policy makers to achieve better
targeting and thereby increase the effectiveness of reducing poverty and
inequality, without detrimental effects on GDP growth. Studying which
expenditure categories are most effective answers the call of Ostry et al.
(2014) for more research on the mechanisms at play to make redistribution
as efficient as possible.
Our results suggest that social expenditure types targeted at families
are most strongly negatively related to both poverty and inequality. Social
expenditure on unemployment and ALMPs and housing and others (mostly
social assistance) are also effective ways of reducing poverty but are not
reducing the Gini (for income inequality). Social expenditure on old age
and survivor is negatively related to Gini for income inequality but the
negative relation with poverty is not statistically significant. Hence, social
expenditure on family, unemployment and ALMPs and housing and others
are on average better targeted, while social expenditure on old age and
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survivor has a more universal character to the benefit of a larger group
of people. However, the budget size of the targeted expenditure schemes
is relatively small and therefore the effect of old age expenditure is still
relatively important as much larger amounts are spent on the old age and
survivor category.
For GDP growth, finding a strong positive relationship with social
expenditure on housing and others indicates that the best targeted social
expenditure schemes are positively associated with GDP growth. This
is in line with Cingano (2014) and OECD (2014) who show that the
negative impact of inequality on growth can mainly be explained by the
gap between the bottom and the middle of the income distribution. This
positive association between spending on housing and others and GDP
growth could be explained by the positive effects of the safety net on the
potential of the poor, the development of skills, levels of risk-taking and
aggregate demand. Potential negative effects on labor supply may be
compensated by higher levels of productivity when more of the potential
of poor people is released. Furthermore, expenditure on housing may
have a large fiscal multiplier as there are non-negligible spillover effects
from the housing market to the broader economy (Iacoviello and Neri
2010), causing a relatively large positive effect on GDP growth.
All in all, we can conclude that the expenditure types most effective
in reducing poverty are also positively related to economic growth, indi-
cating that there is no evidence for a trade-off between redistribution and
economic growth. Second, the more universal expenditure types (old age
and survivor and family) are most effective in reducing the Gini for income
inequality, which is in line with Korpi and Palme (1998).
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Table A.5.1: The OECD social expenditure categories
Category Description
Old-age Pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help and
residential services for the elderly.
Survivors Pensions and funeral payments.
Incapacity Care services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from occupational injury
and accident legislation, employee sickness payments.
Health Spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention.
Family Child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support during leave
and sole parent payments.
ALMPS Active labour market policies: employment services, training youth measures
subsidized employment, employment measures for the disabled.
Unemployment Unemployment compensation, severance pay and
early retirement for labour market reasons.
Housing Housing allowances and rent subsidies.
Other Social policy areas, non-categorical cash benefits to low-income households,
other social services; i.e. support programs such as food subsidies.
Description of the different categories is taken from OECD (2007)
Table A.5.2: Descriptive statistics: control variables 1990-2015
for EU-sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Total public and mandatory private SE 22.4 4.7 11.1 35.2 534
Total public and private SE 24.1 5.4 11.2 37.6 534
Net public SE 20.0 3.3 12.1 28.0 159
Net total SE 21.7 3.7 13.0 31.2 159
GDP per capita 31.6 13.5 8.0 91.4 562
Unemployment rate 8.9 4.3 1.0 27.5 528
Population 15-65 67.1 1.8 61.4 72.2 572
Population 65 plus 15.5 2.4 10.0 22.4 572
Union density 35.3 21.6 2.4 93.9 486
Capital formation growth 2.9 10.6 -41.7 49.8 554
Education 24.3 8.7 6.1 45.9 434
Export share 50.2 30.7 14.0 222.7 563
Inflation 8.5 53.5 -4.5 951.7 558
Poverty working 7.0 3.1 2.8 15.1 236
Poverty 1865 8.6 2.8 3.6 16.5 315
Gini 1865 0.29 0.4 0.21 0.39 317
Poverty 60% 16.1 3.6 7.9 26.2 290
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Table A.5.3: Total public social expenditure on Gini: base results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.0006 −0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0060∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005)
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.0008 0.0003 −0.0021∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.0015∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0008 0.0009∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.0025 −0.0132∗∗∗ −0.0024 −0.0035∗ −0.0019
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0019)
Population 65 plus (t-1) 0.0021 0.0022 −0.0015 −0.0030∗∗ −0.0012
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Union density (t-1) −0.0007∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0005∗ −0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component No No No No No Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust PCSE
Observations 303 275 275 275 270 275
R-squared 0.161 0.537 0.706 0.952 0.4657 0.9634
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 21 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Table A.5.4: Total public social expenditure on GDP growth: base results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.120∗∗ −0.126∗∗ −0.088∗∗ 0.019 0.072 0.142
(0.051) (0.056) (0.043) (0.109) (0.071) (0.102)
Cap. for. gr. (t-1) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Education (t-1) −0.032 −0.019 −0.015 −0.027 −0.006
(0.023) (0.024) (0.087) (0.049) (0.056)
Export (t-1) 0.003 0.011 0.062∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.031) (0.021) (0.028)
Inflation (t-1) −0.219∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.096∗
(0.079) (0.064) (0.071) (0.049) (0.057)
Pop. 15-64 (t-1) −0.290∗∗ −0.171 −0.272 −0.236∗ −0.118
(0.113) (0.161) (0.276) (0.137) (0.261)
Pop. 65 plus (t-1) −0.474∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ −0.300 −0.300∗ −0.222
(0.073) (0.124) (0.332) (0.170) (0.293)
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
C. fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component No No No No No Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust PCSE
Observations 513 406 406 406 401 406
R-squared 0.063 0.265 0.576 0.655 0.564 0.610
Numb. of countries 22 22 22 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.5: Estimation results of different categories of so-
cial expenditure on poverty, inequality and
GDP growth: One social expenditure category
in the model at a time
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Old age and Survivor SE (t-1) −0.226 −0.0060∗∗∗ 0.280
(0.151) (0.0010) (0.232)
Incapacity SE (t-1) −0.366 −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.015
(0.324) (0.0018) (0.308)
Health SE (t-1) −0.181 −0.0009 0.105
(0.177) (0.0016) (0.221)
Family SE (t-1) −1.430∗∗∗ −0.0124∗∗∗ 0.740
(0.205) (0.0031) (0.471)
Unemployment and ALMPS SE (t-1) −0.808∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.133) (0.0014) (0.241)
Housing and Others SE (t-1) −0.992∗∗ 0.0032 1.243∗∗
(0.400) (0.0036) (0.576)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 275 275-277 403-409
Number of countries 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.6: Estimation results of total public and mandatory
private social expenditure on poverty, inequality
and GDP growth
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Total public and mandatory private SE (t-1) −0.308∗∗∗ −0.0030∗∗∗ 0.138
(0.068) (0.0004) (0.099)
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.134∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.0004)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.033 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.0002)
Union density (t-1) −0.101∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.0002)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.297∗ −0.0017 −0.116
(0.172) (0.0018) (0.261)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.282∗ −0.0016 −0.202
(0.147) (0.0013) (0.290)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 275 275 406
R-squared 0.922 0.9643 0.610
Number of countries 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.7: Estimation results of total public and private
social expenditure on poverty, inequality
and GDP growth
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Total public and private SE (t-1) −0.320∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ 0.163
(0.074) (0.0005) (0.106
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.132∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.0004)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.046 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.0002)
Union density (t-1) −0.100∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗
(0.017) (0.0003)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.251 −0.0015 −0.108
(0.165) (0.0020) (0.256)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.236∗ −0.0013 −0.201
(0.135) (0.0014) (0.290)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 275 275 406
R-squared 0.921 0.9643 0.612
Number of countries 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.8: Estimation results of NET public social ex-
penditure on poverty, inequality and GDP
growth
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Net public social expenditure (t-1) −0.298∗∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.065
(0.107) (0.0003) (0.147)
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.182∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.0007)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.007 0.0009∗
(0.034) (0.0004)
Union density (t-1) −0.110∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.0003)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.041 0.0001 −1.095∗
(0.211) (0.0012) (0.578)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.063 −0.0011 −0.262
(0.243) (0.0014) (0.363)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 105 105 136
R-squared 0.932 0.9728 0.760
Number of countries 17 17 21
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.9: Estimation results of NET total social ex-
penditure on poverty, inequality and GDP
growth
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Net total social expenditure −0.271∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.102) (0.0003) (0.154)
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.191∗∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.0007)
Unemployment rate (t-1) −0.005 0.0007
(0.037) (0.0005)
Union density (t-1) −0.122∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.0004)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.118 −0.0010 −1.032∗
(0.228) (0.0017) (0.594)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.134 −0.0019 −0.226
(0.270) (0.0017) (0.380)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 105 105 136
R-squared 0.929 0.9643 0.759
Number of countries 17 17 21
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.10: Estimation results of total pubic social ex-
penditure on poverty, inequality and GDP
growth: OECD countries
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.239∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.043) (0.0005) (0.060)
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.098∗∗ 0.0003
(0.049) (0.0007)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.044 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.0002)
Union density (t-1) −0.073∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.018) (0.0002)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.177 −0.0024∗∗ −0.053
(0.119) (0.0011) (0.152)
Population 65 plus (t-1) 0.001 −0.0004 −0.052
(0.101) (0.0009) (0.185)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 382 382 595
R-squared 0.953 0.9794 0.589
Number of countries 32 32 33
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.11: Estimation results of different social expen-
diture categories on poverty, inequality and
GDP growth: OECD countries
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Old age and Survivor SE (t-1) −0.165 −0.0023∗∗∗ 0.238
(0.103) (0.0008) (0.214)
Incapacity SE (t-1) −0.004 −0.0008 0.118
(0.213) (0.0022) (0.174)
Health SE (t-1) −0.031 0.0015 0.025
(0.066) (0.0010) (0.120)
Family SE (t-1) −1.044∗∗∗ −0.0115∗∗∗ 0.235
(0.156) (0.0032) (0.285)
Unemployment and ALMPS SE (t-1) −0.428∗∗∗ −0.0023∗ −0.239
(0.142) (0.0013) (0.212)
Housing and Others SE (t-1) −0.528∗∗∗ −0.0021 0.486
(0.181) (0.0034) (0.466)
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.152∗∗∗ −0.0003
(0.046) (0.0006)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.039 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.0002)
Union density (t-1) −0.078∗∗∗ 0.0000
(0.017) (0.0002)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.125 −0.0013 −0.150
(0.099) (0.0014) (0.171)
Population 65 plus (t-1) 0.005 0.0007 −0.152
(0.093) (0.0011) (0.236)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 372 372 552
R-squared 0.956 0.9793 0.601
Number of countries 31 31 31
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.12: Estimation results of total pubic social expen-
diture on poverty, inequality and GDP growth:
OECD countries : One social expenditure cat-
egory in the model at a time
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Old age and Survivor SE (t-1) −0.147 −0.0022∗∗∗ 0.320
(0.112) (0.0008) (0.196)
Incapacity SE (t-1) −0.421∗∗ −0.0043∗∗ 0.175
(0.201) (0.0018) (0.146)
Health SE (t-1) −0.143∗ 0.0004 0.108
(0.080) (0.0011) (0.113)
Family SE (t-1) −1.222∗∗∗ −0.0119∗∗∗ 0.300
(0.147) (0.0030) (0.264)
Unemployment and ALMPS SE (t-1) −0.729∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.117) (0.0011) (0.170)
Housing SE −1.690∗∗∗ −0.0074 0.205
(0.263) (0.0079) (0.922)
Others SE −0.485∗∗ −0.0003 0.824∗∗
(0.246) (0.0032) (0.407)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 372-384 372-382 573-598
Number of countries 31-32 31-32 32-33
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.13: Estimation results of total pubic social ex-
penditure on poverty, inequality and GDP
growth: Years 2008-2015
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.210∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗ 0.235
(0.073) (0.0005) (0.194)
GDP per capita (t-1) −0.176∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.0006)
Unemployment rate (t-1) −0.014 −0.0000
(0.030) (0.0001)
Union density (t-1) 0.035 0.0008
(0.034) (0.0006)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.467∗∗∗ 0.0000 −1.602∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.0015) (0.433)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.566∗∗∗ 0.0008 −0.988
(0.143) (0.0033) (0.610)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 133 133 154
R-squared 0.967 0.9800 0.697
Number of countries 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.14: Estimation results of total pubic social ex-
penditure on poverty, inequality and GDP
growth: Years 1990-2007
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Gini GDP growth
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.187 −0.0046∗∗∗ 0.090
(0.130) (0.0012) (0.147)
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.229 0.0010
(0.353) (0.0030)
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.131 0.0020∗∗
(0.139) (0.0010)
Union density (t-1) −0.114∗∗ −0.0001
(0.054) (0.0007)
Population 15-64 (t-1) −0.602 −0.0057 0.003
(0.506) (0.0051) (0.284)
Population 65 plus (t-1) −0.019 0.0020 0.147
(0.304) (0.0029) (0.394)








Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors Robust Robust PCSE
Observations 124 124 230
R-squared 0.709
Number of countries 21 21 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.15: Different categories of social expenditure on poverty among
working population and poverty and inequality among work-
ing age population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Gini Gini
Working Working 18-65 18-65 18-65 18-65
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.068 −0.237∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.035) (0.0008)
Old & Surv. SE (t-1) −0.231 −0.110∗ −0.0054 ∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.058) (0.0009)
Incapacity SE (t-1) 1.056∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ −0.0001
(0.188) (0.113) (0.0023)
Health SE (t-1) 0.078 0.067 −0.0005
(0.186) (0.046) (0.0009)
Family SE (t-1) −0.439 −0.681∗∗∗ −0.0092 ∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.147) (0.0036)
Un. & almps SE (t-1) −0.456∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.0022
(0.182) (0.133) (0.0022)
Hous. & oth. SE (t-1) −1.657∗∗∗ −0.752∗∗∗ 0.0016
(0.632) (0.205) (0.0026)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE
Observations 213 213 273 273 275 275
R-squared 0.803 0.817 0.930 0.939 0.965 0.969
Number of countries 21 21 22 22 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.16: Different categories of social ex-




60% line 60% line
Total pubic SE (t-1) −0.570∗∗∗
(0.080)
Old age and Survivor SE (t-1) −0.504∗∗∗
(0.168)
Incapacity SE (t-1) 0.180
(0.336)
Health SE (t-1) −0.208
(0.150)
Family SE (t-1) −1.851∗∗∗
(0.213)
Unemployment and ALMPS SE (t-1) −0.676∗∗∗
(0.146)
Housing and Others SE (t-1) −0.670
(0.482)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE
Observations 258 258
R-squared 0.938 0.943
Number of countries 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and ***
at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.17: Total public social expenditure on poverty: different lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Total public SE −0.370 ∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ −0.339 ∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.107) (0.105) (0.102) (0.099) (0.101)
GDP per capita −0.178∗∗ −0.162 −0.197 0.031 −0.017 −0.146
(0.087) (0.117) (0.124) (0.071) (0.101) (0.120)
Unemployment rate 0.048 0.032 0.030 0.108∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.078
(0.073) (0.072) (0.053) (0.042) (0.052) (0.066)
Population 15-64 −0.070 −0.275 −0.476 −0.608∗ −0.591∗ −0.611∗
(0.250) (0.272) (0.301) (0.337) (0.343) (0.325)
Population 65 plus −0.018 −0.209 −0.393 −0.424 −0.538∗ −0.618∗
(0.181) (0.160) (0.247) (0.270) (0.289) (0.320)
Union density −0.090∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −0.081 −0.078∗ −0.072
(0.047) (0.038) (0.053) (0.049) (0.042) (0.048)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
Lag 0 1 2 3 4 5
Observations 282 275 273 265 264 250
R-squared 0.916 0.926 0.926 0.930 0.922 0.922
Number of countries 22 22 22 21 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Table A.5.18: Total public social expenditure on Gini: different lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
Total public SE −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0019∗
−0,001) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010)
GDP per capita −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ −0.0022∗∗ −0.0007 −0.0005 −0.0017
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Unemployment rate 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 0.0013∗∗ 0.0012∗∗ 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Population 15-64 −0.0013 −0.0024 −0.0047∗ −0.0051∗ −0.0070∗∗ −0.0075∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Population 65 plus 0.0006 −0.0015 −0.0033 −0.0037 −0.0064∗∗ −0.0067∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0032)
Union density −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0008 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0011∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
Lag 0 1 2 3 4 5
Observations 282 275 273 265 264 250
R-squared 0.950 0.952 0.951 0.953 0.95 0.952
Number of countries 22 22 22 21 22 22
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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Table A.5.19: Total public social expenditure on GDP growth: different lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth
Total public SE −0.123 0.142 0.104 0.060 0.133 0.277∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.102) (0.116) (0.104) (0.089) (0.089)
Cap. for. gr. 0.047∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.010 −0.011 0.009 −0.004
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Education 0.007 −0.006 0.020 0.013 0.011 −0.011
(0.050) (0.056) (0.070) (0.063) (0.054) (0.051)
Export 0.048∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.026 0.014 0.039 0.030
(0.023) (0.028) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030)
Inflation −0.129∗∗ −0.096∗ 0.028 0.013 −0.055 −0.043
(0.053) (0.057) (0.064) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053)
Pop. 15-64 −0.231 −0.118 0.016 −0.134 −0.360 −0.297
(0.211) (0.261) (0.303) (0.274) (0.229) (0.249)
Pop. 65 plus −0.172 −0.222 −0.035 −0.247 −0.481 −0.622∗∗
(0.236) (0.293) (0.358) (0.329) (0.316) (0.303)
1-13 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ar1 component Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE
Lags 0 1 2 3 4 5
Observations 427 406 384 362 340 318
R-squared 0.681 0.610 0.585 0.597 0.618 0.633
Num. of countries 22 22 22 22 22 22
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Onderzoek naar economische effecten van sociale zekerheid
In ontwikkelde economieën wordt tussen de 20% en 30% van het bruto
binnenlands product (bbp) uitgegeven aan pensioenen, gezondheidszorg
en uitkeringen gericht op ouderen, werklozen, gehandicapten, zieken,
gezinnen en armen. Om deze uitgaven op een doelgerichte en kosteneffici-
ënte manier te doen is het nodig om de economische effecten van sociale
zekerheid in kaart te brengen. Aan de ene kant is het relevant of de be-
oogde doelen van sociale zekerheid worden bereikt, zoals het beschermen
van mensen tegen inkomensschokken. Aan de andere kant kan sociale
zekerheid gepaard gaan met onwenselijke gedragseffecten, bijvoorbeeld
dat werklozen door een uitkering mogelijk minder hard zoeken naar een
nieuwe baan.
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de literatuur over sociale zekerheid door
bestudering van enkele beoogde effecten en enkele mogelijke onwenselijke
effecten. We beginnen in hoofdstuk 1 met een kort overzicht van de doel-
stellingen van sociale zekerheid, waarna we bespreken welke negatieve
gedragseffecten sociale zekerheid kan hebben. We bestuderen vervolgens
een aantal van deze positieve en negatieve effecten van sociale zekerheid
in de hoofdstukken 2 t/m 5.
Sociale zekerheid is bedoeld om mensen te beschermen tegen nega-
tieve inkomensschokken veroorzaakt door werkloosheid, arbeidsonge-
schiktheid, ziekte en ouderdom (Barr 2012). In principe is dit welzijn
verhogend omdat mensen risico avers zijn en er onzekerheid bestaat over
het toekomstige inkomen. Risico-aversie houdt in dat een verhoging van
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het inkomensrisico het verwachte nut verlaagt vanwege afnemend margi-
naal nut van consumptie.6 Sociale verzekeringen helpen om het inkomen
over de levenscyclus en over ‘goede’ en ‘slechte’ periodes te spreiden.
Daarmee vermindert het risico’s en verhoogt het totale nut dat over het
hele leven wordt afgeleid. Dit geldt in het bijzonder voor mensen met
liquiditeitsbeperkingen, die minder mogelijkheden hebben om hun con-
sumptiepatroon te laten afwijken van hun inkomstenpatroon (Chetty 2008)
en voor mensen met inconsistente voorkeuren die het heden bevoordelen
ten opzichte van de toekomst en daardoor te weinig sparen (Thaler and
Shefrin 1981). Bovendien kunnen sociale verzekeringen de welvaart ver-
hogen omdat mensen verlies-avers zijn (bv. Kahneman et al. (1991)) en
inkomensverliezen worden verminderd door sociale verzekeringen.7
In een breder perspectief is sociale zekerheid gericht op het vermin-
deren van armoede en ongelijkheid en in sommige gevallen op het laten
stijgen van de werkgelegenheid (Barr 2012). Het terugdringen van ar-
moede en ongelijkheid kan de welvaart en productiviteit onder arme
mensen vergroten (Baldacci et al. 2008; Cingano 2014; OECD 2014). Boven-
dien zal naar verwachting het verkleinen van de ongelijkheid het aantal
rent-seeking activiteiten doen afnemen (Stiglitz 2012).8 Verder kunnen
uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid de ongelijkheid verkleinen en zorgen voor
meer macro-economische stabiliteit. Dit kan ook leiden tot een toename
van de politieke en sociale stabiliteit (Rodrik 1999; Kumhof et al. 2015).
Tenslotte kan sociale zekerheid positieve gedragseffecten veroorzaken.
Inkomenszekerheid kan het nemen van risico’s, investeringen en daarmee
de productiviteit verhogen (Acemoglu and Shimer 2000; Estevez-Abe et al.
2001).
Sociale zekerheid kan echter ook ongewenste gedragseffecten veroorza-
ken. Sociale zekerheid verschuift een deel van de kosten die gepaard gaan
6Afnemend marginaal nut van consumptie betekent dat mensen een hoger marginaal
nut halen uit een extra eenheid consumptie bij een lager niveau van consumptie.
7Verlies-avers verwijst naar de neiging van mensen om het voorkomen van een verlies
te verkiezen boven het verwerven van een gelijkwaardig voordeel.
8Rent-seeking verwijst naar middelen die (door de rijken) worden besteed aan het
vergroten van hun aandeel in de welvaart zonder welvaart te creëren. Rent-seeking
resulteert in minder economische efficiëntie door een slechte toewijzing van midde-





met bepaald gedrag (bijvoorbeeld het nemen van risico’s) naar anderen.
Dit genereert een discrepantie tussen de individuele kosten en baten en
de maatschappelijke kosten en baten. Mensen hebben de neiging om
vanuit maarschappelijk perspectief te veel vrije tijd (of consumptie) te
kiezen wanneer een deel van de kosten van vrije tijd (of consumptie) door
anderen worden gedragen (Chetty 2008; Chetty and Finkelstein 2013). Dit
inefficiënte gedrag wordt ook wel moreel risico genoemd. Voorbeelden
van moreel risico veroorzaakt door sociale zekerheid zijn: verminderingen
in het zoeken naar werk vanwege werkloosheidsuitkeringen (bijv. Krueger
and Meyer (2002)) en vroegpensioen vanwege voordelen bij vervroegde
uittreding (bv. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013)). Een ander verstorend effect
ontstaat uit belastingen die nodig zijn om sociale zekerheid te financieren.
Deze belastingen kunnen het arbeidsaanbod en particuliere investeringen
verminderen, wat kan leiden tot een lagere welvaart.
In de hoofdstukken 2 t/m 5 bestuderen we zowel het behalen van
een aantal van de beoogde doelstellingen van sociale zekerheid, evenals
mogelijke negatieve gedragseffecten die door sociale zekerheid kunnen
worden veroorzaakt. Kortom, we beschouwen de verzorgingsstaat vanuit
verschillende perspectieven, met een focus op zowel het herverdelende
effect van sociale zekerheid als de werkgelegenheidseffecten van sociale
zekerheid.
Het tweede hoofdstuk gaat over het voorkomen van NEET’s, jonge-
ren die niet werken en geen onderwijs of training volgen (NEET= Not
in Employment, Education or Training). Het voorkomen van NEET’s
heeft prioriteit bij beleidsmakers, met name tijdens recessies. NEET’s zijn
bijvoorbeeld een belangrijk punt van zorg voor de Europese Commissie
(Carcillo et al. 2015). Deze aandacht voor het voorkomen en terugdringen
van het aantal NEET’s gaat samen met een andere beleidstrend, namelijk
die van strengere voorwaarden voor het recht op bijstand, bijvoorbeeld
door een strengere baanzoekplicht of het verplicht verrichten van tegen-
prestaties.
We bestuderen de effecten van verplichte activeringsprogramma’s voor
jongeren in de bijstand op het percentage NEET’s tijdens een diepe eco-
nomische recessie. Om precies te zijn bestuderen we de Wet Investeren
in Jongeren (WIJ) hervorming. Deze hervorming is in 2009 ingevoerd
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in Nederland, net na het begin van de Grote Recessie. Het doel van de
WIJ hervorming was om het aantal jonge NEET’s te verminderen. Voor
dit doel werd de ontvangst van de bijstand voor jongeren tot 27 jaar oud
afhankelijk gemaakt van deelname in zogenaamde ‘werk-leertrajecten’.
Dit onderzoek beantwoordt de volgende vraag: “Wat is het effect van
verplichte activeringsprogramma’s voor jongeren in de bijstand op de NEET’s
tijdens de grote economische recessie?"We beschouwen de effecten van de WIJ-
hervorming op de belangrijkste uitkomst variabelen: NEET’s met bijstand,
NEET’s zonder bijstand, totale aandeel NEET’s, de werkgelegenheid en
scholing.
We gebruiken de methodes differences-in-differences en regression discon-
tinuity om de causale effecten van de WIJ-hervorming te schatten. We
maken hiervoor gebruik van het ‘Arbeidsmarktpanel’ van het CBS, dat
een steekproef van 1,2 miljoen personen volgt over de periode 1999-2012.
Voor deze personen beschikken we over arbeidsmarktuitkomsten en over
een groot aantal individuele en huishoudens kenmerken. We bestuderen
de effecten voor drie verschillende leeftijdsgroepen, 20-22, 23-24 en 25-26
jaar, terwijl onze basis controlegroep bestaat uit personen van 27-28 jaar.
Een belangrijke uitdaging in de empirische analyse is om te controleren
voor mogelijke verschillende tijdseffecten tussen de behandel- en controle-
groep, als gevolg van bijvoorbeeld verschillende trends of verschillende
conjunctuurreacties (Bell en Blanchflower 2011). In ons voorkeursmodel
controleren we voor verschillen in conjunctuurpatronen door interactie tus-
sen leeftijd en het werkloosheidspercentage en daarnaast voor jaareffecten,
leeftijdseffecten, specifieke trends voor leeftijd en voor de demografische
kenmerken. We presenteren ook een uitgebreide placebo-analyse, inclusief
placebo effecten voor de jaren voorafgaand aan de hervorming en placebo
effecten voor de eerdere economische crisis in 2002-2004.
Onze belangrijkste bevindingen zijn als volgt. De WIJ-hervorming
heeft niet het beoogde effect gehad om het totale aantal NEET’s te ver-
minderen. Wel nam het aantal NEET’s met een bijstandsuitkering door
de WIJ af met maar liefst 24% in de leeftijdscategorie 25-26 jaar, de enige
behandelingsgroep die alle placebotesten doorstaat. Daar stond echter
een in omvang vergelijkbare toename tegenover van NEET’s zonder bij-




volgen van onderwijs. Een plausibele verklaring hiervoor is dat de WIJ-
hervorming werd ingevoerd toen de Grote Recessie net was begonnen,
een periode waarin het vooral voor jongeren moeilijk was om werk te
vinden. Verder laat onze analyse zien dat het belangrijk kan zijn in een
differences-in-differences analyse om te controleren voor verschillen in trends
bij het bestuderen van een hervorming die zich richt op jonge mensen en
die wat oudere personen gebruikt als controlegroep. Dit is belangrijk om
het effect te vinden op bepaalde uitkomstvariabelen zoals deelname aan
onderwijs. Tot slot laten we zien dat standaard placebo dummies voor de
jaren vóór de hervorming niet altijd in staat zijn om de aanname van de
gelijke tijdseffecten te verwerpen.
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we onderzoek gedaan naar het Added Worker
Effect. Sinds het begin van de Grote Recessie is de belangstelling van
beleidsmakers en academici toegenomen voor het effect van werkloos-
heidsschokken op het arbeidsaanbod van de partners van werklozen, ook
wel bekend als het Added Worker Effect (hierna: AWE). De empirische
literatuur vindt in het algemeen een klein AWE, zie bijvoorbeeld Hardoy
and Schøne (2014), Halla et al. (2018) and Bredtmann et al. (2018) voor
recente bijdragen. Twee openstaande vragen zijn of het AWE belangrij-
ker is geworden sinds het begin van de Grote Recessie en of het AWE
is afgenomen over de tijd doordat de participatiegraad van vrouwen is
toegenomen. Door een hogere participatiegraad blijft er immers minder
ruimte over voor de toename van het arbeidsaanbod na het werkloos raken
van de partner.
We focussen in dit hoofdstuk op de volgende vraag: “Hoe veranderde
het Added Worker Effect over de jaren en over de conjunctuurcyclus in Nederland
tijdens de periode 2003-2015?"Om meer inzicht te krijgen in de relatie tussen
het AWE en de conjunctuurcyclus bestuderen we het AWE voor vrouwen
van wie de mannelijke partner werkloos raakte in de jaren voor en tijdens
de Grote Recessie.
We bestuderen het AWE met de nieuwe versie van het ‘Arbeidsmarkt-
panel’ van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2017). Deze nieuwe
versie van het Arbeidsmarktpanel volgt de arbeidsmarktuitkomsten van
1,8 miljoen Nederlanders voor de periode 1999-2015, evenals het gebruik
van sociale zekerheid. Onze onderzoeksstrategie vergelijkt huishoudens
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met mannelijke partners die werkloos raakten met huishoudens met man-
nelijke partners die niet werkloos raakten in een gegeven jaar. Met een
differences-indifferences analyse met individuele fixed effects, schatten we
de impact van een werkloosheidsschok van mannelijke partners in een
bepaald jaar op het inkomen uit werk en de verkregen winst uit zelfstan-
digheid van beide partners, als ook de inkomsten uit de werkloosheidsver-
zekering (WW) en andere sociale uitkeringen. Dit wordt allemaal gemeten
over een tijdsperiode van 2 jaar vóór het jaar dat de behandelgroep in de
WW terecht komt tot 3 jaar na het jaar dat de behandelgroep in de WW
terecht kwam. Door verschillende referentiejaren te nemen voor de werk-
loosheidsschokken van cohorten in onze steekproef kunnen we bestuderen
hoe de effecten variëren over de conjunctuur en hoe deze veranderen over
de tijd.
Onze belangrijkste bevindingen zijn als volgt. Ten eerste vinden we
dat de werkloosheidsschok van een mannelijke partner, waardoor het
bruto-inkomen 20 tot 30 duizend euro daalt, een klein positief statistisch
significant AWE teweegbrengt van 2-5% (500-1.000 euro). Dit AWE is klein
en niet statistisch significant tijdens de eerste jaren van de Grote Recessie
(2008-2009). We vinden zowel intensieve (uitbreiding uren) als extensieve
(toename van aantal werkenden) marge effecten voor het AWE. De afname
van het AWE wordt in het begin van de Grote Recessie vooral gedreven
door een afname van het intensieve marge effect, terwijl het extensieve
marge effect is afgenomen over de tijd. Verder is er een AWE van ongeveer
2% (500 euro) uit winst uit zelfstandigheid. Tot slot compenseren werkloos
geraakte mannen een steeds groter deel van het inkomensverlies met
winst uit zelfstandigheid. Dit neemt toe van ongeveer 2000 euro 3 jaar
na werkloos raken in 2004 tot ongeveer 4500 euro 3 jaar na het werkloos
raken in 2012.
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over de effecten van een grondwettelijk recht op
sociale zekerheid (Constitutional Commitment to Social Security, hierna:
CCSS). In de afgelopen decennia hebben politici en academici het belang
van sociale grondrechten benadrukt voor sociale en economische ontwik-
keling (Townsend 2007; ILO 2014). Het belangrijkste argument voor een
op rechten gebaseerde benadering van sociale zekerheid is dat het een




gelijk recht zijn mensen afhankelijk van de ’goede wil’ van de huidige
regering voor goed onderwijs, gezondheidszorg en sociale zekerheid. In
theorie kan de grondwet een belangrijke rol spelen voor sociale rechten,
aangezien de grondwet voor iedereen geldt en bescherming biedt aan
minderheden. Echter, het aantal empirische studies over het effect van
sociale grondrechten zijn beperkt.
Wij dragen bij aan deze literatuur door het beantwoorden van volgende
vraag: “Wat is het effect van een grondwettelijk recht op sociale zekerheid op
verschillende soorten uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid?". Allereerst zijn we geïn-
teresseerd in het effect van een grondwettelijk recht op sociale zekerheid
op de totale sociale uitgaven, waaruit blijkt dat CCSS een positief effect
heeft op uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid. Ten tweede onderzoeken we of
het effect van CCSS het grootst is voor sociale uitgavenregelingen gericht
op groepen die door de publieke opinie gezien worden als groepen die
minder steun verdienen. We verwachten een groter effect van CCSS op
deze sociale-uitgavenregelingen als de mediane stemmer minder belang
hecht aan deze sociale-uitgavenregelingen, waardoor een grotere rol voor
de grondwet is weggelegd.
We gebruiken een paneldataset voor 17 EU-landen van 1990 tot 2012.
De gegevens over uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid als percentage van het
bbp zijn afkomstig van de Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) van de
OESO. Voor CCSS gebruiken we de indicator ontwikkeld door Ben Bassat
en Dahan (2018), die we als 0 of 1 definiëren, afhankelijk van de aan-
wezigheid van een grondwettelijke bepaling over de steun aan ouderen,
nabestaanden, gehandicapten, werklozen, zieken of armen. We gebruiken
OLS-modellen, 2SLS-regressiemodellen en het Heckman tweestappenmo-
del met de rigiditeit van de grondwet als een instrumentele variabele, om
te corrigeren voor mogelijke endogeniteit en om het effect te schatten van
CCSS op de verschillende uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid. In lijn met onze
verwachtingen, heeft de rigiditeit van de grondwet een positief effect op
CCSS, wat aangeeft dat ons instrument relevant is.
Onze belangrijkste bevindingen zijn als volgt. Ten eerste vinden we
een positief significant effect van CCSS op de totale uitgaven aan sociale
zekerheid van 3,8 procentpunten. CCSS heeft een positief effect op de
uitgaven aan ouderen, nabestaanden, arbeidsongeschikten, werklozen en
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op actief arbeidsmarktbeleid. Ten tweede vinden we de meest omvangrijke
effecten, uitgedrukt als een percentage van de gemiddelde bestedingen,
voor uitgaven voor aan werklozen en actief arbeidsmarktbeleid. Dit zijn de
uitgavenregelingen gericht op mensen die door de publieke opinie gezien
worden als een groep die minder steun verdient dan bijvoorbeeld ouderen
en gehandicapten (Blekesaune en Quadagno 2003; Van Oorschot 2006). Ten
derde is er geen positief effect op sociale uitgaven aan gezondheidszorg en
gezinnen. Deze uitgaven worden niet gedekt door de definitie van CCSS.
Dit suggereert dat het positieve effect op uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid
daadwerkelijk wordt verklaard door CCSS en niet wordt veroorzaakt door
een positieve houding tegenover herverdeling.
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over de relatie tussen verschillende sociale uitgavenre-
gelingen en armoede, ongelijkheid en bbp-groei. Sinds Piketty (2014) zijn
werk over inkomensongelijkheid heeft gepubliceerd is er een heropleving
van het publieke en academische debat over inkomens- en vermogenson-
gelijkheid. Dit debat wordt versterkt door de opkomst van populistische
bewegingen. Beleidsmakers en academici hebben lang gedacht dat er een
afruil bestaat tussen het verkleinen van inkomensongelijkheid en het ver-
groten van economische groei (Kaldor 1957; Okun 1975; Lazear and Rosen
1981; Benabou 2000; Arjona et al. 2003). Meer recente studies betwisten
dit en vinden een negatieve associatie tussen inkomensongelijkheid en
economische groei (Persson and Tabellini 1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994;
Perotti 1996; Easterly 2007; OECD 2014; Dabla-Norris et al. 2015). Boven-
dien laat recent empirische onderzoek zien dat herverdeling niet negatief
samenhangt met economische groei (Thewissen 2013; Ostry et al. 2014).
Niettemin is herverdeling een breed concept en verschillende soorten
herverdeling, vertaald in verschillende soorten sociale uitgaven, hebben
verschillende gevolgen voor armoede, ongelijkheid en economische groei.
Daarom concentreren we ons in dit hoofdstuk op de vraag: “Hoe hangen
verschillende soorten uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid samen met armoede, ongelijk-
heid en economische groei?”. Allereerst onderzoeken we hoe sociale uitgaven
op geaggregeerd niveau samenhangen met armoede, ongelijkheid en de
groei van het bbp. Deze analyse biedt inzichten in de potentiële afruil
tussen het verkleinen van de armoede en ongelijkheid aan de ene kant




relaties verschillen voor sociale uitgaven aan 1) ouderen en nabestaanden-
pensioenen, 2) arbeidsongeschiktheid, 3) gezondheidszorg, 4) gezinnen, 5)
werklozen en actief arbeidsmarktbeleid en 6) huisvesting en overige. Deze
analyse toont het belang van de verschillende soorten uitgaven voor het
verkleinen van armoede en ongelijkheid en hoe de verschillende soorten
uitgaven samenhangen met de economische groei.
We gebruiken een paneldataset van 22 EU-landen voor de jaren 1990-
2015 voor onze basisresultaten en een paneldataset van 32 OESO-landen
in onze robuustheidsanalyse. De gegevens zijn afkomstig uit verschillende
OESO-databases. We maken gebruik van OLS en 2SLS regressiemodellen
waarin we de vertraagde waarden van de verschillende variabelen voor
sociale uitgaven gebruiken als verklarende variabelen. We nemen sociale
uitgaven in periode (t-1) omdat de sociale uitgaven zelf ook kunnen
worden beïnvloed door economische groei en mogelijk ook door armoede
en ongelijkheid.
In ons 2SLS-model gebruiken we de variabelen voor sociale uitga-
ven in periode (t-2) als instrumentele variabele. Ons voorkeursmodel
is een OLS-model waarin we corrigeren voor seriële correlatie door het
toevoegen van een autoregressieve error component en controleren voor
demografische, economische en institutionele verschillen, als ook voor fixed
effects voor landen en jaren. Daarnaast hanteren we panel gecorrigeerde
standaardfouten.
Onze belangrijkste bevindingen zijn als volgt. Ten eerste vinden we dat
hogere uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid samenhangen met minder armoede
en een kleinere ongelijkheid en dat uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid niet
gerelateerd zijn aan bbp-groei. Daarom lijkt er geen afruil te bestaan
tussen het verminderen van armoede en ongelijkheid enerzijds en ho-
gere economische groei aan de andere kant. Ten tweede, de relaties met
armoede, ongelijkheid en economische groei verschillen aanzienlijk tus-
sen de verschillende sociale uitgavenregelingen, waardoor beleidsmakers
verschillende sociale uitgavenregelingen kunnen gebruiken voor verschil-
lende doelen. Voor armoede vinden we de sterkste negatieve relaties met
gezinsuitgaven, werkloosheidsuitkeringen, actief arbeidsmarktbeleid, huis-
vesting en overige (vooral sociale bijstand). Voor ongelijkheid vinden we
een sterk negatief verband met sociale uitgaven aan ouderen, nabestaan-
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denpensioenen en gezinnen. Tenslotte is er een sterke positieve relatie
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Social protection aims to protect individuals against negative income shocks 
and to reduce poverty and inequality. In developed economies, no less 
than 20-30% of GDP is spent on social protection, such as pensions, public 
expenditure on health and benefits targeted at the elderly, unemployed, 
disabled, sick, families and the poor. In order to ensure that these 
expenditures are well-targeted and cost-efficient, we need to know the 
economic effects of social protection.
This thesis studies a number of the intended effects and potential adverse 
effects that social protection may have. It contains four empirical studies 
that answer the following questions. Are mandatory activation programs 
for young welfare recipients reducing the number of individuals Not in 
Employment, Education or Training (NEETs) during a severe economic 
recession? To what extent are income losses caused by unemployment 
shocks compensated by increases in earnings from the spouse? Does a right 
to social security in the constitution have an impact on social expenditure? 
How are different social expenditure types related to poverty, inequality 
and GDP growth? Altogether, this book considers the welfare state from 
different perspectives, with a focus on both the redistributive effects and the 
employment effects of social protection.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This study is part of 
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